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This dissertation attempts to demonstrate the relevance and significance of American 
presidents' moral arguments to their foreign policy decisions. An interpretive approach that 
treats as important what presidents say is important to them suggests that so-called 
“normative” questions about rightful intervention may represent earnest and provocative 
moral foreign policy imperatives that are the reasons for their actions. These inherently 
significant imperatives deserve empirical inquiry in the field of international relations, which 
tends to vacate moral opinions of any agency in order to fit them into generic, deterministic 
mechanisms. As a contrast to this tendency, this study analyzes the pivotal decade of the 
1890s, and in particular the major foreign-policy controversies of Grover Cleveland and 
William McKinley. What emerges from this exploration is that, even in the frenzy of his 
situation, each president deliberately sought, and argued for, a policy consistent with his 
understanding of international justice.
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In urging ratification of the United States Constitution, the American Founders ar-
gued that national security is “the most powerful director of national conduct.”1 Judgments 
about war and peace define the regime’s character and determine the extent to which a re-
public can enjoy domestic peace without degrading domestic liberty. Given the unique chal-
lenges to “nations the most attached to liberty,” they reasoned that national security depends 
on an executive office invested by a responsible individual with independent powers.2 Abra-
ham Lincoln, who harnessed and manipulated these powers with tremendous effect, encap-
sulated the inseparable connection of foreign and domestic policy when, in his Second Inau-
gural, he called the nation to seek and cherish “a just and lasting peace among ourselves and 
with all nations.”3 
While the nation’s Founders provided a timeless exhortation for all future presidents, 
history suggests that there is no timeless category of “a just and lasting peace.” There is, ra-
ther, only some particular and transient moment of peace, conditioned in part by the judg-
ments of the executive in charge of foreign policy. Presidents must navigate distinct foreign 
challenges and opportunities not by mechanically applying some axiom of a just and lasting 
                                               
1 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper No. 8. In Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Fed-
eralist Papers (Signet Classics) (Yale University Press, 2003).  
2 Federalist Papers No. 70, 72, 74–75. In Hamilton, Madison, and Jay.  
3 Abraham Lincoln, “Second Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1865. R. R. Mathisen, The Routledge Sourcebook of 




peace, but by deciding the character of their own just peace—one that advances the national 
interest in conformity with what they believe is morally right.  
To be sure, no leader acts without some laxity in moral principle. Presidents face 
powerful incentives to act according to individual or collective interests that, on their own, 
do not entail any well-considered moral beliefs. These factors constitute the impressive range 
of structural, institutional, systematic, and psychological explanations for foreign policy in 
the field of international relations (IR).  
However, these theories do not, and do not purport, to discern the complicated mix-
ture of moral and strategic justifications that constitute how a president’s self-understood 
moral opinions relate to foreign policy intentions. Most IR researchers sit at a critical height 
from their subjects, not so much listening to them as speaking about them—and doing so in 
an abstruse, foreign language. In reviewing presidents’ private and public foreign policy de-
liberations, one would search in vain to find any hint that presidents understand their judg-
ment as emerging from cognitively- or culturally-derived “heuristics,” “socialization,” or even 
“ideology.” In making judgments about diplomatic and military matters to secure the na-
tional interest, presidents do not usually speak of “Pareto efficient outcomes,” “single-peaked 
preferences,” or “symbolic interaction.”  
The task of the scientist would be easier if presidents spoke of foreign policy objec-
tives and the national interest in measurable, austere terms consistently devoid of complex, 




Trump, our era’s famous champion of unadulterated national egoism. Rising to the presi-
dency on a campaign slogan of putting “America First,” he promised to return to a politics of 
“total allegiance to the United States of America.”4 His speeches consistently inveighed 
against what he regarded as foolish national generosity, promising a new direction that ruth-
lessly exploits the spoils of military conquest, and jealously defends American sovereignty to 
the exclusion of foreigners. Trump’s rhetoric has been criticized for championing a blood-
and-soil nationalism bereft of civic creeds and moral dignity. “Too often he seems to want to 
make America great without appreciating what makes it exceptional,” noted two critics.5 
Still, even Trump’s parochial nationalism is constantly justified by him, and his administra-
tion, as one that seeks a higher good, such as by letting the nation “shine as an example for 
everyone to follow.”6 His National Security Strategy unapologetically promises a new path in 
which the “security and prosperity” of Americans “will always come first” while also repeat-
edly invoking a “principled,” uniquely American foreign policy that advances “peace and 
prosperity around the globe” and that sets a “positive example…to the world.”7 
                                               
4 Donald Trump, “Inaugural Address,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2017/01/20/us/politics/donald-trump-inauguration-speech-transcript.html. Accessed February 2018. 
5 Ramesh Ponnuru and Rich Lowry, “For Love of Country,” National Review (February 20, 2017). 
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2017/02/20/donald-trump-inauguration-speech-and-nationalism/. 
Accessed February 2018.  
6 Trump, “Inaugural Address.” 
7 Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Executive Office of The Presi-




These may be nationalistic platitudes qualified by other, moralistic platitudes. But 
the ubiquity and persistence of these latter platitudes suggest a stubborn inadequacy of es-
pousing a foreign policy homed by mere survival, calculating acquisitiveness, and national 
aggrandizement. In other words, even if these platitudes are instruments of persuasion, they 
reveal a need—whether in the speaker, the audience, or both—for an appeal to some overrid-
ing moral principles that justify foreign policy beyond a narrow, materialistic conception of 
the national interest.  
The rhetoric of moral conduct is grounded in the supposition that citizens and the 
officials representing them have the capacity and obligation to transcend perceived conven-
ience and well-being for some higher common good—whether national, global, or spiritual.8 
Questions relating to rightful intervention and the nature and obligations of international 
law have animated the most searching intellectual debates for millennia, sublimating into 
concrete matters of statecraft, diplomacy, and war. Underlying these consequential contests 
of moral imperatives is a voluntarist notion that any decision for war or peace is an elec-
tion—perhaps “the ultimate election”—and that “soldiers and statesmen have to make 
choices that are sometimes moral choices.”9  
Today, much of IR literature regards these moral controversies as “philosophic” en-
terprises, confined to IR’s small and diminishing silo of “normative theory,” or to the idle 
                                               
8 Joseph Cropsey, “The Moral Basis of International Relations,” in Political Philosophy and the Issues of Politics 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977). 
9 Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, War: Ends and Means (1989), 26; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: 




antiquarians “caught up in ‘the big questions’—what the highest nature of man ought to be, 
or what the ‘right’ state of government really is, or what ‘justice’ truly means in political 
terms.”10 Dominating the field are scientists who, equipped with “modern tools of analysis,” 
examine “what is.”11 Underlying this distinction of “is” and “ought” is the notion that any 
decision for war or peace is a product of some combination of domestic and international 
conditions. Early in the process of this inquiry, statesmen, as research subjects, lose the dig-
nity of believing, arguing, and explaining moral arguments. Rather, they are either treated as 
dupes of their (or their culture’s) inescapable ideological matrix or are said to be “us[ing] mo-
rality expediently,” that is, as a tool to advance “interests.”12  
The resulting dichotomy of “interests” and “norms” has led scholars who remain in-
terested in the moral relevance of foreign policy to wonder why “there has been a great deal 
of reticence in IR as a whole to address the ethical dimension of world politics.”13 The thor-
oughgoing empirical dismissal of moral controversies is rooted in methodological decisions 
that privilege a kind of data—clear, unambiguous, and (often) quantifiable—that are absent 
in a subject’s articulated self-explanations and public deliberations. When it comes to moral-
ity, IR theories tend to adapt the subject to their methods rather than adapt their methods to 
                                               
10 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics, 
xxii.  
11 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 14. 
12 Werner Levi, “The Relative Irrelevance of Moral Norms in International Politics,” James N. Rosenau (To-
ronto: The Free Press, 1969), 194, 197. 
13 Toni Erskine, “Normative International Relations Theory,” International relations theory: discipline and diver-




their subject—redefining, or reducing, complex political arguments into inexorable “exoge-
nous” factors neatly situated in parsimonious causal explanations. In seeking panoptic expla-
nations and the discovery of systematic patterns, such methods proceed only by first at least 
implicitly denying the existence of statesmanship. They simplify the complex by “priming” 
their subjects with antecedent assumptions of venal motives or psychological complexes. In 
some cases, their subjects’ articulated moral justifications are redefined as subjective “ration-
alizations” that are a function of a pre-tailored range of strategic interests and constraints. In 
other cases, these theories reduce decisions to manifestations of highly stylized models of stra-
tegic interaction or psycho-social processes discernible only to the trained researcher. The 
tendency to reject moral agency in questions of foreign policy, says one scholar, is a “puzzling 
feature of much International Relations scholarship.”14  
There is no point in denying the tremendous scholarly profit yielded by the method-
ological bets underpinning deterministic theories. By simplifying and organizing a wilderness 
of idiosyncratic data, “elegant definitions” of complex phenomena enable “explanatory sys-
tem[s] having only a few variables.”15 Often unacknowledged, however, are these bets’ prodi-
gious costs. As the political scientist, Morton Grodzins, put it six decades ago, “Virtuosity in 
technique…is pleasurable to behold. It may also be highly instructive.” However, theoretical 
                                               
14 Toni Erskine, “Assumptions of Moral Agency in International Relations: Responsibility Misdirected and 
Obscured,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations Locating Responsibility: The Problem of Moral 
Agency in International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal Oxford University Press, 2009), 
703.  




elegance often comes with significant self-imposed partiality toward the subject of inquiry, 
and “the scientist who defines his technique first and his problem second has placed second 
things first.”16  
This dissertation attempts to put first things first by considering the virtue of a more 
liminal, interpretive approach to analyzing the moral basis of American foreign-policy deci-
sions—one that treats as important what presidents say is important to them. This approach 
does not deny that presidents have a variety of individual, institutional, and geostrategic in-
centives to not only use their independent constitutional powers but also to “sell” a foreign 
policy to their audience—whether to Congress, the public, the press, or foreign counterparts. 
Nor does this approach refute any notion that presidents are influenced by their cultural or 
ideological environment and so may be unwittingly pursuing a policy that conforms to their 
“worldview.” A foreign policy may be directed at expanding American power, increasing do-
mestic wealth, appealing to a critical electoral base; it may also be an unwitting attempt to 
reconcile a subjective identity with some objective reality. The point is that these incentives 
and subconscious inclinations—patterns and contexts that constitute the mass of explana-
tions in IR theory—tell us nothing about a president’s specific reasons or arguments for their 
actions. As Donald Davidson explains, “Talk of patterns and contexts does not answer the 
question of how reasons explain actions, since the relevant pattern or context contains both 
                                               




reason and action.”17 In other words, even if we accept that presidents have generic inclina-
tions or incentives to act in a certain way, their actual reasons and arguments for their inten-
tions give us crucial information about their political practice. Did the President view his 
chosen policy as a matter of national necessity? Electoral advantage? Moral obligation? How-
ever useful for methodological purposes, damning statesmen’s reasons and arguments as ex 
post facto rationalizations (or exercise of “mere rhetoric”) covering some underlying desire, or 
as a byproduct of some structural determinants, is also to damn any charitable attempt to un-
derstand their reasons and arguments in the first place. It is to guarantee the empirical irrele-
vance of statesmen’s moral opinions before we find out what they are and how they relate to 
their statecraft.  
IR theory would benefit from a mode of interpretation that tries to understand ac-
tors’ intentions by empathetic analysis of their reasons. Such an intentional analysis entails 
liberation from IR’s cherished orthodoxies that preordain their subjects’ motives with apo-
deictic “microfoundations,” that is, simplified models of individual beliefs and desires. It en-
tails a stepping down from the critical heights of the social scientist, as though to ask the 
studied subject to explain his opinion and the purpose of his action. I argue that an inten-
tional analysis that listens to the answers reveals the possibility that so-called “normative” 
questions represent earnest and coherent moral foreign policy imperatives—and that these 
inherently significant imperatives deserve empirical inquiry in their own terms. 
                                               




In that spirit, this dissertation aims to show the relevance of presidents’ moral views 
in foreign policy by analyzing the pivotal decade of the 1890s, and in particular the foreign 
policies of Grover Cleveland during his second, non-consecutive term (1893–1897) and 
William McKinley’s first, and only completed, term (1897–1900). For historians and politi-
cal scientists, the waning years of the Gilded Age was a seismic transformation in American 
grand strategy, the transition of a nation enjoying splendid isolation to an ambitious global 
power with a hand in nearly every global controversy. There is no period in American history 
that better exemplifies the powerful appeal of highly deterministic explanations in account-
ing for foreign policy changes. Most prominent studies of turn-of-the-century foreign policy 
radically underplays the statesmanship of the time, attributing the shift in American grand 
strategy to long-standing pressures relating to American institutions, cultural attitudes, the 
political climate, and global changes in the balance of power.18  
Deterministic accounts are uniquely capable of cutting through a wilderness of cir-
cumstantial detail to discover important, transhistorical causal factors. These advantages 
come at the cost of presupposing that Cleveland and McKinley’s moral arguments were pre-
texts to—or, at most, subtexts of—the realization of inexorable exogenous forces. In seeking 
                                               
18 Thomas A. Bailey, “America’s Emergence as a World Power: The Myth and the Verity,” Pacific Historical 
Review 30, no. 1 (1961); Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (Holt, 1955); Richard 
Hofstadter, “Manifest Destiny and the Philippines,” America in Crisis (1952); George Frost Kennan, American 
Diplomacy, 1900–1950 (1951); Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Joseph Rhodes, The Politics 
of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests (Columbia University Press, 1999); Fareed Zakaria, 




the roots of a historic shift in grand strategy, these explanations look through a lens that pre-
clude the articulated arguments of the constitutionally empowered actors on the scene. In so 
doing, they massively underplay the discrete differences between Cleveland and McKinley 
and the profound contrast between the two presidents’ moral reasoning as it related to their 
respective foreign policies. The arguments and pronouncements of these presidents too hast-
ily fall casualty to a prior, unquestioned axiom that the utterances of leaders are superficial, 
derivative, or subnational manifestations of broader economic, cultural, or political processes.  
A more painstaking and patient textual analysis begins with taking seriously the pos-
sibility that statesmen can, and do, give reasons that are not reducible to post-hoc rationaliza-
tions, narrow strategic pretexts, or duplicitous manipulations. Such an analysis leaves open 
the possibility that moral opinions were thoughtful, not merely a witting or unwitting eluci-
dation of an “untouchable zeitgeist.”19 However flawed or intellectually inadequate, the 
moral justifications articulated by the two presidents in making foreign policy decisions were 
nevertheless sufficiently coherent to deserve the dignity of charitable interpretation.  
These are arguments that present contrasting understandings regarding the interna-
tional duties of the nation, the conditions of rightful foreign intervention and territorial ac-
quisition, the nature and limits of sovereign rights, and the connection between international 
law and human rights. As I will argue, Cleveland’s major foreign policy decisions during his 
second term—his withdrawal of the Hawaiian annexation treaty, his interposition into the 
                                               





British-Venezuela border dispute, and his vociferous resistance to intervention in Cuba—
were all anchored in a communitarian notion of international justice. He repeatedly spoke of 
the United States as a member of a family of co-equal nations living under a uniform law 
with global authority. In his view, it was precisely the great might of a global power that 
made its strategic temptations stronger, respect for the presumed sovereignty of other law-
abiding states more difficult, and demonstrated subservience to international law more 
meaningful and praiseworthy. His successor, by contrast, rejected the notion that state sover-
eignty constitutes any categorical right against forcible intervention, regardless of the pres-
ence of a direct threat. Instead, McKinley articulated a humanitarian understanding of inter-
national justice whereby a state’s legitimacy must be earned by demonstrating right conduct 
toward its citizens. In justifying his decisions to intervene in Cuba and to annex the Philip-
pines, McKinley argued that the United States may rightfully use its discretion to judge, 
monitor, and sanction violations of humanity, regardless of whether a sovereign power is 
meeting its legal obligations by communitarian standards. Even in the frenzy of the moment, 
each president thought carefully about the requirements of international justice as a means of 
securing or confirming the nation’s virtue.  
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 surveys the normative-positivist 
divide in IR that has contributed to Procrustean methodological commitments. On one side, 
a rich “normative” debate between the communitarian and humanitarian understandings of 




intervention. On the other side, a prolific positivist tradition has sought to discover the un-
derlying determinants of morality in foreign policy while dismissing the possibility or value 
in distinguishing between high moral motives and low material needs. I argue that these de-
terministic perspectives are rooted less in the requirements of scientific propriety than in the 
decidedly political (and even polemical) program of the field’s realist founders. From this 
analysis of the field I develop, in Chapter 2, an argument in favor of an interpretive analysis 
that is more flexible, less concerned with causal generalities, and more sensitive to intentions 
of decision-makers as elucidated by their stated arguments. In Chapters 3 and 4, I undertake 
a provisional, question-driven investigation into the moral basis of Cleveland’s and McKin-




Chapter 1: The Normative-Positivist Divide in International Relations 
 
In this chapter, I argue that normative theory presents thought-provoking questions 
about the conditions of rightful intervention that are relevant only if we remain open to the 
possibility that statesmen have the capacity and willingness to exercise ethical judgment. 
However, positivist IR methods do not consider the relevance of these moral questions be-
cause of their commitment to methodologies that are ill-suited to interpreting the signifi-
cance of moral opinions as presented by statesmen. Fortunately, as I argue, these methodo-
logical decisions stem less from the inescapable requirements of science than from the field’s 
political foundations in twentieth-century realism. Understanding these roots is the necessary 
first step to bridging the unhelpful divide between normative and positivist methods. 
 
THE RISE OF STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM 
In his famous 1966 essay, Martin Wight of the London School of Economics argued 
that the field of IR has failed to contribute to any serious and coherent body of moral and 
intellectual work on morality in the modern state system. According to Wight, “international 
theory is marked, not only by paucity but also by intellectual and moral poverty.”20 Wight’s 
penetrating essay illuminated the segregation of international relations into two realms: one 
small, increasingly diminished scholarly realm subjected to regime-defining questions about 
                                               




moral principles; and a second, growing, positivist approach concerned with systematizing 
patterns in interstate relations. 
This second approach is best represented by the dominance of structural theories, 
and especially neorealism, in IR theory. Neorealists described their theory as a breakthrough 
akin to the “Copernican revolution” because it finally provided an answer to the “the great 
unanswered” question of international-political studies relating to the causes of war, discov-
ering the decisive importance of system-level, as opposed to the individual- or state-level, de-
terminants of state action.21 According to neorealism's estimable representative, Kenneth 
Waltz, the anarchical nation-state system compels all states to seek survival as necessitated by 
their placement in an international system, and especially by their proximity to great powers. 
“Analysis of the consequences arising from the framework of state action” explains state be-
havior.22  
A theory resting on the constraints imposed on all states by structural determinants is 
one that rejects the utility of foreign policy studies, or of understanding international politics 
from the standpoint of statesmen or the character of regimes that they lead.23 The distribu-
tion of power in an international system “is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as 
                                               
21 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Waveland Press, 2010), 69. 
22 Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (Columbia University Press, 2001), 231. 
23 Waltz's theory rejects inquiry into leaders' intentions on the argument that, although leaders’ intentions may 
have some impact on short-term foreign policy, the national interest is driven by survival, and is the basis for 
long-term and systematic outcomes. Thus, Waltz averred: “I am writing a theory of international politics, not 
of foreign policy.” Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 175. Waltz has warned against expecting his theory to 
“explain the particular policies of states.” Waltz, 121–22; also see Waltz, “International politics is not foreign 




it is imposed by events on statesmen.”24 States are like actors in an economic market—their 
interests are fixed and “self-regarding.”25 Whereas an economist assumes players seek to max-
imize profit, the IR theorist assumes that “states seek to ensure their survival.”26 
A student of history and political theory, Waltz was aware that such an assumption is 
not a “realistic description of the impulse that lies behind every act of state.”27 Indeed, he re-
garded such assumptions about “the motivation of the actors” as “a radical simplification” of 
observable reality.28 To proceed with any theory based on a “brazenly false” assumption that 
treats men as single-minded maximizers of a single motive, “the world must be drastically 
simplified; subtleties must be rudely pushed aside, and reality must be grossly distorted.”29  
Waltz nevertheless defended the use of such a “false impression of the world,” argu-
ing that neorealism’s conceptual liberties are “made for the sake of constructing a theory.”30 
A structural theory “is not an edifice of truth and not a reproduction of reality” but a mental 
picture that can isolate certain connections in a world of “infinite materials.”31 By “moving 
away from 'reality,' not staying close to it,” neorealism can bracket innumerable variables, 
                                               
24 Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis,209. 
25 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 74, 91–92. 
26 Waltz, 91. 
27 Waltz, 92. 
28 Waltz, 91. 
29 Waltz, “Realist thought and neorealist theory,” Journal of International Affairs (1990), 31–32. 
30 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72, 91. 




achieving parsimony and elegance possible only when a theory operates at a high level of ab-
straction.32 However much violence an assumption does to reality, “the question to ask of 
the assumption, as ever, is not whether it is true but whether it is the most sensible and use-
ful one that can be made.”33 A “useful” assumption is one that leads to an explanation of reg-
ularities and continuity, and can predict international-political outcomes, “including events 
that none or few of the actors may like.”34 Waltz recognized that, just as there is no eco-
nomic market without firms, there is no international system without states. However, by 
constraining “the freedom of the units, their behavior and the outcomes of their behavior be-
come predictable.”35 By design, then, structure-based theories trade descriptive richness for 
prediction, attempting to discover the determinants of behavior that are exogenous (or exter-
nal to) individuals’ unique, contextual self-understanding and articulated justifications.36  
Waltz’s structural determinism is rooted in the broader social-scientific belief (a “be-
lief” since it is yet unproven) that “factual propositions cannot be derived from ethical ones 
by any process of reasoning, nor can ethical propositions be compared directly with the 
                                               
32 Waltz, 7. Waltz wrote that his theory “abstract[s] from every attribute of states except their capabilities.” 
Waltz, 99; see also 80. Elsewhere, Waltz wrote: “Elegant definitions of structure enable one to fashion an ex-
planatory system having only a few variables. If we add more variables, the explanatory system becomes more 
complicated…” Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics,” in Neorealism and its Critics (1986), 
330. 
33 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 91; see also 172.  
34 Waltz, 69.  
35 Waltz, 72. According to Waltz, what any state or statesman desires at any moment is empirically trivial to 
predicting how general conditions (that is, systematic constraints) relate to war. See, Man, the State, and War: A 
Theoretical Analysis,37, 40, 231–232. 
36 Michael Nicholson, “The Continued Significance of Positivism,” International theory: Positivism and beyond 
(1996), 13, 136; John Vasquez, “The Post-Positivist Debate,” in Unset International Theory: Positivism and Be-
yond, ed. K. Booth S. Smith and M. Zawelski Cambridge University Press, 1996), 230; Kenneth Waltz, Theory 




facts—since they assert ‘ought’ rather than facts.”37 According to Waltz, moral arguments are 
irrelevant because they do not, and cannot, change the immutably conflictual nature of the 
international system.38 Waltz asks: “A good cause may justify any war, but who can say in a 
dispute between states whose cause is just?”39 Today, much of positivist IR consider claims of 
justice as so obviously subjective, as so inescapably conditioned by context, that they are dis-
missed as “prescriptive” wishes—as concerned purely with “values” rather than “facts.”40 
 
THE NORMATIVE DEBATE ABOUT INTERVENTION 
The great success of structural determinism in spurring a large class of elegant theo-
retical systems has come at the cost of meaningful engagement with the ethical dimensions of 
                                               
37 Herbert A. Simon, “Administrative Behavior,” (2013), 56. 
38 Waltz seems to rule out the possibility of heterogeneous nations uniting under a single power. See Theory of 
International Politics, 111–112, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis,228, 238. 
39 Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis,113. 
40 Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to international relations: theories and approaches (Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 260–261; Arnold Wolfers and Laurence Martin, eds, The Anglo-American Tradition in 
Foreign Affairs: Readings from Thomas More to Woodrow Wilson (Yale University Press, 1956), ix; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics (Public Affairs, 
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seeking scientists, even as they unwittingly reveal their “values.” Michael C. Desch, “It is kind to be cruel: the 




foreign policy, as represented by the now-small scholarly niche represented by IR’s “norma-
tive theories.”41 Although the moral philosophy of international relations has roots in antiq-
uity, and up until the twentieth century comprised the whole study of foreign affairs, it is 
now absent in most IR departments, “relegated to religion departments, theological seminar-
ies and a few Catholic universities.”42  
Normative theorists protest the fact-value distinction, pointing out that the rules, in-
stitutions, and decisions responsible for international conduct have moral content.43 On a 
methodological level, normative theory is grounded in the voluntarist notion that it is possi-
ble and desirable for citizens, soldiers, and statesmen to use the basic human capacity of self-
command to discern between necessity and choice.44 Further, most normative theorists as-
sume that scholars may discern and evaluate the reasoning of statesmen who speak in the 
name of moral duty and national security.45 Beyond this basic starting point, normative the-
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ory has no unifying position; it represents no “canon” of accumulated or progressing wis-
dom. Rather, it is another way of describing a series of debates about the moral basis of inter-
national relations.46  
Normative theorists attempt to clarify and organize the diversity in theoretical posi-
tions by categorizing the moral requirements of rightful intervention into two schools: com-
munitarianism and humanitarianism.47 According to communitarians (also knowns as “lib-
eral communitarians” or “statists”), states are rights-bearing members in a society of states. 
Simply by their non-threatening existence, states deserve presumed sovereign legitimacy from 
other states, which must refrain from forcibly intervening in their domestic politics. Accord-
ing to humanitarians (also known as “cosmopolitans”), states enjoy rights only as far as they 
abide by a commitment to human rights. When a regime shows lack of commitment to basic 
human rights, other states have a right and perhaps a responsibility to take forcible action 
against the transgressive state.  
The purpose of this critical review is twofold. First, the questions and concerns raised 
in the debate over legitimate intervention will serve as the backdrop for the case studies in 
Chapters 3 and 4 in which we will assess how (or to what degree) such questions and con-
cerns were addressed in practice by Presidents Cleveland and McKinley. The competing the-
oretical classifications are highly idealized heuristics; they are not predictive models. They 
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can therefore discipline historical analysis by bringing to the fore the most fundamental disa-
greements in moral outlooks. Second, and more immediate to our purposes, the debate be-
tween communitarianism and humanitarianism illuminates that thinking critically about 
such moral questions in foreign policy entails methodological voluntarism, or some openness 
to the possibility of moral volition, responsibility, and judgment. 
 
Communitarianism 
According to communitarianism, the sovereignty of each political community is the 
most fundamental moral element of international relations.48 States are rights-bearing, co-
equal entities and their relations are bound by laws that aim to protect their unique, internal 
political life. Communitarians believe that there is no escaping the particularity of political 
membership and the primacy of national independence in matters of international affairs. 
Communitarian justice demands virtuous restraint and intellectual humility in service of the 
maintenance of civilized relations among the “society of nations” or (in older terms) the 
“family of nations.”  
                                               
48 As understood today, sovereignty is a legal concept coeval (and arguably inseparable from) early liberal social-
contract theory. The idea is that individuals are inherently divided by their self-interests. To attain lasting secu-
rity, it is necessary for individuals in a specific territory to transfer all rights and powers to an undivided “sover-
eign representative” empowered to enact binding, enforceable laws that protect individuals’ private spheres 




Communitarianism appears in the background of a wide range of contemporary IR 
theories. It is evident in neorealism’s (usually implicit) moral exhortations for Western pow-
ers to discipline and limit foreign policy aims. As a thoroughgoing doctrine, communitarian-
ism is famously associated with Michael Walzer’s work, especially his Just and Unjust Wars. 
However, communitarianism dates back centuries, and is well-presented by the German phi-
losopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and his argument that, just as civil society is a social 
contract among rights-enjoying individuals, states have rights in the community of nations 
by their mere existence: 
Nations certainly can be regarded as nothing else than individual free persons living 
in a state of nature, and therefore the same duties are to be imposed upon them, both 
as regards themselves and as regards others, and the rights arising therefrom, which 
are prescribed by the law of nature and are bestowed on individual men, because by 
nature they are born free, and are united by no other bond than that of nature.49 
For communitarians, there can be no real social pact among nations; politics is fun-
damentally about membership in a defined group or territory, and individuals depend on a 
self-enclosed political community to practice politics and exercise their rights.50 “[A]s indi-
viduals need a home, so rights require a location,” Walzer writes.51 In principle, each state 
has a right to police and coercively guarantee the maintenance of its preservation and inde-
pendence. The right of a state to act with force is derived from its right to protect itself in a 
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(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1934), 5. 
50 Even though individuals do not literally contract with each other to a civil government, the purpose of any 
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world that has no “higher entity.”52 Consequently, a state cannot extend that right to punish 
transgressors that have not injured or threatened it.53  
What follows from this notion of state equality and political community is that, by 
meeting some baseline of functional existence and “fitness,” states deserve some degree of 
presumed legitimacy from other statesmen.54 If a state’s institutions are indigenous, appear to 
represent a nation, and do not threaten other states, then that state deserves to enjoy its 
peaceful sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
Communitarians believe that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a foreign leader to 
judge whether there is fitness between the government and its people. There is no foreign ar-
biter who can judge among disparate civil movements, gauge their strength, and figure out 
the point at which an established government has lost authority. The problems inherent in 
evaluating legitimacy means that even tyrannies have rights, and outsiders “must act as if 
they were legitimate” even if those states do not, in fact, enjoy the support of their rebellious 
subjects.55 According to Walzer, the presumption of legitimacy “is simply the respect that 
                                               
52 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 113. See also Man, the State, and War, 190, 201. 
53 Emmerich De Vattel, The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Af-
fairs of Nations and Sovereigns (Philadelphia: J.W. Johnson & C, 1883), Book II, Chapter 1, Paragraph 7. 
54 Communitarians concede that this is not scientific or easily applied standard. Walzer explicitly likens com-
munitarian contract theory to Burkean conservatism which sees a community as a contract among “the living, 
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55 Even submitting that citizens’ right to self-determination includes the right of rebellion, that right cannot 
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foreigners owe to a historic community and to its internal life.”56 The necessary corollary to 
presumed legitimacy is the duty of statesmen to protect their citizens from the intervention 
of foreigners since such intervention represents a compromise of the community’s political 
integrity.  
The principle of presumed legitimacy curtails the possible moral grounds to inter-
vene because it insists on neutrality toward a regime’s character and institutions.57 No state 
can justly intervene on the mere basis that it considers another regime’s institutions or behav-
ior toward its citizens as oppressive.58 Unless its preservation or independence is threatened, 
no state has a right to arrogate to itself the responsibility of sanctioning any natural law du-
ties to humanity.59 As Wolff explained, rulers are accountable only to their respective territo-
rial jurisdictions, and the principle of sovereignty means that they can punish a state that has 
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57 Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace 
(Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 180–181. 
58 Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,” 216. Even autocratic governments that 
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harmed them.60 However, the same principle prohibits a state from exercising any enforce-
ment powers belonging to another state.61 The upshot of the communitarian presumption of 
legitimacy is a highly restrictive notion of rightful intervention. 
Elevating sovereignty to such a high standing means that communitarianism discour-
ages ethical appraisal of other states—an abdication of judgment whose logical endpoint is 
moral relativism and the blind hegemony of parochial national interest.62 Of course, such in-
tellectual paralysis is wholly out of communitarianism’s spirit, which demands of statesmen 
high regard for their moral responsibility in contributing to both domestic and international 
peace. Communitarianism promotes domestic liberty by restraining ambitious leaders search-
ing for a rationale to expand their power, recognizing that usurpers have always justified their 
dominion on a philanthropic basis.63 At the same time, communitarianism’s call for restraint 
does not entail isolationist indifference; even when communitarians critique particular acts of 
war, they expect leaders to exercise their power to use force. For Walzer, just war theory, as a 
abroad tradition of military ethics, assumes the practical possibility of fighting just wars and 
                                               
60 Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum in the Classics of International Law, Vol. II, para. 272. 
61 “By nature no nation has the right to any act which belongs to the exercise of the sovereignty of another na-
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of recognizing them as such. It is “a doctrine of radical responsibility, because it holds politi-
cal and military leaders responsible, first of all, for the well-being of their own people, but 
also for the well-being of innocent men and women on the other side.”64 In some cases, for 
example, communitarian concern for the welfare of other states may lead to rightful abroga-
tion of sovereign agreements.65 In other cases, a non-threatened state may nevertheless inter-
vene against outright genocide because such a crime constitutes an unambiguous shock to 
the “moral conscience of mankind.”66 Communitarianism poses “hard tests” for humanitar-
ian intervention not due to nationalistic indifference or pedantic legalism but because such 
intervention “is an expensive business” that risks “significant negative consequences” on both 
sides.67  
Indeed, it is precisely the sensitivity to the limits of any state to guarantee global se-
curity and justice that contributes to global security.68 Global evils, diagnosed perfectly in the 
abstract, prove intractable when actual state resources are directed to combat them.69 Com-
munitarians are sensitive to the slippery tendency of especially powerful nations, acting out 
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of the highest motives, to expand their responsibility beyond the bounds of what they can re-
alistically manage; ambitious international projects aimed at doing good often exacerbate the 
evils they seek to expunge.70 Understanding that the well-being of innocent people in other 
states also depends on their membership to a political community discourages states from us-
ing the pretext of global justice to extend their own ambitions, or to exacerbate the evils they 
seek to address.71 Powerful nations are subjected to the greatest (but also the most foolhardy) 
temptations to do good, “to end conflict in a contentious world” and to be certain “that the 
solution it seeks to impose is a just one.”72 As the eighteenth-century diplomat Emmerich De 
Vattel argued, when a state arrogates to itself the mantle of justice, it almost inevitably in-
creases the length of a war and the cruelty of its conduct.73 Consequently, it is when tempta-
tions are highest—such as when a foreign state seems most illegitimate and censurable, when 
there is some pretext for flouting an international agreement, or when the positive gains of 
intervention are highest—that commitment to respect for sovereignty is most morally mean-
ingful.74 So, far from signifying moral apathy, a policy of neutrality to global evils can be a 
testament to the highest code of conduct. As Walzer puts it, “neutrality is a feature of all the 
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rules of war; without it there could be no rules at all but only permissions addressed to the 
Forces of Good entitling them to do whatever is necessary (though only what is necessary) to 
overcome their enemies.”75 Thus, the prudential arguments grounding communitarianism 
and neutrality follow from what communitarians consider to be the highest principles of jus-
tice in international relations.  
 
Humanitarianism 
If the communitarian common good is based on the principle of sovereignty, why 
does it make exceptions to its non-interventionism when sovereignty protects patently unjust 
states? Moreover, how do communitarians discern when interventions are limited to appeals 
of conscience, and when a state can undertake military action? According to humanitarians, 
communitarianism is uncomfortable with intervention but, as its qualifications show, recog-
nizes the absurdity of neutrality toward immoral, oppressive state behavior. Humanitarians 
like Charles Beitz argue that, even if a state has some moral standing, it is not incumbent on 
all states to presume such an unqualified degree of legitimacy.76 States are not like individuals 
in that they lack the autonomous quality of human beings to enjoy presumptive rights.77 The 
communitarian acceptance of domestic tyranny and prohibition of international enforce-
ment is nonsensical; coercion—whether by a domestic government or an external party—
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must always be justified by principles of justice. According to Beitz, “The analogue of the 
moral autonomy of persons, at the level of states, is a state’s conformity with appropriate 
principles of domestic justice.”78  
For humanitarians, it is individual rights—not state rights—that constitutes interna-
tional justice. A regime’s sovereignty and the rights conferred to it are contingent on whether 
that state respects human rights. Humanitarians argue that any meaningful notion of politi-
cal self-determination in a community assumes some level of domestic justice (such as civil 
and political freedom).79 If a state is coercive or cruel toward its citizens, then the state “be-
trays the very purpose for which it exists,” and can no longer count on any right against in-
tervention by another state.80 Leaders must not only avoid massacring their citizens but must 
demonstrate some higher commitment to rights. According to Beitz, “only those states 
whose institutions satisfy the appropriate principles of justice can legitimately demand to be 
respected” as maintaining a right against intervention.81 Thus, humanitarianism holds re-
gime type and behavior as highly relevant to questions of intervention. A regime with op-
pressive institutions has no right to non-intervention.82 Humanitarians argue that it is mor-
ally permissible for other states to intervene for humanitarian improvements, even if it is not 
aimed at preventing any specific atrocity.83  
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The implication of humanitarianism is that the threshold of legitimate intervention is 
much lower than that of communitarianism. The logical endpoint of humanitarian permis-
siveness is almost limitless intervention for philanthropic improvement, resulting in perpet-
ual global instability and warfare.84 As Walzer put it, “The work of the virtuous is never fin-
ished.”85 Communitarians point out that intervention on the basis of humanitarian improve-
ment is tantamount to a declaration that the target government is illegitimate because it has 
failed to protect its citizens. That meant that a humanitarian war, from the outset, is an ef-
fort at regime change—a project.86  
Like communitarians, humanitarians have looked to rescue their principles from self-
defeating extremes by adopting some exceptions to their theories. For example, they argue 
that intervention must be executed proportionally to the abuse it aims to stop, and that in-
digenous citizens must approve of it.87 Meanwhile, critics point out that such utilitarianism 
is highly contingent on dubious judgments, based on necessarily limited knowledge that may 
serve as pretexts for self-interested intervention masked as moral reform.88  
Communitarianism and humanitarianism each claim to advance some notion of jus-
tice, fairness, and the common good that is grounded on a particular understanding of what 
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is legally permissible, politically possible, and morally imperative. For communitarians, states 
have a moral standing (and therefore a right against foreign intervention) because they are 
political communities of individuals who depend on territorial integrity free of interference 
to exercise their political membership. According to humanitarians, communitarians put 
conditional rights (of states) before foundational or primary rights (of individuals). Humani-
tarians argue that the right against intervention depends on a government treating its citizens 
with certain human rights; when a state does not do so, it is the responsibility of other states 
to act against them. 
Although the finer points in the debate about just intervention can develop into re-
condite legal and philosophic quarrels, they advance questions that have never been confined 
to cloistered academic halls. In fact, they are questions that have repeatedly penetrated the 
highest levels of decision-making and public deliberation about international controversies.89 
Both perspectives assume that those who make foreign policy decisions are responsible agents 
with some level of freedom and ability to reason through alternatives that have moral impli-
cations. As Walzer explains, while war is sometimes waged under the aegis of unrelenting ne-
cessity, it is more commonly the case that “soldiers and statesmen have to make choices that 
are sometimes moral choices.”90 The inherently moral dimension of acts of war means that 
they cannot simply be reduced to necessity. “Justice still needs to be defended; decisions 
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about when and how to fight require constant scrutiny.”91 The competing moral claims ad-
vanced by each perspective assumes that it is possible to appraise such moral choices accord-
ing to the persuasiveness of their justifications. As I argue next, positivist studies of morality 
in foreign policy not only avoid such presumptions but make methodological commitments 
that effectively rule them out of empirical consideration. 
 
THE POSITIVIST STUDY OF MORALITY IN FOREIGN POLICY 
In the last few decades, and especially in the last few years, social scientists, including 
IR theorists, have renewed efforts to study how moral attitudes shape foreign policy.92 How-
ever, positivist IR has avoided serious inquiry into the significance of the questions raised by 
the long-kindled philosophic tradition relating to justice in foreign intervention. For positiv-
ists who do not dismiss ethical questions in international affairs as irrelevant, morality is ei-
ther a handmaiden of interest or an epiphenomenal reflex rooted in sociological or biological 
needs.93 
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Two positivist approaches—described here as “instrumentalist” and “reductionist”—
dominate current IR research on morality. Each redefines morality to fit methods that pre-
clude the possibility of genuine moral agency and the study of moral arguments. In the sec-
ond part of this section, I argue that these deterministic tendencies baked into the positivist 
approaches are rooted less in the requirements of scientific procedures than in the inertia of 
prejudices that grew out of the field’s political mission, as defined by its realist founders. 
 
Two Deterministic Approaches to Moral Action in Foreign Policy 
According to the instrumentalist perspective, moral language is a manifestation of ra-
tional egoism—a strategy of power-seeking “ideology,” or expression of subjective “prefer-
ences” that must be examined in light of the actor’s strategic constraints. Meanwhile, an al-
ternative, reductionist perspective, treats morality as an epiphenomenon (or byproduct) of 
psychological traits, often rooted in biological or evolutionary mechanisms. In the name of 
empirical rigor, both perspectives start from ontological assumptions that redefine morality 
in such a way as to preclude meaningful moral autonomy, thus narrowing the range of alter-
native explanations of foreign policy motivations. 
 
Instrumentalism: Morality as Strategy 
Researchers who adopt some form of the instrumentalist perspective explain moral 




Usually adopting formalistic models of rationality, this approach views moral-sounding ut-
terances as strategic, ego-driven instruments of power or expression of subjective “utility” 
that is outside the scope of a researcher’s evaluation.94  
Scholars following instrumentalist methods examine the moral language of political 
officials as a tool of domestic or diplomatic manipulation toward some (largely self-serving) 
end, such as garnering political support.95 In her study of moral language in presidential 
statements, Colleen J. Shogan argues that moral appeals are a “strategic tool” used by Ameri-
can presidents “to enhance their political leadership and strengthen existing authority,” even 
when doing so is untethered to policy arguments.96 Applied to foreign policy, the instrumen-
talist logic suggests that expressions of moral imperatives, whether in the domestic or diplo-
matic context, are meant to enhance the “authority and credibility” of leaders who “sell” or 
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“frame” their chosen policy to some end.97 Thus, following Karl Mannheim and the Public 
Choice theory he inspired, scholars in the instrumentalist tradition argue that moral opinions 
and imperatives of political actors are best understood as “tainted with its espousers’ desire to 
gain power”—that is, as expressions of “ideology.”98 To study morality as ideology “means 
that opinion, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value 
but are interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them.”99 To 
study ideology specifically from the instrumentalist perspective is to view opinions and state-
ments as disguises of interests.  
To be sure, studies following the instrumentalist perspective do not insist that moral 
framing is necessarily self-regarding, amoral, or the sole basis of moral rhetoric.100 Rational-
ity, as they understand it, is merely taking proper means to any designated ends. In practice, 
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however, the effect of redefining moral concerns as inherently subjective preferences leads the 
positivist to avoid any meaningful attempt to evaluate the meaning, coherence, or merits of 
any moral argument.101 This tendency is evident in IR’s institutionalist literature, which con-
siders state compliance with legal and moral obligations “a key puzzle in the study of interna-
tional relations.”102 The typical “solution” to the puzzle is to redefine compliance as the cal-
culation of costs and gains—even when the actors themselves define compliance as a moral 
obligation.103  
The bet against an interpretation of moral opinion is not an arbitrary one. Such side-
stepping is necessary because the focus of instrumentalism is not to evaluate any attitude or 
decision but to discover the factual relationship between the decision and designated aims. 
The instrumentalist believes it is not the role of the scientist to evaluate moral statements as 
expressions about objective truth and imperatives. After all, “there is no way in which the 
correctness of ethical propositions can be empirically or rationally tested.”104 Moral opinions 
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are subjective, unfalsifiable constructs that must be analyzed “from a critical vantage 
point”—that is, as a source of power and legitimacy in the service of interests.105 The instru-
mentalist bet is that black-boxing human behavior, making assumptions about human moti-
vations, and focusing on the constraints represented by the strategic environment is a firmer 
basis for deriving testable, logically consistent predictions.106 
In sum, the instrumentalist approach professes agnosticism toward human motiva-
tions while treating moral attitudes and opinions that accompany human behavior as either a 
means to (usually) fixed and self-serving ends, or otherwise necessarily subjective preferences 
whose substance and coherence are irrelevant to the researcher. By bracketing the vexing 
problems inherent in endogenous variables, especially moral beliefs, and instead testing how 
the changing conditions of a strategic environment affect individual and state interactions, 
these studies obtain generalizable conclusions that transcend the idiosyncrasies of any single 
sample. However, the advantages of the instrumentalist approach come at the cost of limit-
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ing the range of potential explanations. If opinions of right and wrong are rooted in ideol-
ogy, then they are, by definition, false or dishonest opinions. If moral ideas are merely ex-
pressions of preferences that are neither true nor false, then they are unworthy of charitable 
evaluation in their own terms.107 In either case, the instrumentalist approach forgoes serious 
examination of the substance of moral opinions, gambling away the possibility that moral 
opinions are coherent, meaningful articulations of the opinions that explain foreign-policy 
decisions. 
 
Reductionism: Morality as Epiphenomena 
As Herbert Simon put it in 1955, however reasonable the rationalist approximation 
of reality, there is a “complete lack of evidence that, in actual human choice situations of any 
complexity these computations can be, or are in fact, performed.”108 Over the last few dec-
ades, a growing group of behavioralists in IR have argued in favor of testing overt and ex-
pressed behavior of agents, arguing that the conveniences of the instrumentalist approach 
come at the cost of increasingly uncertain methodological bets about human motives.109 Of-
                                               
107 Leo Strauss, “Epilogue,” in Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), 324. 
108 Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, no. 1 
(1955), 104. 
109 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, et al., “The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations,” International 
Organization 71, no. S1 (2017); Alex Mintz, “Behavioral IR as a Subfield of International Relations,” Interna-




ten drawing on social-psychological theories, these critics argue that, despite professed agnos-
ticism toward human motivations, rationalist inquiries are based on ontological assumptions 
about “microfoundations”—that is, “the elementary events” at the individual level, such as 
beliefs and their formations, before they manifest as a macro-level pattern.110 Behavioralists 
argue that to not only predict patterns but also to explain events, scholars must open the 
black box of individual decision-making, and examine the extent to which actual human be-
havior conforms to rationalist assumptions.111 What they will find is that preferences are not 
homogenous and that beliefs are not simply aberrations from rationalist expectations.112 The 
promise of behavioralist IR is that by relaxing assumptions of rational decision-making mod-
els, it is possible to reach a more sophisticated and real-world understanding of human opin-
ions and moral motivations.  
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However, while some rationalist models approach moral opinions as the object of 
strategic manipulation through ideology, behavioralist IR tends to reduce moral opinions to 
epiphenomenal manifestations of psychological mechanisms that drive human behavior. By 
importing prepackaged theories from psychology and evolutionary biology, behavioralist 
studies often begin their inquiry by defining moral expressions as hedonistic mechanisms, 
such as avoiding “painful value tradeoffs” or seeking emotional gratification through venge-
fulness.113 Everything from interstate war and ethnic conflict to nuclear proliferation and 
diplomatic outcomes is explained by classifying political beliefs as mechanisms of emo-
tions.114 According to Jonathan Mercer, “A belief in alien abduction is an emotional belief, 
but so is a belief that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, that one’s country is good, that 
a sales tax is unjust, or that French decision makers are irresolute.”115 
The tendency to redefine moral opinions as expressions of reflexive mechanisms is 
evident especially in IR research on identity.116 Identity is a kind of priming mechanism that, 
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through an unconscious process of “self-stereotyping,” helps individuals “cope” with dilem-
mas in a way that is consistent with the interest of their identifying group.117 According to a 
recent study, seemingly coherent beliefs relating to national identity are driven by uncon-
scious “internal emotional desires.”118 Even the radically non-egoistic “cosmopolitan social 
identity”—which one might assume exhorts individuals to subordinate self-interest to the 
global good—is based on an automatic, “psychological sense” of internalized norms that is 
elicited by “reflexive, rapid, and heuristic reasoning style.”119  
Behavioral IR, to its credit, has proven unsatisfied with imputing motives of self-in-
terest when individuals express moralistic opinions. Much of the literature conveys the sense 
that human nature is intrinsically moralistic and judgmental. However, recent research on 
foreign-policy attitudes has also proven all-too-comfortable with reducing moral language to 
biologistic categories, such as those described in social intuitionist models.120 These “pro-so-
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cial” theories suggest that moral judgments are representations of ingrained cognitive mod-
ules—the reflexive, automatic, and predictable evolutionary responses that help individuals 
address social dilemmas and fulfill evolutionary social requirements.121 As the social psy-
chologist Jonathan Haidt explains, the appearance of heroism, altruism, and religious faith is 
ultimately a manifestation of “evolutionary adaptation” to socialize groups that are then ab-
sorbed as unchallengeable “narratives,” blinding adherents to alternative moral worlds.122 
The upshot is that moral justifications that resemble deliberative reasoning by the public or 
foreign policy leaders are just “rationalizations”; what appears to be ethically-derived deci-
sions and judgments are, in fact, rooted in instinctual foundations that help individuals “sup-
press or regulate selfishness and make social life possible.”123 In other words, these theories 
not only reject the notion that moral opinions deserve sympathetic evaluation but that doing 
so is highly deceiving. “[D]on’t take people’s moral arguments at face value,” says Haidt. 
“They’re mostly post hoc constructions made up on the fly, crafted to advance one or more 
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strategic objectives.”124 By treating moral opinion as a byproduct of psychological mecha-
nisms that are alien to the patent self-understanding of decision-makers, the reductionist per-
spective redefines the political as the biological, and dismisses (if not discourages) efforts to 
interpret moral opinions in their own terms.  
In sum, the contributions of behavioralist IR to examining moral beliefs that arose 
from a rebellion of formalist orthodoxies have revealed their own self-imposed limitations. If 
the instrumentalist studies examine moral language in light of strategic and environmental 
constraints, reductionist studies examine moral language in light of biological, cognitive, and 
evolutionary constraints. Whereas instrumentalism employs a highly abstract rational man, 
reductionism employs a highly abstract biological man. In both cases, moral opinion is va-
cated of human agency, and therefore vacated of any interpretable substance or discursive co-
herence. Interpretation of moral arguments is deemed irrelevant (and even deceptive) be-
cause moral arguments are defined as post hoc, subjective rationales for an underlying inter-
est or need (whether individual or collective, and whether material or psychological).  
There is no denying that the literature on morality in IR has produced a considerable 
body of work that advances valuable questions. However, if behavioralists are correct that 
conclusions about moral beliefs must arise from careful observation rather than assumptions, 
then it is not obvious that the preconceived biological-psychological frameworks are the 
                                               




most, or only, appropriate methods to interpreting agents’ overt moral expressions.125 The 
dominant approaches in IR do not examine morality in foreign policy so much as they clas-
sify it according to highly deterministic models that, however plausible and compelling, are 
not bound by their subjects’ articulated arguments. The manipulation of moral phenomena 
to fit systematizing methods leaves out a whole class of voluntary motives that can be under-
stood only through interpretation of moral language. 
 
The Foundational Efforts to Tame the “Moral Force” in Foreign Policy 
The evasion or rejection of moral agency is a methodological gamble that, normative 
IR theorists have long considered “a puzzling feature of much International Relations schol-
arship.”126 In this section, I argue that the tendency within IR to disfigure morality into mer-
cenary and reductive concepts—a tendency so strong and pervasive that it rarely meets a jus-
tification—emerged from the polemical arguments of early realists, who founded the scien-
tific study of foreign policy as it is known today. The importance of early realists such as 
Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr in setting “the paradigmatic boundaries of the discipline” 
is well known.127 William Wohlforth concurs: “It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the 
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academic study of international relations is a debate about realism.”128 But what is often 
overlooked is that early realists set the methodological boundaries of the discipline. The realist 
founders of modern IR self-consciously sought to establish a science that inculcates an attitu-
dinal aversion to the study of human intentions and substantive moral argumentation. 
The realist science was a counter-educational campaign tailored to combat urgent po-
litical dangers facing Western democracies caused by a voluntarist notion of morality. As 
Morgenthau put it, “Dominant elements in Western Culture, and American culture in par-
ticular, have consistently misunderstood the nature of foreign policy and they have done so 
in the name of morality. In the process, our culture has deformed its understanding of mo-
rality and corrupted its moral judgment as well.”129 Early realists believed that an insistence 
on human malleability and an exaggerated notion of human agency had led Western intellec-
tuals, leaders, and publics to seek peace through democratic reform and enlightenment. They 
argued that the tendency to study and shape motivations, a perennial one, is especially dan-
gerous in the modern, industrial age of destructive weaponry. Responding to this challenge, 
realists called for “deliberate manipulation” of “the new moral force of nationalistic univer-
salism.”130  
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Since the dominant positivist studies remain in the shadows of classical realism, un-
derstanding the political nature of the methodological enterprise is fundamental to attaining 
clarity about its limits. For Brian C. Schmidt, “realism, in one form or another, survives and 
continues to provide what many would argue to be the initial essential assumptions for ex-
plaining international politics as it has been traditionally defined by the field of IR.”131 Pre-
cisely because early realists were so successful in establishing the parameters of inquiry, it is 
difficult to recognize what has become the passively accepted doctrines pervading the field. 
As Morgenthau himself observed, political scientists unaware of the ideas that produced their 
intellectual predispositions, and unwilling to critically detach from them, are unwittingly ad-
vancing someone else’s agenda rather than understanding their subject matter.132 If passive 
methodological prejudices originate in arguments, understanding and appraising those argu-
ments are the vital first step to intellectual liberation and scientific advancement. 
Classical realism was a reactionary intellectual movement that grounded its purpose 
and arguments against a cultural and political adversary it called idealism (and sometimes 
“utopianism,” “liberalism,” or “liberal internationalism”).133 During the twentieth-century 
interregnum, idealists pointed to the collapse of the European Concert and the devastation 
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of the First World War as evidence that the non-democratic, secretive diplomacy, emblem-
atic of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European relations, was paving the future for 
perpetual interstate conflict.134 Blinded by balance-of-power politics that has governed Euro-
pean relations since the Napoleonic Wars, Western leaders were contributing to a breakdown 
in collective security through their coercive and provocative pursuit of relative power. Ideal-
ists believed that war is pathological cruelty, the consequences of a man-made, self-fulfilling 
belief in international anarchy that leads to a costly breakdown in rational communica-
tion.135 
Crucial to idealism was the voluntarist rejection of the idea that war is a tragic inevi-
tability, whether of human insecurity or moral contestation. Idealists argued that human be-
ings and political communities have the capacity and the obligation to sacrifice myopic con-
venience for long-term, global peace.136 Since war is a misguided but correctable departure 
from civilization, what is most needed is “to deepen and strengthen the foundations of gen-
eral education,” wrote Alfred Zimmern, the first IR professor at Oxford University.137 The 
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hope was that education, combined with rationally designed institutions and mechanisms, 
would channel state behavior away from pyrrhic victories and toward perpetual peace.138 
At the most fundamental level, realists of the 1930s and ‘40s shared idealist goals of 
global peace and security.139 They also agreed with idealists that “political science is the sci-
ence not only of what is, but of what ought to be,” as Carr put it.140 The disagreement was 
on the level of methods in defending Western liberty and security. Alarmed by the pervasive-
ness of idealist thought in diplomatic and elite culture of Western democracies, realists like 
Carr, Morgenthau, and George F. Kennan, argued that idealism was a form of crude morali-
zation that was discredited by history’s stubborn refusal to yield to even the most well-mean-
ing sermons.141 In Scientific Man, Morgenthau argued that twentieth-century idealism, in 
contrast to its earlier, liberal versions, is merely principled pacifism—“a self-defeating absurd-
ity” that puritanically curtails state action even at the expense of the success of liberty.142  
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While early realists conceded that moralism is a congenital fact of human life, they 
believed that its modern, democratic form is particularly dangerous. Idealists were foolishly 
advocating for democratic reform, arguing that, by broadening the constituency of political 
leaders, foreign policy would become more reasonable and less parochial.143 Realists rejected 
this view, pointing out that the authoritative voice of mass opinion is fickle and, on matters 
of war and peace, prone to manipulation and easily beguiled by quixotic hopes.144 In fact, 
the democratization of politics has only meant more efficient and rapid means “to mold and 
direct” the public will to belligerent state action.145 What made democratic moralism espe-
cially dangerous, and why it was so urgent to counteract it, was the incidence of “modern 
technology,” which “has made possible total war.”146  
Since the carnage of the century was made possible by the deadly recipe of demo-
cratic moralism and technology, prevention of future destruction demands that the science of 
foreign policy address one of the two ingredients—modern weaponry or democratic moral-
ism. There was little question of what a more realistic goal was: “The effects of modern tech-
nology cannot be undone,” wrote Morgenthau. “The only variable that remains subject to 
deliberate manipulation is the new moral force of nationalistic universalism.”147  
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So powerful was this “new moral force” that the only way to manipulate it was to up-
root its methodological voluntarism. “The utopian is necessarily voluntarist,” wrote Carr. 
“He believes in the possibility of more or less radically rejecting reality, and substituting his 
utopia for it by an act of will.”148 The attraction and promise of Western democratic moral-
ism relied on a profound sense of human freedom and mutability.149 Moral crusaders must 
convince themselves that political relations—including international anarchy itself—are a 
function of human decisions and variable contingencies that need not perpetuate noxiously. 
Voluntarist notions of morality seduce people into a scientific study of human motives and 
the way in which education can reform and channel preferences to peaceful ends.  
Realists argued that human motives are far too opaque and complicated to form the 
basis of any reliable science of applied ethics. As Morgenthau explained, examining motives 
“is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, fre-
quently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we 
really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?”150 
The examination of human motives leads to undue confidence and an exaggeration of the 
relationship between peace and good intentions. “History shows no exact and necessary cor-
relation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy.”151  
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Realists like Carr and Morgenthau concluded that they must respond to idealism’s 
purpose (the discovery and application of pacifying universal moral principles) by uprooting 
its methods (the inquiry and reformation of human intentions). “The new moral force of na-
tionalistic universalism,” as Morgenthau called it, must be tamed by a new science of interna-
tional relations. This science, a “necessary corrective to exuberance of utopianism,” would in-
culcate an “attitude” that treats political life as an epiphenomenal manifestation of underly-
ing mechanistic causation, thus reforming human behavior by deprecating efforts to do so.152  
In the first place, realists challenged the idealist insistence that there are discoverable 
and accessible universal moral truths. Following Reinhold Niebuhr, they argued that all hu-
man knowledge is “finite knowledge, gained from a particular perspective.”153 Applied to in-
ternational relations, the lesson is that “there are no internationally accepted standards of 
morality,” as Kennan put it.154 Circumstantial and material differences among states means 
that “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states.”155 The idealist 
disguises the human fact of “divergent interests.” These divergent interests, based on the ma-
terial inequality of nations, meant that it is “a dangerous illusion to suppose that this hypo-
thetical world community possesses the unity and coherence of communities of more limited 
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size up to and include the state.”156 However seemingly sacrificial and altruistic, moral ideas 
are artificial constructs emanating from some particular power dynamic in a social order:  
The realist cannot logically accept any standard value save that of fact. In his view, 
the absolute standard of the utopian is conditioned and dictated by the social order, 
and is therefore political. Morality can only be relative, not universal. Ethics must be 
interpreted in terms of politics; and the search for an ethical norm outside politics is 
doomed to frustration.157  
The realist science must unveil apparently earnest, philanthropic, or spiritual opinions as the 
parochial, materialistic concerns of certain individuals and groups.158 In other words, moral 
rhetoric and opinions must be interpreted as ideology—as “primarily…a vehicle of power,” 
or “transparent disguises of selfish vested interests.”159 As Morgenthau explained, human be-
ings use “ideological concealments, rationalizations, and justifications of necessity” to cover 
over the “moral deficiency” inherent in the underlying aspiration for power that pervades hu-
man behavior.160 It follows that immorality is merely the socially constructed stigma one as-
cribes to the individual aspirations for power.161 In reality, the needs of the political “have no 
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moral quality,” wrote Kennan.162 What states need “are the unavoidable necessities of a na-
tional existence” which are “not subject to classification as either ‘good’ or bad.’ They may be 
questions from a detached philosophic point of view. But the government of the sovereign 
state cannot make such judgments.”163 According to Morgenthau, the only “objective” cate-
gory that is universally valid is the “concept of interest defined as power.”164 Similarly, Carr 
argued that “the exposure of the real basis of the professedly abstract principles commonly 
invoked in international politics is the most damning and most convincing part of the realist 
indictment of utopianism.”165  
By distinguishing between the hard, amoral facts of material interests and the moral, 
mythical (or “constructed”) moral principles, realists established a science that not only 
avoids substantive questions of moral judgment but explicitly denies their scientific rele-
vance:  
Any rational approach to foreign policy requires the assumption that there exists a 
national interest as an objective datum, by which thought and action can orient 
themselves. Without that assumption, we could not speak of truth with regard to 
matters of foreign policy but only of opinion. People would take a stand according to 
their individual preferences, and there would be no possibility of distinguishing be-
tween correct and false opinion. One man’s opinion would be as good as the next 
one’s, and power to make one opinion prevail over the others in the contest of the 
marketplace would be the only applicable criterion.166 
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Establishing a deterministic science that (in Morgenthau’s words) “guards” against concern 
with motives and ethics means distinguishing between the factual nature of interests and the 
subjective, socially and materially contingent nature of morality.167 The realist science de-
manded on an explicit division between ethics, which “in the abstract judges the moral quali-
ties of motives,” and politics, which judges the value-neutral qualities of “intellect, will, and 
action.”168 The deterministic approach teaches that “there is little room for meaningful 
choice on the part of state decisions makers, and even less room for the choice of moral val-
ues that conflict with the national interest.”169 
The practical effect of the division interests and ethics was designed to provide “ra-
tional principles of sound foreign policy,” bringing greater coherence and understanding to 
what would otherwise appear to be circumstantial motives, preferences, and the moral and 
intellectual qualities of statesmen.170 As Morgenthau explained, “The concept of interest de-
fined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into 
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the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possi-
ble.”171 Statesmen and citizens could then become more comfortable with their self-love and 
keep straight a distinction between the duty of advancing national interest and the mere 
“personal wish” of realizing moral values.172 “Scientific analysis has the urgent task of prun-
ing down national objectives to the measure of available resources to make their pursuit com-
patible with national survival.”173  
In developing a division between the “empirical” and “normative” sides of IR, the re-
alist project has enjoyed a legacy that transcends classical realism. No less than the “first-im-
age” realists of whom it disapproves, Waltz’s neorealism is motivated to combat idealist ef-
forts to trace war and peace to human behavior because such modes of thought contributes 
to deadly conflict.174 Indeed, Waltz parts ways with classical realism because he believes it is 
not sufficiently categorical in rejecting human mutability.175 If classical realists sought to ed-
ucate, with arguments, that claims of justice are constructs of their context, neorealism has 
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been so thoroughly educated that it no longer attempts to make the argument.176 Accord-
ingly, neorealism also takes for granted that the most urgent task of IR is to circumscribe the 
scope of foreign policy to “a narrow calculation of state interests.”177 Today, even empiricists 
who have no “realist” labels are prone to dismissing moral controversies as the realm of idle 
philosophic traditions that “lacked modern tools of analysis (which we, luckily, have at our 
disposal)” to examine empirical reality.178  
The legacy of realism in international relations as a whole is well-known to norma-
tive-theory scholars, who have criticized early realists for dogmatically dismissing the empiri-
cal relevance of moral judgment and human agency.179 However, such criticism misses a cru-
cial point: the purpose of the realist science was not necessarily aimed at establishing a more 
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rigorous empirical standard for studying foreign policy. Rather, it was aimed to free a certain 
mode of decision-making from what they believed to be the powerful and misguided moral-
ism of the day. To paraphrase A.J.P. Taylor, if the idealists of the twentieth century fought 
just wars and killed millions, the realists sought to improve the situation by teaching the 
world to fight necessary wars that killed thousands.180 In fact, early realists conceded that 
their science was at least in part a tendentious obfuscation of reality—an attitude based on 
half-truths meant to oppose “the moral impulses” of Western society that were endangering 
prudent statecraft.181 It is no exaggeration to say that the deterministic sterility of IR and its 
hostility to charitable examination of moral opinions is itself a moral projected with political 
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objectives. Realists believed that, by founding a field of study that is habitually averse to en-
tering the realm of moral judgment and decision, they could educate their fellows in such a 
way as to encourage “rational principles of sound foreign policy.”182  
 
Conclusion 
At the heart of normative theory in IR is a distinction between moral principles and 
selfish interests, a discernment between high and low motives, and the capacity of individuals 
act according to rules of conduct irreducible to the compulsions of necessity and desire. Such 
an understanding of self-command and agency is absent in the dominant positivist ap-
proaches in IR, which default to deterministic explanations of moral opinions. Unlike nor-
mative theories, which assume that statesmen can and do consider the moral basis of their in-
ternational actions, much of positivist research suggests that “statesmen are inclined to give 
moral norms secondary consideration in making policy decisions or to use morality expedi-
ently.”183 Rather than assess the meaning and significance of moral questions, these empirical 
approaches redefine moral opinion as either the instrumental means to some fixed (and usu-
ally selfish) ends, or otherwise reduce them to unconscious, biological determinants. Mean-
while, scholars inclined toward “normative” questions have puzzled over their exclusion in 
empirical studies.  
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However, as we have seen, the orthodoxies underlying the deterministic commit-
ments were born from political, rather than scientific, necessities. Like social science more 
generally, modern IR theory began as an attempt to contribute to society’s progressing de-
mands of peaceful well-being by transforming politics into an emotionally and morally neu-
tral technical art.184 At the heart of the empirical approach is the desire “to substitute rational 
decisions for…snap judgments,” or a “normative” desire to devise methods to supplant ran-
dom instances of “good” or “bad” policy with systematic observations and standards.185 Sim-
ilarly, the founders of modern IR sought to destroy the false hopes generated by notions of 
human reform and make policy on the sturdier and more disciplined foundation of self-in-
terest. To that end, they encouraged a political orientation with a scientific varnish that es-
chews open inquiry of human motivations—one that distinguishes between “factual” deter-
minants and the “wishes” of morality, and methodically positions voluntarist notions of 
moral concerns as irrelevant, if not inconsistent with, empirical inquiry.  
There is a paradox in the success of the realists in reprobating the voluntarist study of 
foreign policy in order to reform foreign policy thinking. By convincing IR’s practitioners 
that they are perched at a “critical vantage point” from which they can analyze foreign policy, 
the field has become enmeshed in passively held, deeply rooted assumptions about human 
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motivations that go unchallenged. These assumptions obscure what early realists recognized 




Chapter 2: Interpreting the Moral Basis of Foreign Policy 
The positivist imperative of following a rigorous protocol that subsumes morality in 
interests and needs has provoked alternative empirical approaches that privilege thoughts and 
ideas over material conditions and forces. The constructivist and psycho-attitudinal perspec-
tives argue that human behavior is inseparable from some combination of subjective, so-
cially-developed ideas. Both perspectives have served as a powerful corrective to the highly 
materialistic inertia in the study of international relations. However, both perspectives also 
point to a need for an interpretive approach that considers the articulated intentions of the 
decision-makers under investigation. By carefully and charitably analyzing the arguments 
and justifications of political leaders, an intentional analysis could help generate more 
grounded explanations of American foreign-policy decisions. 
Few historical periods better demonstrate the virtue of an intentional analysis than 
late nineteenth-century American foreign policy. Beginning especially in the 1930s, scholars 
have attributed the shift from America’s tradition of isolation to global predominance as a 
function of strategic and cultural determinants playing out independently of the articulated 
moral arguments uttered by Grover Cleveland and William McKinley, the two presidents 





TAKING IDEAS SERIOUSLY 
 
The constructivist and the psycho-attitudinal approaches have ably challenged the 
positivist tradition that tends to reduce behavior to fixed interests or environmental con-
straints. Both, however, point to a need for an interpretive method. 
Constructivism rejects the notion that interest (including “the national interest”) is 
an objective and fixed concept, emphasizing the role of identities, discourses, and ideas in 
foreign policy.186 Constructivists argue that interests are shaped by subjectively-defined 
norms that may not conform to a static definition of well-being.187 Because they reject the 
rigid ontologies of the “materialist” perspectives, constructivists are open to questions relat-
ing to moral beliefs.188 Indeed, some constructivists argue that global cultural norms may 
trump domestic state interests in foreign policy.189 However, constructivists tend to avoid 
charitable analysis of moral opinions, instead privileging structural (as opposed to agent-
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based) explanations.190 The result is that many constructivists treat norms as uniform, ethe-
real forces that “function as constraints or even as determinants of political behaviour.”191 
When constructivists do pay attention to foreign policy decision-makers, they typically do so 
with an “oversocialized” view of agents, as though individuals are mere “cultural dupes,” or 
passive transmitters of ideas into policy.192  
In contrast, attitudinal and personality theories are deeply concerned with how indi-
viduals interpret moral ideas and how these ideas shape their behavior.193 These theories rest 
their hypotheses on particular “belief systems,” “operational codes,” or “role conceptions” to 
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formulate causal links between individual behavior and personality dispositions or existential 
worldviews.194 According to these theories, decision-makers need not follow the cost-benefit 
rationality of formalized models; actors may comply with habits, identities, or heuristics that 
result in rationally confounding behavior.195 However, in their effort to generate parsimoni-
ous explanations with generalizable inference, the psycho-attitudinal perspectives have run 
into familiar limitations.196 Like constructivists’ socialized beliefs, the psycho-attitudinal “im-
ages” or “lenses” are independent constraints that are developed by the researcher rather than 
the subject under study.197 The “truth” of any leaders’ words is irrelevant because “the objec-
tive situation” is necessarily filtered through subjective “values.”198 For example, according to 
one study, “Elites primarily seek support not by appeal to truth but through appeals to values 
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couched in statements that gain their strength from unfalsifiable visions of the good soci-
ety.”199 The success of “framing,” or promotion of a viewpoint, is preordained according to 
the preexisting worldview of the audience.200 Here ideology is not necessarily imprisoned by 
interests (as it is for the instrumentalist perspective) but is imprisoned by some cognitive 
“structure”—whether belonging to an individual mind, a group, or an entire epoch.201 Not 
surprisingly, these top-down theories typically forego substantive analysis of opinions, and 
even historical context, instead employing some combination of terse exegesis, term-aggrega-
tion, and content classification, sometimes conducted by language-mining computer soft-
ware.202 
In sum, the constructivist and psycho-attitudinal approaches reject many of the 
methodological commitments of positivist approaches. They have demonstrated the virtue of 
broadening inquiry into behavior that is not entirely constituted by material constraints and 
interests. However, these approaches also mimic the formal sciences in their highly abstract, 
reified interpretive narrowness. They prime their subjects with established sociological or 
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psychological ascriptions, damning their subjects’ arguments as false representations of real-
ity, rather than proceed from a bottom-up, interpretive analysis of moral opinions. Ironi-
cally, then, these approaches lead to methods that convey little curiosity about the argumen-
tative meaning of the ideas and beliefs at the center of their research.203 This has left an 
opening to scholars who are more tolerant of liminal, non-axiomatic explanations.204 As one 
study explains, “the rise of constructivism, critical theory and poststructuralism in foreign 
policy analysis has thus led to the use of interpretive methods but not…to a thoroughgoing 
interpretive approach.”205 
 
THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY 
An interpretive approach is “an account of the reasons for or meanings of social ac-
tion.”206 For a specific political action to be intelligible, or meaningful, we must understand 
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not only the conditions that gave it rise, but also its rationalization.207 We can have compre-
hensive knowledge of the physical laws that makes a window break with a thrown rock and 
yet not understand why an individual decided to throw it.208 As John Ferejohn explains, “We 
want to know not only what caused the agent to perform some act but also the agent's rea-
sons for taking the action.”209 It is not sufficient to explain an action by saying it appealed to 
the actor; interpretation means assessing the actor’s rationalization to explain what it was 
about the action that made it appealing.210 As Jeffrey Tulis explains (in the context of studies 
on the American presidency), the interpretive approach “is more a search for meaning than 
for causes, more a concern for significance than for laws, more a quest for coherence than for 
certainty.”211 The open-ended nature of interpretive analysis permits the researcher to em-
phasize the purposive character of individual actions without any antecedent assumptions 
about intentions or pre-packaged, axiomatic theories of human behavior. The subject is 
given the opportunity to explain himself—what politics means to him, what are the reasons 
for his preferences, and why he takes certain actions.  
Typically, positivists view interpretation as important, but insufficient, for generating 
causal inferences. They argue that, to truly understand why a political actor did something, 
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the interpreter must abide by strict procedures (relating to such considerations as sample size 
and variance) that can transform “a mass of facts” into “specified values,” or simplified repre-
sentations that can be measured systematically (whether qualitatively or quantitatively) and 
establish non-idiosyncratic, “abstract” relationships.212 In this view, absent any attempt to 
find generic effects from observed data, or the effect of some variable(s) on some other varia-
ble(s) across stipulated conditions, interpretation is limited to historical narration of unique 
events.213  
It is undoubtedly true that the interpretive approach cannot reduce an action to an 
effect of some exogenous, causal regularity—to do so is to reject the very meaning of a volun-
tary, purposeful action. An interpreter cannot simultaneously treat seriously an individual’s 
self-articulated reasons for action while also attributing those same reasons to determinants 
that acted upon the individual. However, despite the limits of interpretation to establishing 
generic causal inferences (that is, the establishment of patterns and regularities across cases), 
the interpretive approach can do more than merely “describe” or “narrate” subjects’ rationali-
zations. By analyzing an actor’s reasons for actions, we can uncover the actor’s intentions. 
For “to know a primary reason why someone acted as he did is to know an intention with 
which the action was done.”214 That intention, in turn, can be said to represent at least an 
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instance of a general phenomenon. Thus, by accepting the possibility of voluntary, non-de-
luded action, the interpretive approach is in the business of causal inference insofar as it 
treats the actor’s specific intentions as causes of action. Such an “intentional analysis” inter-
prets rationalizations, subordinating the search of generic causal regularities to specific de-
scriptions of purpose, in order to build toward an understanding of how an action followed 
from an individual’s (or institution’s) intentions. As Donald Forbes explains: 
[J]ust as rational choice theory can be positive and theoretical without being causal in 
the standard sense, so too can the analysis (or interpretation) of the purposes actually 
pursued by individuals, groups, and political communities. Its rules of procedure 
may be less easily codified than those for statistical analysis or formal modelling; its 
criteria of success or failure may be less clear; its assumptions about human motiva-
tion may be far less parsimonious than the gross simplifications associated with ‘ra-
tional choice’, but intentional analysis is nonetheless directed to answering factual 
questions of a theoretical character. It is not just disguised moralizing or devious pre-
scribing—or at least no more so than the currently more reputable forms of positive 
theorizing. And its descriptions, like theirs, are not just collections of brute facts: they 
are revealing abstractions from or interpretations of the facts, showing a certain dis-
tinctive detachment from practice.215 
An intentional analysis abstracts and theorizes only as far as is necessary to understand rea-
sons or rationalizations. That means it keeps intact political and moral opinions as complex 
statements of purpose, rather than “surface expressions” conditioned by an inescapable sche-
matic structure (such as the economist’s notion of a market, the neorealist’s notion of an in-
ternational system, or the constructivist’s notion of a reigning ideology).216 Standing at a re-
move from his subject, a researcher may be inclined to treat his subject’s reasons for action as 
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mere opinions, personal values, or an expression of an inescapable cultural situation. But if 
an actor expresses his moral opinions as causally meaningful—as the truest principles com-
pelling him to do right and avoid wrong—then the analyst of intentions must try, at least as 
a first step, to try to understand what, according to the actor, are these moral reasons and 
how they inform his action. This charitable allowance is its own sort of methodological bet, 
of course, but it is an essential one for the researcher who aims to find out how, or whether, 
an actor’s moral reasons are related to his policy decisions. 
In no way does the privileging of agency over “structure” trivialize the importance of 
a broader “context.” Nor does it preclude the importance of exogenous factors beyond the 
agent’s control. On the contrary, focusing on specific claims and rationalizations means that 
the interpretive approach is uniquely suited to understanding the environment of its subjects. 
By allowing the subject to explain the extent to which the environment influences his ac-
tions, the interpreter is better able to undertake an iterative, grounded analysis of the reasons 
for action and establish what is (or is not) important about the context.217 For “to under-
stand an individual's behaviour, we must know how he perceives the situation, the obstacles 
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he believed he had to face, the alternatives he saw opening up to him.”218 In other words, 
context is indeed important, but the interpreter does not begin by assuming that the subject’s 
statements and actions are simply conditioned or determined by the context; to do so would 
leave no basis for separating intentions from the context.219 
The interpretive approach is not without its challenges. To derive meaning from the 
subject, the interpreter must often formulate conclusions based on contradictory, incoherent, 
and incomplete materials.220 Moreover, a sustained commitment to derive meaning from 
language means that the interpreter is always susceptible to exaggerating the significance of 
data to the research questions. As argued in the previous chapter, much of IR theory casts 
doubts on the earnestness of rhetoric on the (not unreasonable) argument that individuals 
make decisions for reasons that may have nothing to do with their stated justifications.221 
Whereas positivists methods typically bracket any attempt to distinguish between sincere and 
insincere rhetoric, the interpreter is inclined to take on the burden, despite the absence of 
any accepted standard for such adjudication. Alternatively, some positivists point out that 
leaders may “frame” foreign policy decisions in moral terms, whether to delude others or 
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themselves, and that there is no logical relation between motivations and attached state-
ments.222 Whereas the rigorous positivist draws a precise map to his destination, the free-
wheeling interpreter paints an impressionistic landscape inspired by his own creativity—un-
bound by the universally valid rules of research design.223 Then there is the problem at the 
other end of the magnifying glass: can the interpreter truly be said to access his subject’s “re-
ality” without distorting the picture by his own contextually-conditioned, jaundiced lens? 
According to one line of arguments (common among positivist as well as critical theorists 
and postmodernists), there is no escaping one’s perspective, and it is “impossible” to expect 
of the researcher “disinterested analysis,” or to have the capacity “to know the underlying 
truth of the situation.”224  
These challenges to the interpretive approach illuminate its limitations but also its 
unique virtues.225 First, that data is not unambiguous is a universal feature of all empirical 
methods; no data is relevant without interpretation by the researcher. What is important is 
whether, and how, the researcher justifies an interpretation.226 As argued in Chapter 1, much 
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of the research on morality in IR consists of imputing motives—not because of any detailed 
interpretation, or because the assumptions are so obviously true, or because the researcher 
has succeeded in transcending his own context—but because of the researcher’s decisions 
about what is methodologically convenient.227 Thus, despite its name, the interpretive ap-
proach does not differ from other methods purely because of its use of interpretation. Rather, 
it is distinguished by its attempt to provide a defense of its interpretation through a sustained 
analysis of the reasons and arguments given for actions. These actions may indeed seem fickle 
and contradictory; their reasons may exhibit ignorance, confusion, and intellectual deficien-
cies; perhaps, even, a researcher’s critical, aerial perspective can more accurately surmise the 
true intentions of the studied agent than the agent himself. Nevertheless, an intentional anal-
ysis presumes that, before drawing such conclusions, it is worth finding out what the subjects 
did and the reasons they provided for their actions.228 This kind of political analysis tolerates 
language that is not perfectly clear or unambiguous, recognizing that such complexity “corre-
sponds to the complexity of political life.”229 The analyst assumes that human beings carry 
with them faculties to make decisions and to articulate coherent reasons (however flawed) for 
them.230 It leaves open the possibility of a distinction between desire and choice, and that 
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moral justifications, even if they help a leader attain amoral desires, are not necessarily com-
prehensive explanations for a leader’s choice.231 Finally, such an intentional analysis leaves 
open the possibility that individuals do not merely have “preferences” but also preference-
shaping and preference-prioritizing moral principles. These are principles that do not (or do 
not merely) act upon individuals through socialization. They are principles that individuals 
may affirmatively hold, understand, and attempt to explain.232  
Such a mode of inquiry—one that attempts to “rethink the thoughts” of the sub-
ject—is unavailable to the researcher whose primary purpose is to discover abstract causal 
regularities.233 In contrast to positivist orthodoxies of causal analysis, the probative value of 
an intentional analysis does not depend on excluding the possibility that political opinions 
are earnest and thoughtful.234 As one scholar explains, “no nomological inquiry—no search 
for the causal patterns that may have led up to the action—can do justice to this purposeful 
character of human action, since it cannot tell us about the meaning of the action to the in-
dividual who performed it.”235  
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INTERPRETING THE STRATEGIC SHIFT: 1893–1901 
The present study undertakes an intentional analysis of Cleveland’s second term and 
McKinley’s first term during the pivotal, waning years of the Gilded Age.236 This study uses 
case studies because intentional analysis, as described above, depends on a careful and de-
tailed examination of how individuals understand their situation and their priorities. In the 
spirit of the intentional analysis just described, the case studies are meant to demonstrate the 
relevance of analyzing the opinions and arguments of the presidents to apprehend how they 
understood the purpose of their decisions and policies.237 With each president, I focus on the 
foreign policy challenges that provoked the most controversy, since these are also the chal-
lenges that provoked the most extended justifications and self-reflection. I undertake an orig-
inal analysis of the President’s private and public policy justifications. I trace the President’s 
decisions using a variety of primary sources, especially public addresses, private correspond-
ence, and diplomatic memos that convey the presidents’ directives.238  
The Gilded Age, and in particular the 1890s, has been the subject of extensive schol-
arly debate. Recent historical works have cast doubt on the era’s reputation as a period of 
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highly corrupt interest-driven politics and cynical mass manipulation. Not unlike the 1780s, 
the 1890s is now regarded as a period of an unusual degree of political deliberation in which 
participants “debated real issues, grappled with genuine problems, and sought workable solu-
tions.”239 This was “a time of intense conflict between old values and the pressures generated 
by massive change,” supported by contests over national identity and statecraft with great 
consequences—politically, culturally, and militarily.240 The period represents a moment of 
great flux and contention over America’s foreign obligations and national identity—a mo-
ment when the needs and expectations of extensive arguments were heightened.241  
In foreign policy, the legacy of the 1890s is widely regarded as the pivot from strate-
gic, aloof isolation to expansive hegemony.242 As George Herring put it, “During that tumul-
tuous decade, the pace of diplomatic activity quickened. Americans took greater notice of 
events abroad and more vigorously asserted themselves in defense of perceived interests.”243 
The United States, for the first time, was acquiring overseas territory without any intention 
of statehood incorporation. It culminated with the defeat of Spain, the control of Cuba, 
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Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. It was a moment when the United States aban-
doned its confined continental hegemony and strategy of geostrategic aloofness. Samuel 
Flagg Bemis famously called the change “the great aberration.”244  
Not long after McKinley’s assassination in 1901, historians began reflecting on the 
legacy of the period and offering several reasons for America’s strategic shift from continental 
to global power. What emerged were three alternative (though sometimes intertwined) 
schools of thought, sourcing the change to motives of profit, security, and cultural ideas. 
According to the profit-centered school, the foreign policy of the period was driven 
by a combination of economic trends, such as the surplus of goods in a saturated domestic 
market, growing industry punctuated by economic upheavals, and the desire and economic 
need to attain access to new foreign markets.245 Charles Beard argued that, by 1895, “Ameri-
can economic interests in Cuba were strong enough to induce interference. Slavery was gone, 
but capital, still more dominant, had taken its place.”246 The new foreign policy reflected 
“the frank acknowledgment of the new emphasis on world policy which economic interests 
demanded.”247 More recently, Walter LaFeber has traced the rise of the United States as a 
global power to a centralization of politics and military strength, which itself was driven by 
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the expanding needs of corporate capitalism in a cycle of domestic centralization and foreign 
expansion.248 The movement of the U.S. economy comprised of agrarian production to a 
more urbanized, dynamic, industrial, and globalized market compelled political officials to 
protect commercial interests by securing existing foreign claims and finding new ones.249  
These profit-centered accounts typically work backward, drawing inferences of mo-
tives from the outcomes of foreign policy (i.e., commercial expansion). The historian 
Thomas D. Schoonover demonstrates succinctly how such inferences are typically drawn: 
“U.S. action in the Gulf-Caribbean and Pacific basins had responded to the depression of the 
1890s. After the war of 1898, the U.S. economy experienced a boost in Asian and Caribbean 
trade.”250 As the political scientist Richard F. Hamilton has shown, explanations that point 
to colonial markets as fields of new investments draw most of their evidence not from the 
lips of the era’s politicians (or even business moguls) but from other historians, journalists, 
and politicians who were rarely involved in actual policy-making.251 Hamilton summarizes 
these “progressive” narratives by noting that “Political leaders, the elected and appointed offi-
cials figure prominently in those accounts but they are assigned less importance, being 
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treated typically as little more than ‘agents’ of the business leaders.”252 Meanwhile, one 
strains to find in these studies any sustained or charitable analysis of the great mass of moral 
justifications provided by the presidents of the time.  
When they do not ignore the prevalence of moral rhetoric, the profit-centered expla-
nations situate moral arguments in the context of a reigning “ideology.” The theological and 
nationalistic ideas elucidated by the prominent theologians, intellectuals, and strategists are 
said to be “more a rationale for, than a cause of, American expansionism.”253 The politicians 
of the decade are sometimes described as canny manipulators of a gullible public that desper-
ately needed some kind of moral crutch to justify their raw pursuit of profit and domestic 
stability.254 In his influential histories, William Appleton Williams claims that Gilded Age 
politicians wielded moral arguments to reinforce “hard-headed economic requirements.”255 
Similarly, Michael H. Hunt argues that “Ideology was functional, a tool used by the grandees 
of American capitalism to maintain their economic power and with it their sociopolitical 
control.”256 When a gap seems to emerge between the moral rhetoric and the conduct of 
                                               
252 Richard F. Hamilton, America’s New Empire (Routledge, 2017), 1. 
253 Walter LaFeber, “Comments,” The American Historical Review 83, no. 3 (1978), 669. LaFeber is referring 
here to Social Darwinism. As his analysis of Josiah Strong, Alfred Mahan, and John Fiske indicate, their central 
contribution to the climate of the time was their emphasis on demographic and economic determinants. La-
Feber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898, chapter 2. 
254 Williams argues that the ruling elite was deeply insecure about chaos and revolution resulting from labor 
unrest and corporatism. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 21. 
255 Williams, 64. 
256 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 9. See also 
Gerald E Markowitz, “Progressivism and Imperialism: A Return to First Principles,” Historian 37, no. 2 (1975). 
As David Pletcher has argued in a critique of these works, many politicians of the period spoke of foreign mar-
kets without taking actions to attain them. His lesson seems to be that we should be wary of reading too much 
into rhetoric. David M. Pletcher, “Rhetoric and Results: A Pragmatic View of American Economic Expansion-




U.S. policy, some scholars dismiss the language as a transparently hypocritical cover for eco-
nomic motives, rather than provide a charitable account of the arguments and available alter-
native explanations.257 
Other scholarship on the period focuses on the security motivations that drove 
American expansion. On its face, the Gilded Age was a period of uncharacteristic peace and 
presents an interesting quandary for the realist belief in the primacy of security.258 During 
this period, Great Britain was in relative decline, Germany was in relative ascent, and the 
United States was enjoying relative peace an ocean away from most controversies. Mired in 
their dependencies in Africa and Asia, European powers had little interest in confronting an 
increasingly powerful hemispheric hegemon.259 Addressing America’s strategic shift, realist 
explanations of different flavors have pointed to the increasing capability of the United States 
government and the security imperative to block major competitors that threatened en-
croachment into the hemisphere.260  
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Like the profit-centered explanations, the security-centered theories either ignore 
moral arguments or simply reduce them to instrumental rationalizations that fed the under-
lying security needs of the nation. For John Mearsheimer, what is important to emphasize on 
this score is that ideational factors “did not contradict the security imperative.”261 Indeed, 
the presence of moralism during this period is corroboration that a “proper mask” was needed 
to cover over the “brutal politics” that made possible America’s expansion.262  
While this realist explanation imputes motives without considering what was actually 
said at the time, an older realist account, found in George F. Kennan’s seminal American Di-
plomacy, 1900–1950, acknowledges that evidence of security motivations is, alas, largely ab-
sent in the debates at the time. Kennan thus does not assume that leaders were operating ac-
cording to hidden security motivations. However, his highly polemical critique leads him, 
without evidence, to conflate the moral considerations of the leadership with ill-defined but 
overwhelming emotional fever that encompassed much of the public. Kennan’s account is 
one of many that relies on assumptions about “popular moods,” “emotional complexes,” and 
the prevalence of ill-considered “legalistic ideas.”263 McKinley, Kennan concludes, resorted 
to war with Spain for “subjective and emotional reasons” untethered to any prudent, secu-
rity-minded understanding of the national interest.264  
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Other scholars, among them constructivists, have provided more persuasive assess-
ments of the role of ideas during the Gilded Age. According to Edward Rhodes, the decade 
marks “a reconstruction of the cultural and cognitive landscape, not necessarily a response to 
change in the physical or political one.”265 Following the Civil War, a heightened sense of 
nationalism and imperialism took hold of American society. The most powerful leaders of 
the time were driven by new ideas—relating to religious destiny, racial hierarchy, and politi-
cal legitimacy—that were propagated by the likes of naval strategist Alfred Mahan, clergy-
man Josiah Strong, historian John Fiske, and political scientist John Burgess.266 The naval 
enlargement that culminated in America’s strategic shift was part of a broader, cultural revo-
lution in American identity and purpose spurred on by political reformers like Assistant Sec-
retary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of State John Hay, Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge, and Senator Albert J. Beveridge.267 A yellow press overseen by propaganda outlets, in-
cluding Joseph Pulitzer's New York World and William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal, 
put these ideas into the public imagination.268  
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Most of these constructivist and ideology-oriented accounts privilege structure over 
agency. They speak of ideas as independent forces that compel or constrain leaders.269 In 
such depictions, rhetoric matters little because it was used merely to reinforce shared ideas—
an effort to draw “on values and concerns widely shared and easily understood by its audi-
ence.”270 Moral arguments, in other words, are important only insofar as they are effective 
tools to persuade the public, or reveal a shared identity that the President himself has 
adopted.271 Most of the work of these theories proceeds according to the determinants of 
ideas (such as Social Darwinism and racial hierarchy) that rationalize expansionism, rather 
than the specific elaboration or explanation of individuals.272 Ultimately, studies on ideas 
and ideology are compelling insofar they describe a structural-ideational context. But they 
have less to say about what leaders actually said and what these leaders meant.273 
In a sense, downplaying the importance of Gilded Age statesmen is understandable. 
The period is sometimes regarded as a time when presidents were mired in domestic discord 
to the exclusion of foreign policy. Herring quotes the British academic James Bryce (1838–
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1922) as observing that “the President has rarely leisure to give close or continuous attention 
to foreign policy.”274 However, Herring does not mention that Bryce himself recognized that 
the executive power maintained “an unfettered initiative, by means of which he may embroil 
the country abroad or excite passion at home,” and that initiative, in matters of war, “ex-
pands with portentous speed.”275 The 1890s represent a moment when presidents vigorously 
exercised these constitutional powers to facilitate and shape public debate over the nation’s 
character, its global fate, and what moral responsibilities pair with its increasing power. The 
deterministic narratives treat moral language as a rationalization for profit- and security-cen-
tered objectives, or as manifestations of an inescapable cultural matrix. They have little to say 
about the intentions of the presidents as revealed by their own privately- and publicly-articu-
lated explanations. The purpose of the case studies in the following chapters is to fill this gap, 
while demonstrating the unique advantage of an intentional analysis to understanding Amer-
ican foreign policy decision-making. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The constructivist and psycho-attitudinal critique in IR has illuminated the limita-
tions of materialist approaches and the empirical importance of interpreting norms and 
ideas. However, both have remained wedded to the positivist tendency to attribute moral 
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opinions to determinants that act upon decision-makers.276 By training the researcher’s atten-
tion to the meaning of agents’ actions as they understand them, an intentional analysis can 
open a range of moral motivations that are effectively closed off by deterministic theories.  
The purpose of the following case studies is to demonstrate the comparative ad-
vantages of an intentional analysis. The extant literature on waning years of the Gilded Age 
betrays a remarkable gap between the importance ascribed to the period and the attention 
paid to how political leaders understood and justified their decisions. Most of the prominent 
explanations infer from outcome to cause, beginning with the fact of America’s global strate-
gic and economic ascendancy at the beginning of the twentieth century, and then tailoring 
their analysis of the antecedent period to fit that outcome. As I argue in the following chap-
ters, this outcome-driven, deterministic approach has led some scholars to simply ignore the 
contrast in McKinley and Cleveland’s foreign policies and treat the period as a kind of secu-
lar providence by which “structural” forces gradually and inexorably culminate in unprece-
dented and world-historic expansionism. As we shall see, the differences between the presi-
dents are sometimes acknowledged. Yet these differences are reconciled only by a strained in-
terpretation that situate Cleveland’s tenure in the beginning of an inexorable movement to-
ward global outreach that became fully manifest during McKinley’s presidency. 
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Chapter 3: The Communitarianism of Grover Cleveland 
Glancing at the titles of Grover Cleveland’s sympathetic biographies—A Study in 
Courage (1932), A Study in Character (2000), An Honest President (2000), The Forgotten Con-
servative (2013)—one quickly ascertains that this was a man known for his concern for per-
sonal probity, civic virtue, and traditional political formalities.277 Early in his New York ca-
reer as Mayor of Buffalo (1882) and Governor (1883–1885), he cultivated an image of fear-
less political integrity, presenting himself as an enemy of corrupt electoral politics and gov-
ernment waste. When the journalist Joseph Pulitzer endorsed Cleveland’s bid for president 
in 1884, he provided four reasons: “1. He is an honest man. 2. He is an honest man. 3. He is 
an honest man. 4. He is an honest man.”278 When his political enemies accused him of hav-
ing a child out of wedlock, Cleveland publicly conceded the possibility, voluntarily provided 
child support, and dissipated the controversy.279 Whatever his shortcomings, Cleveland 
strived to serve as an exemplar of the common patriotic citizen—sensible, accessible, free of 
intellectual pretensions, and attentive to the public interest. At the same time, Cleveland was, 
as Richard E. Welch put it, “a tangle of self-contradictions: humble and ambitious, coura-
geous and cautious, practical and moralistic, irritable and kindly, aggressive and sensitive.”280 
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As his published post-presidency lectures addresses suggest, Cleveland was deeply interested 
in elucidating the necessary virtuous requirements of sound democratic character while hold-
ing up his example as worthy of emulation. He was, as one early biographer said, “immoder-
ately modest”—someone who sought to be an extraordinary model of ordinary virtue.281 
Cleveland’s pride in personal and political rectitude is evident in his domestic 
agenda. A Bourbon Democrat, and the only Democratic president between 1861 and 1913, 
he was a proponent of free trade and interstate commerce. His enthusiasm for free markets, 
however, was tempered by his deep suspicion of the political influence of big business and 
special interests.282 He constantly sought to exercise his commitment to government effi-
ciency and accountability, even when doing so won him little popularity.283  
Cleveland’s concern with domestic reform should not be confused with intellectual 
disinterest or policy passivity in matters of foreign policy. While he respected the need and 
propriety of legislative deliberation on every major foreign policy issue facing him, he also 
demonstrated a firm commitment to protecting and exercising the prerogatives of his office. 
He did not hesitate to interject in congressional deliberations, forcing legislators to change 
course and take up new issues. When he felt it was necessary to maximize his discretion and 
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execute his foreign policy agenda, he forcefully asserted his constitutional authority over law-
makers’ protests and threats.  
That agenda has not vexed scholars as much as it should. On one hand, Cleveland is 
regarded as the last gasp of America’s commitment to traditional neutrality and national con-
tentment with its “splendid isolation.” Indeed, Cleveland’s responses to the few international 
controversies of his first term (1885–1889) were largely consistent with his inaugural prom-
ise to continue Washington and Monroe’s policy of “independence” and “neutrality,” avoid-
ing “foreign broils” while repelling great powers from hemispheric encroachment.284 After 
losing office to Benjamin Harrison and winning it again four years later, Cleveland returned 
to the White House (in March of 1893) under a party platform that promised in foreign pol-
icy much of what he gave the country in the first term—a strong national defense, backed by 
a strong navy, and the maintenance of a diplomacy that cultivates friendships, especially with 
Latin neighbors, while avoiding entangling alliances.285 However, Cleveland’s second term 
(1893–1897) was much more eventful. During this period, foreign controversies became do-
mestic issues. The President was deeply involved in international affairs and sometimes 
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seemed to stray from his reputation as a non-interventionist, and from the putative isolation-
ist inertia of the era.  
Most scholarship on Cleveland’s foreign policy makes little effort to understand his 
conveyed understanding of his intentions. The overriding lesson of much of the literature is 
that Cleveland’s foreign policy intentions are insignificant—that his personal inclinations 
were contained within an immotile political car inexorably moving on tracks prepared for 
him by domestic and international forces. His preferences made no practical difference, we 
are told, since his foreign policy was merely continuing his predecessor’s, and preparing the 
ground for his successor’s expansionism. “His personal and his party’s isolationist inclina-
tions could not impede the structural pressures that demanded the United States take a more 
active role in world affairs,” says Fareed Zakaria.286 
Needless to say, Cleveland himself did not view his stated objectives and justifica-
tions as epiphenomenal expressions of, or futile resistance to, a disembodied expansionist 
providence. This chapter considers Cleveland’s moral arguments as he understood them—
that is, in light of the circumstances and considerations he said were most important to shap-
ing his foreign policy. To that end, this chapter analyzes the three international episodes of 
his second term that invited the most public controversy and self-reflection by Cleveland: 
His attempted reversal of ongoing plans for Hawaii’s annexation, his interposition into the 
border dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, and his decision to maintain a policy of 
                                               




neutrality as Cubans revolted against their Spanish masters.287 What emerges from this inter-
pretation, I argue, is a strikingly lucid and fairly consistent articulation of a national interest 
guided by an overriding concern with certain communitarian principles of international jus-
tice.  
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII (1893–1895) 
Cleveland’s decision to thwart the treaty to annex the Hawaiian islands is regarded by 
his biographer, Allan Nevins, as among the most important, yet neglected, episodes in Amer-
ican diplomatic history—furnishing “the first great debate in American history over the mer-
its of imperialism.”288 For supporters of annexation, Cleveland’s decision to reverse his pre-
decessor’s policy was bizarre—a gratuitous political recrimination that sided with an anti-
American, corrupt, anachronistic monarchy. As Robert N. McElroy wrote in his 1923 biog-
raphy of Cleveland, “It would have been easy, had he been fitted with a less exacting con-
science, for President Cleveland to go smoothly on to its culmination.”289 Cleveland chose to 
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depart from the easy route and take an uncompromising stand that, in his view, would pro-
tect the independence of a helpless nation against the contemptible actions of an aggressor—
that is, his own country. In part because the debate over Hawaii annexation was so polariz-
ing, and because so much seemed at stake to both sides, it helps shed light on the moral rea-




Cleveland’s refusal to connive at the annexation of Hawaii is all the more striking 
given the apparent inevitability of American control of the Hawaiian islands, not only from 
the perspective of a historian’s hindsight, but also among the nineteenth-century political 
elite, who witnessed the island’s rapid transformation into a protected American colony.291 
Since the days of John Quincy Adams, the islands were regarded as of utmost importance to 
America’s long-term geostrategic interests. By the 1820s, the navy routinely dispatched its 
ships to collect debts owed to American traders by Polynesian chiefs. Over the following dec-
ades, ties deepened as New England Congregationalist made native Hawaiian society one of 
their primary targets of spiritual reform. Meanwhile, the archipelago turned into a major 
economic partner of American sugar planters and whalers. In 1842, John Tyler declared that 
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the United States would not accept any foreign acquisition of the islands. Three years later, 
the Reciprocity Treaty consummated the relationship and the United States gained complete 
access to the kingdom’s sugar market while formally prohibiting the island from any foreign 
control. 
As independence of the Sandwich Islands was approaching purely nominal status and 
the crown became a symbolic shell, the process of peaceful integration was interrupted ab-
ruptly. In 1891, a native monarch, Queen Liliuokalani, came to power on a nationalist plat-
form to restore the kingdom to its historic majesty. Rejecting the constitutional designed 
foisted on her late brother’s kingdom by a white establishment, she declared war on the lib-
eral elements of her constitution. Hawaii’s modernity came at the cost of surrendering the 
kingdom to foreigners who have little stake in Hawaiian heritage, she argued. The “down-
town party”—the mercantile element embodied by the Chamber of Commerce, the sugar 
planters, and missionaries—were wielding disproportionate influence on the kingdom’s 
crown, which she regarded as “the sole guaranty of our nationality.”292 On January 14, 1893, 
in the name of her indigenous constituents, she purged her cabinet of dissenters and prom-
ised the constitutional disenfranchisement of the foreign white elite.  
Interpreting the queen’s actions as an abdication of the regime’s constitutional au-
thority and sensing an opportunity to thwart the queen’s designs, the haole (white), mostly 
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American elite of Oahu, comprised of pro-annexationist politicians, lawyers, and business-
men, began a revolution against Hawaiian royalty. Once she sensed danger was afoot, the 
queen attempted to recant her program. This would come too late: Undoubtedly sympa-
thetic to the revolutionary cause, John Stevens, President Harrison’s minister to Hawaii, dis-
patched American marines of the USS Boston (which happened to be stationed off Honolulu 
at the time) to help the revolutionary leaders force the queen out of power and to set up a 
provisional government in her place.293 Stevens then declared the Provisional Government 
the presumptive ruling entity under a U.S. protectorate, and the 1,600-year-old kingdom 
was effectively dead. In February, President Harrison sent a treaty of annexation to the Sen-
ate, but his term expired before Congress could conclude deliberation of the treaty that 
would see these provisions into law. In the weeks following the revolution, a debate emerged, 
with some questioning whether Hawaii was stolen or whether annexation was worth the po-
litical and military risks.294 
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In general, however, attitudes were quite favorable to annexation. As the New York 
Tribune put it: “The popular verdict is clear, unequivocal, and practically unanimous. Ha-
waii is welcome.”295 Aside from Minister Stevens and his troops, the political class in the 
United States had no direct role in the revolution; the whole incident came to them as a sur-
prise.296 By most indications, the American public and its representatives were eager to wel-
come the surprise.297 The leaders of both parties appeared signaled their support of annexa-
tion.298 President Harrison and Secretary of State John W. Foster were quite willing to play 
their dealt card in America’s favor, and seemed confident that both parties do, too.299 While 
Harrison was in office, an informal Senate poll suggested the Republican-controlled body fa-
vored annexation, though only tepidly.300 As the historians John A.S. Grenville and George 
Berkeley Young suggest, with some Democrats supporting ratification, “the treaty thus ap-
peared to be sure of speedy ratification—had not Cleveland intervened at this late stage.”301 
Before his second term, Cleveland was a champion of conventional wisdom regard-
ing Hawaii, believing that it was an essential hub of America’s growing commercial activity. 
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In 1884, when an agreement was pending to establish Pearl Harbor as an exclusive U.S. na-
val inlet, Cleveland strongly advised the Senate to approve it. Those islands, he said, “are vir-
tually an outpost of American commerce and a stepping-stone to the growing trade of the 
Pacific.”302 In his first term, Cleveland would speak of the United States’ “paramount influ-
ence” in Hawaii, owing to “a natural interdependency and mutuality of interest” between the 
two nations. He said the islands “left almost alone in the enjoyment of their autonomy, 
which it is important for us should be preserved.”303 Yet it is precisely such an arrangement 
that would be difficult to resurrect, should the United States retreat and allow its competitors 
to appropriate its position.304  
As he was preparing for his reentry into presidential office, Cleveland withheld his 
opinion of the annexation treaty, even as some newspapers anticipated that the treaty would 
sail smoothly from the Senate to his pen.305 Within a week of his inauguration and the seat-
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ing the now Democratic Senate, Cleveland withdrew the treaty “for the purpose of re-exami-
nation,” before it could be debated.306 Days later, in a letter to the illustrious German immi-
grant, Carl Schurz, Cleveland said he is not opposed to annexation of territory, in principle, 
but that “I am sure we ought to stop and look and think. That’s exactly what we are doing 
now.”307  
Cleveland revealed his suspicions that the overthrow of the queen was an imperialist 
subversion within days of his inauguration in March 1893, when he commissioned Georgia 
congressman James H. Blount, an outspoken anti-imperialist, to undertake a four-month in-
vestigation into the circumstances that led the queen to relinquish her crown. Blount’s report 
concluded that the dethronement of the queen was an illegal affair in which the United 
States government was at least indirectly responsible. Blount said that the queen abdicated 
involuntarily and because the revolutionaries had spoken in the name of the American gov-
ernment and enjoyed the support of the American marines. The inquiry revealed that the an-
nexation plan was excogitated months in advance by Stevens. Furthermore, the revolutionar-
ies were motivated by the promise of power and profit rather than self-defense. The regime 
change occurred despite native support for the provisional government and the prospect of 
American annexation. Blount’s recommendations pointed squarely against the annexation of 
the islands and in favor of restoring the monarchy.  
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Not surprisingly, Blount’s work was praised by anti-imperialists, including the Ha-
waiian queen herself.308 One of Cleveland’s home newspapers feared that the conspiracy un-
covered by Blount’s good work threatens to “sully the honor and blacken the fair name of 
the United States.”309 Equally vociferous were the imperialists and their sympathizers (in-
cluding Stevens) who complained that Blount’s findings were highly tendentious and his 
method of inquiry biased and selective. “Inaccurate, incomplete, and grossly prejudiced” was 
how the Chicago Tribune described Blount’s report.310 Opponents cried that Blount was less 
investigator than unapproved diplomat, hired by the administration to devise a pretext that 
could justify the preexisting, anti-annexationist policy of the administration.311 
The firestorm around Blount’s findings could not have surprised Cleveland, who 
would have guessed that his hand-picked investigator, a known critic of naval enlargement 
and strategic expansion, would portray any annexation in unflattering terms. It soon became 
clear that Blount’s report was significant less for its revelations than for confirming to Cleve-
land that the conditions that would legitimize an annexation were utterly absent in January 
1893. In July, Cleveland accepted Blount’s report and agreed with its conclusions: the revo-
lution was one of design rather than necessity, made possible by collusion with American as-
sociates and illegitimate military reinforcement, and that the provisional government did not 
come into power with the support of natives, who overwhelmingly opposed annexation. The 
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status quo ante must be restored on the islands, he determined, and the provisional govern-
ment must hand back its control to the queen. However, Cleveland soon learned that restor-
ing the monarchy would be impossible without bloodshed: the provisional government was 
unlikely to step down peacefully. The queen, meanwhile, refused to promise clemency to the 
revolutionaries short of a quick beheading.312 It became apparent that the kingdom could 
not be restored without congressionally-authorized military action that would violently re-
store the queen. That was out of the question. 
On December 18, 1893, the awkward impasse led a frustrated Cleveland to transfer 
back the matter from his executive authority to congressional deliberation. Accompanying 
Cleveland’s decision to hand back the reins to Congress was a rousing, sometimes near-cate-
chetic, six-thousand-word public message. This “masterly” and “powerful” statement (to 
quote the New York Times) laid out in patently moral terms the motivations that led him to 
interject into congressional deliberations of the treaty, attempt to reverse course, and ulti-
mately (upon recognition of the limits of his choices) re-submit the matter to Congress.313 
Despite the popularity of expansion into the Pacific and the general (though not universal) 
antipathy toward a foreign queen who had proven unfriendly to the cause of constitutional 
liberty, his message indicated that nothing deserved more attention than the sins committed 
                                               
312 McElroy, Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman: An Authorized Biography, 63. 
313 “The Hawaiian Message.: President Cleveland’s Position Unassailable and Right.” New York Times, Decem-




in the name of the United States. “Never,” says McElroy, “did he denounce a foreign gov-
ernment more uncompromisingly than he here denounced his own government.”314  
 
Cleveland’s Case Against Hawaiian Annexation 
Cleveland’s explanation for why he revoked the treaty was almost entirely grounded 
in his conviction that strategic and economic acquisitiveness, especially against a weak and 
helpless regime, is a moral crime and a disgraceful demonstration of America’s lack of con-
cern for “international morality.” His message was partly an effort, in the name of “national 
honesty,” to publicly flagellate America’s role in an unlawful conspiracy. It also provided an 
extended exhortation for the United States government to live up to a code of conduct in 
foreign policy based on “right and justice”—conduct that is worthy of “the mission and 
character of our Government and the behavior which the conscience of our people demands 
of their public servants.”315  
Cleveland argued that Hawaiian annexation was “wholly without justification” be-
cause it betrayed the features of imperial conquest. “Our country was in danger of occupying 
the position of having actually set up a temporary government on foreign soil for the purpose 
of acquiring through that agency territory which we had wrongfully put in its possession,” he 
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said. It was forcible in that it proceeded despite visible native support for American govern-
ance. To any reasonable observer, it appeared as a concocted scheme to acquire territory ra-
ther than a transparent and internationally defendable state action. Despite Senate delibera-
tion, annexation also fails any domestic legal standard, as it was initiated by conspirators who 
had skirted ordinary constitutional procedures and arrogated to themselves undue authority. 
Most incriminating, argued Cleveland, the good name of the United States was made an ac-
complice to transgressive actions animated by impure motivations—a “desire for territorial 
extension, or dissatisfaction with a form of government not our own.” 
In his address, Cleveland never denied the merits of the arguments made by annexa-
tionists, including Stevens, that American control of the islands would redound to the mate-
rial, economic, and strategic benefit of the continent. Cleveland provided no indication that 
his views have changed about the importance of motioning American influence over Hawaii. 
In fact, noting America’s long tradition of acquiring new territories, he affirmed America’s 
general right to annexation.316 Yet every general right is delimited by conditions, and it was 
the nefarious motivation and circumstances of the revolution that led him to believe “that 
the United States could not…annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of 
acquiring them by unjustifiable methods.” 
                                               
316 While Cleveland was sympathetic to the more limited arguments of anti-imperialists like Schurz, who had 
argued that Hawaiian annexation was impractical and unnecessary, he had also said he (unlike them) is not 
against annexation as a general principle. Cleveland to Schurz, March 19, 1893. In Schurz, Speeches, Corre-




For Cleveland, the overthrow of the queen had to be condemned precisely because it 
was driven by strategic and material interests. Cleveland censured Stevens’ “ardent desire” for 
American control of the islands as precipitating intervention that superseded proper political 
and legal procedures (both constitutional and diplomatic), which Stevens had dismissed as 
inconvenient formalities. On the blatantly bogus excuse of self-defense, Stevens dispatched 
160 marines in order to exploit a local event and use it as a pretext to secure Hawaii for 
America. Citing Blount’s report, Cleveland said that “There is as little basis for the pretense 
that such forces were landed for the security of American life and property.” Stevens’ indis-
cretion betrayed premeditated conspiracy stemming from opportunity rather than necessity.  
Cleveland was undoubtedly correct in his estimation that Stevens was a supporter of 
annexation and was looking for a golden opportunity to exploit. Even after the overthrow of 
the queen, Stevens publicly championed the cause of American annexation.317 But Stevens’ 
case was not wholly based on notions of national aggrandizement and interest. Cleveland ig-
nored Stevens’ argument that the American interest has proven to be a facilitator of the is-
lands’ general prosperity, and that annexation would serve indigenous interests. Since the Ha-
waiian Islands were in danger of becoming a satellite of another, much less friendly, foreign 
power, the question, for Stevens, was simply which power would be the first to pluck the 
pear from the geostrategic tree. In that respect, Stevens argued that there was little doubt that 
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the natives would be far better off under American power. The United States has long-term, 
vested interests in the territories, whereas other powers would use the islands as their navy’s 
way-station, exploiting the islands for their transient needs.318 
As to the Polynesian kingdom’s current government, Stevens had pointed to the del-
eterious corruption of monarchy, both in principle and its instantiation in the Pacific, as evi-
dence that republicanism would be a significant improvement of conditions for the islanders, 
including the natives. “In truth the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism,” Stevens wrote 
to the secretary of state, months before the rebellion took place. “It has nothing on which it 
logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, 
the monarchy now is only an impediment to good government—an obstruction to the pros-
perity and progress of the islands.”319 In sum, Stevens had made a robust case that American 
annexation is justified both by American and native interests. 
It is not difficult to understand why, in his message, Cleveland does not recount Ste-
vens’ humanitarian argument with great detail. In the first place, Cleveland argues that it is 
hypocritical to make a case in favor of the installation of a republican government that “owes 
its existence to an armed invasion by the United States.”320 Even a superior, less corrupt, 
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more republican government is nevertheless illegitimate if it emerges from unlawful proce-
dures. Cleveland suggests that even well-meaning regime change on republican principles can 
be an illegal (and therefore immoral) affair. For however badly the native government serves 
its people, it is nevertheless the only “lawful authority” on the islands—and an authority that 
broke no promises to the United States and posed no direct and immediate threat to Ameri-
cans. The “feeble but friendly” regime was therefore entitled to its sovereign right of self-de-
termination and self-rule, which includes the freedom to determine its own political institu-
tions, including those that fall short of American standards: 
While naturally sympathizing with every effort to establish a republican of govern-
ment, it has been the settled policy of the United States to concede to people of for-
eign countries the same freedom and independence in the management of their do-
mestic affairs that we have always claimed for ourselves; and it has been our practice 
to recognize revolutionary governments as soon as it became apparent that they were 
supported by the people. 
Cleveland grounded America’s legal and moral obligations to the monarchy in the 
principle of international sovereign equality, which he said is analogous to civil equality. 
“The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of conduct governing 
individual relations between citizens or subjects of a civilized state are equally applicable as 
between enlightened nations.” The moral test of the nation’s fidelity to international law is 
deepened and more urgent when legal transgressions are more tempting, as they are to the 
stronger power that can easily prey upon the weak: 
It has been the boast of our government that it seeks to do justice in all things with-
out regard to the strength or weakness of those with whom it deals. I mistake the 
American people if they favor the odious doctrine that there is no such thing as inter-




one, and that even by indirection a strong power may with impunity despoil a weak 
one of its territory. 
As the power disparity between nations grow, so too does the meaningfulness of a great 
power’s restrained conduct. Cleveland acknowledged that international law does not enjoy 
the enforcement mechanisms of domestic law. However, as he argued, international law’s re-
liance on the “good faith” and “conscience” of its members are attributes that endow the law 
with its moral power. Such absence of enforcement, he says, “only give additional sanction to 
the law itself and brand any deliberate infraction of it not merely as a wrong but as a dis-
grace”:  
A man of true honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more 
scrupulously, if possible, than he does the bond a breach of which subjects him to le-
gal liabilities; and the United States in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most 
enlightened of nations would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its interna-
tional relations any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that 
ground the United States cannot properly be put in the position of countenancing a 
wrong after its commission any more than in that of consenting to it in advance.  
Cleveland argued that the annexation treaty is a pernicious danger to American char-
acter because it suggests the United States is willing to opportunistically undermine interna-
tional law and countenance injustice when doing so redounds to the material and strategic 
benefit of the nation. Much of the damage has already been done, Cleveland said. Shining a 
light on it, or “national honesty,” as his address explained, is the first step. The second step is 
for the United States to undo the illicit conspiracy and restore the monarchy, as far as doing 
so is practicable. “The United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice 




Despite Cleveland’s strong words and success in persuading many Democrats to his 
cause, his efforts to right the wrong in Hawaii had only mixed success. Cleveland stance was 
consistent with Southern and Western opposition to annexation.321 Pro-annexationist sena-
tors, including those within Cleveland’s party, questioned the President’s interference, espe-
cially by his manner of unilaterally appointing Blount. In February of 1894, a Senate-com-
missioned report overseen by Democrat (and advocate of expansion) John T. Morgan, con-
tradicted some of Blount’s findings on key points and exonerated Stevens’ actions, leading to 
a Senate resolution prohibiting further executive intervention against the provisional govern-
ment of Hawaii.322 However, although reinstalling the kingdom was no longer expedient, 
Congress agreed on a policy of future non-interference, tacitly sanctioning the status quo, 
but formally and explicitly affirming the President’s argument that the setting up of the pro-
visional government “was contrary to the traditions of our Republic and the spirit of our 
Constitution, and should be and is condemned…. [W]e heartily approve the principle an-
nounced by the President of the United States that interference with the domestic affairs of 
an independent nation is contrary to the spirit of American institutions.”323 In July of 1894, 
as Hawaii’s provisional government became the Hawaiian republic, modeled after American 
institutions, Cleveland acknowledged that a stable civil government was now in operation, 
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fulfilling its functions and obligations as a state. Whatever sins made its formation possible, 
there was no longer doubt that it now deserved presumed legitimacy. On May 27, 1896, the 
Hawaiian legislature adopted a unanimous joint resolution declaring that it is “firmly and 
steadfastly in favor of the Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States of Amer-
ica.”324  
Even if Cleveland’s opposition to annexation did not permanently change the course 
of American foreign policy, his manner and reasons for opposition successfully politicized 
questions that many were eager to ignore. From the perspective of his political opponents, 
Cleveland had “blackguarded the foreign policy of his predecessor before the world.”325 In 
making the issue a partisan one, he forced Republicans (and pro-annexation Democrats) to, 
for the first time, defend a policy in light of the unseemly facts, in light of its moral shortfall 
when juxtaposed against the nation’s high standards of “international morality.” 
Throughout his final years in office and throughout his retirement, Cleveland de-
scribed his decision to politicize the matter as a success. In June of 1897, when President 
McKinley submitted a new annexation treaty to the Senate, Cleveland regarded his own ac-
tions as noble attempts to rectify the wrongs—a means of protecting “American honor and 
probity” by demonstrating grave discomfort with an instance of a disgraceful disregard of 
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justice.326 When annexation was consummated and the American flag was raised in Hono-
lulu in 1898, Cleveland maintained that he was disgusted by the original sins that had made 
it possible. Writing to Richard Olney, he said: “As I look back upon the first steps in this 
miserable business and as I contemplate the means used to complete the outrage, I am 
ashamed of the whole affair.”327  
Although the response to Cleveland’s 1893 message was predictably mixed and did 
not enjoy long-term success, few denied the President’s earnestness. In March of 1897, when 
McKinley met with a delegation from the Hawaiian government, one of its members, Wil-
liam Smith, noted that  
The difference between the attitude of the present administration and the last one is 
like that of the difference between daylight and darkness. The present is a friendly 
one, waiting for the best opportunity and most favorable means of presenting the 
matter. The other was irrevocably opposed to it.328 
Without predicting that Cleveland would be successful, the Democratic and independent 
press praised Cleveland for, in The Boston Globe’s words, acting “as his conscience dictates.” 
The paper’s editors estimated that “He will assuredly lose neither honor nor reputation be-
cause he has been scrupulous to do all that he could consistent with law to make amends for 
what he sincerely believe was a great wrong.”329 The Waterbury of Connecticut praised Cleve-
land for doing “all that was possible for patriotism, and a high ideal of what the American 
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good name demands before the nations of the earth.”330 Cleveland’s early, sympathetic biog-
rapher wrote that Cleveland overturned a popular policy and invited the conflict “solely in 
the interest of international justice, solely that another weak and defenseless people might re-
main free.”331  
Cleveland’s loyal defenders may have exaggerated the President’s noble altruism—
after all, he did not describe his position in those terms, and he clearly sought a policy that 
he believed would save his own country (and perhaps his own administration) from the igno-
miny of territorial invasion. On the other hand, contemporary scholars undoubtedly exagger-
ate the cynicism of efforts, too quickly dismissing or misrepresenting his articulated inten-
tions and well-reasoned arguments. Beginning especially with Charles and Mary Beards’ 
claim that “it was mainly sugar that precipitated the crisis,” deterministic accounts have 
sought to play down Cleveland’s temporary “delay” of the inevitable, and play up the struc-
tural constraints at work.332 For example, according to LaFeber, Cleveland, while “right-
eously rejecting the burdens of governing a polyglot population located two thousand miles 
from the mainland,” was acting shrewdly, in a way that acknowledged economic and social 
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pessimism while tightening America’s hold on the islands.333 Zakaria, meanwhile, points ad-
ditionally to a divided government and a “bleak atmosphere,” caused by a devastating finan-
cial crisis, as temporarily dampening expansionist fervor.334 “The movement to annex Ha-
waii…failed because of America’s economic troubles,” he asserts.335 For Hunt, the determi-
native cause of the “delay” of annexation was the racial fears of anti-annexationists.336  
Such exogenous factors can reasonably be said to have contributed to the “delay” of 
annexation, as well as its eventual realization. However, one would struggle to find any evi-
dence in Cleveland’s own words that his reasons had anything to do with economic con-
straints, strategic maneuvering, racism, and resistance to irrepressible institutional and geo-
strategic forces. In fact, his explanations for inviting conflict and attempting to reverse what 
many saw to be a fated juggernaut constituted coherent and well-reasoned arguments that 
impressed those who listened, convincing many that the United States was about to ratify a 
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treaty without acknowledging or attempting to rectify the corruption that had made it possi-
ble.  
Broadly, Cleveland’s public disapprobation of his own government was grounded in 
a concern for demonstrating America’s moral commitment to international law and explain-
ing the importance of subsuming strategic and commercial temptations to a legal code of 
conduct. More specifically, it was grounded in Cleveland’s view that intervention of a sover-
eign state is only justified when there is a direct danger to American lives and property, pro-
ceeds according to domestic and diplomatic formalities, and refrains from establishing Amer-
ican rule that does not follow the affirmative assent of natives. Unlike many anti-imperialists, 
he was not opposed to annexation in principle, nor did he indicate any change of heart re-
garding his long-held view that the United States must protect its interests on the islands. 
Cleveland believed that territorial expansion, however closely tied to national interests, must 
be lawful, and never proceed simply from a “desire for territorial extension, or dissatisfaction 
with a form of government not our own.”337 A non-threatening sovereign government be-
having lawfully deserves territorial and political integrity, regardless of whether that sovereign 
government is democratic or whether American political interference would redound to the 
benefit of the indigenous natives. For Cleveland, the written and unwritten rules governing 
all nations hold force not despite, but because they are based on principles that are blind to 
                                               




earthly power disparity, have no institutional enforcement, and depend on voluntary, con-
science-driven obedience. As the relative strength of a nation increases and temptations to 
press its advantage increase, so too does its responsibility to vindicate international law, and 
its opportunity to demonstrate its exceptional commitment to international morality 
through virtuous self-restraint.  
Cleveland had lived to see these arguments, and his policy intentions, twisted and 
misunderstood. In his retirement, Cleveland was outraged by annexationist opportunists, in-
cluding some Democrats, who misrepresented his stance in 1893 in order to draw support 
for their policies. Writing to the Senate in 1898, the ex-president said: “I will…say that ever 
since the question of Hawaiian annexation was presented I have been utterly and constantly 
opposed to it…. I regarded, and still regard, the proposed annexation of these islands as not 
only opposed to our national policy, but as a perversion of our national mission.” Cleveland 
rejected any notion that his policy was either an alliance with Hawaiian monarchy or as a du-
plicitous way to bargain toward a more favorable treaty. Rather, he simply believed that 
American involvement with the overthrow was “disgraceful.” “I would gladly, therefore, for 
the sake of our national honor and our country’s fair name, have repaired that wrong.”338 
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Cleveland was vexed that, since he had left the White House, his intentions had been di-
vorced from his contemporaneously articulated justifications. “I did not suppose that there 
was anyone in public life who misunderstood my position on this matter.”339 
 
THE ANGLO-VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE (1894–1897) 
In the case of Hawaii, Cleveland had attempted to thwart American annexation of 
the strategically vital islands on the basis that his nation had unjustly interfered with its poli-
tics and must reverse course to prove its virtue to itself and the world. The following year, 
the President turned south and interposed his administration into a bilateral territorial quar-
rel between Venezuela and Great Britain, the global hegemon of the day. For many histori-
ans, the case of the Anglo-Venezuelan border dispute reveals an altogether different Cleve-
land—one who, by escalating a diplomatic dispute into a diplomatic crisis, “had risked in-
volving the United States in a shooting war with England” over a matter that did not affect 
American lives or property.340 In other words, Cleveland was charged with having exercised 
the kind of meddlesomeness he had long criticized. Ultimately, the affair ended peacefully: 
In February 1897, Britain yielded to arbitration and, in October 1899, a settlement was 
reached. Despite the anticlimactic conclusion, Cleveland’s decision to intervene in the dis-
pute is regarded as an unprecedented assertion of American power in the hemisphere—or 
what one historian calls “the most important incident in the foreign policy of the second 
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Cleveland administration, with the possible exception of Hawaii, and one of the most im-
portant in all of the nineteenth century.”341 Cleveland himself regarded it as among his 
proudest achievements.342 Despite the great importance of the controversy, Cleveland’s in-
tentions in intervening in it has eluded scholars. As Grenville and Young explain, “Historians 
have generally been at a loss to account for Cleveland’s decision to embark on a new policy 
toward the Anglo-Venezuelan quarrel during the closing months of 1894.”343 
Most analyses of the episode proceed from a cursory dismissal of Cleveland’s justifi-
cations for his policy. We are informed that they amount to ridiculous reinventions of the 
Monroe Doctrine or highly cynical exploitation of Venezuelan grievances for the purpose of 
advancing America’s hemispheric power. His positioning is described as a tactical announce-
ment of U.S. strategic and commercial hegemony in the hemisphere, a pivotal prelude to the 
openly expansionist aims of his successors and the eventual global preeminence of the na-
tion—“a milestone in the emergence of the United States as a world power,” as Grenville 
and Young put it.344 Given the consequential, if not earth-shifting, implications of Cleve-
land’s maneuvers, it is remarkable that so much of the evidence hangs on the loosest infer-
ences and insinuations, and so little effort is made to understand Cleveland’s decisions in 
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light of his own extensive explanations, many of which are explicitly addressed to his per-
plexed contemporaries.  
An intentional analysis of Cleveland’s private and public reflections, correspondence, 
and addresses suggest a more complex mixture of motives—both moral and prudential—that 
are irreducible to the acquisitive, strategic, and politically cynical motivations often imputed 
to him. Cleveland (and his new secretary of state, Richard Olney) acknowledged that the 
United States had a security interest in preventing great powers from unlawfully aggrandiz-
ing their territory in the hemisphere. However, much to the confusion of their audience 
(both in his and our day), they did not elucidate any immediate or specific security interest 
in intervening in a dispute over the uninhabitable hinterlands. Nor, contrary to what is im-
plied by many scholars, did they justify their policy as a means of commercial or strategic ag-
grandizement. As we shall see, Cleveland’s arguments in favor of intervention in Venezuela 
were largely congruent with his justifications against intervention in Hawaii. Both involved 
the paramount importance of demonstrating the nation’s commitment to international law. 
He explained that it was America’s responsibility to heed Venezuela’s claims of injury and 
force Britain to arbitration because the alternative was “supine submission to wrong and in-
justice.”345 As the only power in the hemisphere capable of enforcing international rules, the 
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United States is bound by a commitment to its security and character to discredit the perni-
cious principle that superior strength dictates international justice. 
 
The Context 
The Venezuela boundary dispute was decades old by the time Cleveland decided that 
the United States must take an aggressive step in resolving it. In 1814, as part of a settlement 
of the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain had gained control over the Dutch territory of Gui-
ana (known today as Guyana), a former Spanish colony on the west side of Venezuela. In 
1841, Britain and Venezuela had begun quarreling over the boundary between Venezuela 
and British Guiana in what was called the Schomburgk Line, which flowed through a jungle 
marking Britain’s western boundary. The furor focused especially on the mouth of the Ori-
noco River, one of the longest rivers in South America, and whose gold-rich mouth at the 
Atlantic Ocean was a key gateway to one-quarter of South America. Throughout the dec-
ades, and especially in the 1880s, Venezuela sought a settlement, while Britain gradually and 
opportunistically enlarged its claims, hoping that Venezuelan internal political fragility 
would eventually give way to greater British territorial bounty.346 Beginning in the 1860s, as 
British claims became more expansive, Venezuela appealed to Washington to intervene, ar-
guing that America’s Monroe Doctrine implies an interest and a right to determine the mer-
its of the disputants. However, despite Britain’s stated willingness to negotiate, Washington 
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exerted little effort to advance the stalemate. As Herring explains, “Venezuela numerous 
times sought to draw the United States into it by speaking of violations of Monroe’s state-
ment. Each time, Washington had politely declined…”347 Washington’s somewhat tepid re-
sponses began to change in December of 1894, when Cleveland announced he would “renew 
the efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between the 
disputants and to induce a reference to arbitration—a resort which Great Britain so conspic-
uously favors in principle and respects in practice and which is earnestly sought by her 
weaker adversary.”348 As Herring explains, “it is not entirely clear why Cleveland now took 
up a challenge his predecessors had sensibly resisted.”349  
What explains Cleveland’s decision to depart from the “sensible” path of his prede-
cessors and risk war over a far-flung jungle? Since at least Charles Beard’s intellection, histori-
ans and political scientists have pointed to the trajectory of American power in the hemi-
sphere to argue that it was a thirst for national power and profit, combined with efforts to 
divert attention from domestic problems, that drove the United States to intrude itself into 
an issue of dubious urgency. These accounts attribute U.S. intervention to the deliberate 
pursuit of commercial and strategic hegemony.350 As Hamilton shows in his critical review of 
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the scholarship, the portrayal of the episode is interpreted “as one of series of events that ulti-
mately had world-historic significance,” the beginning of a new effort in which “the United 
States was both demonstrating its power and ‘reaching out’ for an empire.”351 
Following Frederick Jackson Turner’s influential thesis that the “closing of the fron-
tier” led to foreign “outreach” campaigns to satiate growing economic needs, some accounts 
attribute Cleveland’s foray into British Guiana as a manifestation of an inexorable profit mo-
tive.352 LaFeber says that this episode was a pivotal maneuver to “control one of the conti-
nent’s great commercial waterways.”353 It “indicated the explosive potential of the conclusion 
reached by American political and business leaders that overseas commercial expansion could 
solve the economic stagnation and the attendant social unrest.”354  
Other accounts attribute U.S. intervention to the domestic and international pres-
sures that compelled an unprecedented expansion of American power. For Zakaria, “The 
magnitude of American power and the absence of significant threats made the expansion of 
American influence in the area inevitable.”355 And yet, even while Zakaria implies that politi-
cal leaders were pawns of irrepressible domestic and international forces, “the United States’ 
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right to intervene in any matter relating to any state in the hemisphere” is described as a re-
sult of the concerted diplomatic maneuvers by Cleveland and Olney to compel Britain’s sub-
mission.356 Lars Schoultz argues that the episode was “an announcement that the United 
States intended to move upward on the hierarchy of nations, even if European powers 
thought the idea presumptuous.”357 He attributes this announcement to the “U.S. officials in 
the late nineteenth century” who recognized the significance of their actions with greater 
awareness than observers a half-century later.358 One of those officials, according to Herring, 
was the President himself. Cleveland, Herring says, was “determined to use the dispute to as-
sert U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.”359 If true, the outspoken anti-imperialist 
in the White House was not so different from Alfred T. Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and 
Henry Cabot Lodge in sensing an imperative to unshackle the United States from its tradi-
tion of isolation. As Herring puts it, in the case of the Venezuela matter, “even the normally 
cautious and anti-expansionist Cleveland was not immune to the spirit of the age.”360 If such 
depictions are correct, the characteristically judicious Cleveland had risked war over Vene-
zuelan hinterlands to catapult the United States into its destined role as the hemisphere’s 
master. 
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Deterministic studies attribute American commercial and strategic dominance in the 
early twentieth-century to the antecedent assessments, deliberations, and intentions of re-
sponsible political actors. Thus, it is fair to ask: What evidence is there that the Cleveland 
and his ministers sought the goals imputed to them? 
 
Cleveland’s Case for Intervention in the Anglo-Venezuelan Dispute 
Richard Olney’s July 1895 memo, often described as the “Olney Corollary” to the 
Monroe Doctrine, is the most important first clue to answering this question.361 Olney’s 
statement was addressed to London after extensive conferral with the President, who would 
praise the memo effusively.362 It called for Britain to submit evidence for her partitives re-
garding British Guiana or to yield to American-led investigation and arbitration.363 For 
many scholars, the bumptious memo that Cleveland called “Olney’s twenty-inch gun” was 
Olney’s smoking twenty-inch gun—a betrayal of national-aggrandizing motives through the 
brazen distortion of the Monroe Doctrine. In the course of a few sentences, Olney is said to 
have justified America’s hemispheric right on the basis of America’s hemispheric might:  
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Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law 
upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the 
pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character 
as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable char-
acteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other 
grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of 
the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.  
Thus, a policy of neutrality and non-interference, once meant to prevent European coloniza-
tion in the Western hemisphere, it appears, gave way to a new imperative to settle any out-
standing matters that concerns European powers in the hemisphere, regardless of threat 
proximity.364 In this telling, the parochial subject of controversy—a remote jungle over 
1,000 miles away from American shores—was incidental to the true purpose. Olney, says Za-
karia, was “asserting an American protectorate over the entire hemisphere.”365 
If such an interpretation is correct, we are immediately forced to confront a contra-
diction: Olney states explicitly that the Monroe Doctrine “does not establish any general 
protectorate by the United American states over other American states.”366 In reality, Olney’s 
famous two sentences are part of a memo over 11,000-words long in which he repeatedly re-
jects the notion that legal or moral authority can be purchased through the power of the 
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United States (or any other power). While Olney does not deny the “practical benefits” of 
the Monroe Doctrine to national security, he summarily rejects the notion that the doctrine 
is an imperious absolution of international law or that it authorizes the United States to do 
whatever it wishes because of its strength.367 Years later, in an 1898 speech about the Mon-
roe Doctrine and the Venezuelan issue, Olney would say that “We are now, as always, under 
the restraint of the principles of international law, which bid us respect the sovereignty of 
every other nation and forbid our intermeddling in its internal affairs.”368 That Olney of 
1898 was merely repeating the argument of his 1895 memo, which explicitly denied that the 
Monroe Doctrine is a legitimate justification for interfering in external disputes on the basis 
of American might.  
What, then, did Olney mean when he said America’s “fiat is law”? Olney’s statement 
only makes sense in the context of his extended argument in the memo. As Olney explained, 
the Monroe Doctrine’s purpose is to protect domestic liberty and self-government by treat-
ing any fresh acquisitions as potentially irreversible, looming threats. The United States must 
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deter such threats when it is “only the United States [that] has the strength adequate” to de-
fend its free institutions from European encroachment.369 If Venezuela’s claims are true (and 
Olney does not say that they are, only that they may be), then the United States—the only 
hemispheric power presently so capable—is obligated to repel British conquest as a matter of 
continuing its established policy of deterrence.  
Of course, even if we accept Olney’s broad argument about the preventive nature of 
the Monroe Doctrine, the dangers of European proximity to American security, and the fact 
that only the United States is capable of preventing the danger, we are left wondering how, 
in practical terms, British claims in Venezuela might lead to an extreme scenario whereby the 
“integrity, tranquility, or welfare” of the United States is endangered. To put it another way, 
even if the United States has a right to protect its security by intervening in the British Gui-
ana matter, Olney has not explained why it is expedient or prudent that the United States flex 
the doctrine’s muscles in this case—especially given the prospect that doing so threatens to 
make a great adversary a dangerous enemy. The failure to provide a specific connection be-
tween Monroe’s principles and the putative threat in Venezuela is the key weakness of 
Olney’s memo (and of Cleveland’s own subsequent explication of his policy). It has raised 
questions over whether Olney’s inexperience in diplomacy and the hasty manner in which he 
was thrust into his position contributed to this carelessness.370 It is also fair to wonder if the 
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strained prudential argument is merely a pretext toward some other strategic end—such as 
the assertion of America’s hemispheric preeminence. However, if we follow that logic, we are 
compelled again to acknowledge that Olney’s long memo never suggests that the United 
States seeks to establish a protectorate or commercial hegemony, not least by the facts of na-
tional strength. Indeed, as we have seen, Olney explicitly, vigorously rejects that argument. 
What Olney does convey in his long memo is a sustained, yet usually ignored, moral 
justification for intervention—a justification that became a prominent theme in Cleveland’s 
own private and public justifications for his arbitration policy.371 This moral argument: the 
United States cannot withstand the prospect of a settlement to a territorial dispute in the 
hemisphere resulting from a brute assertion of power.372 Olney says that inaction by the 
United States—the only hemispheric power presently capable of deterring Britain—would 
serve as a vindication of the principle that there is no international justice. As he explained, 
Britain’s claims on the basis of its strength—“it is to be so because I will it to be so”—com-
bined with Venezuela’s “feebleness as a nation,” effectively proves the principle that the weak 
are “to be denied the right of having the claim heard and passed upon by an impartial tribu-
nal.” Olney argues that such a principle is universally damaging: It “deprives Venezuela of 
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her free agency.” It also degrades Britain as a nation that does not “love of justice and fair 
play.” Finally, by averting its eyes when it has the strength to prevent it, the principle sug-
gests the United States is ignoring the Monroe Doctrine, a “policy with which the honor and 
welfare of this country are closely identified.”373  
Several months after Olney’s memo was delivered, he wrote a draft congressional 
statement for Cleveland that made the point in even more morally stark terms. Olney wrote 
that that are no calamities, including war, that is “to be more deprecated or more to be 
shunned than those which follow from a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the 
consequent loss of national honor and self-respect.”374 For Olney, the Monroe Doctrine was 
an “accepted public law of this country” that was an instantiation of a universal right, an-
chored in a core principle of international law—and it is that core principle that the United 
States has every right and obligation to maintain.375 In other words, Olney’s moral argument 
is nearly the opposite of the one imputed to him by future scholars. As he stated repeatedly 
both while serving in office and during his retirement, his policy was based on the imperative 
to use national power to prevent the conclusion that might makes right.376 
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In 1912, Woodrow Wilson’s secretary of state, Philander C. Knox, delivered a speech 
to the New York State Bar Association that discussed Olney’s by-then-famous fiat-is-law 
statement:  
The spirit behind these words contemplated, I am sure, no arbitrary exercise of sheer 
power, but a determined zeal in magnanimous consideration for the rights of other 
American Republics, a sincere sympathy with them in their trials, an insistence upon 
the right, that good might come to them, and that our own vital interests should not 
be menaced.377 
Looking back on the Venezuelan episode, Olney had expressed regret that most people had 
“only most dimly and imperfectly comprehend[ed] what the government had done or why it 
had done it.”378 But he wrote Knox to praise him for his “comprehending view” of the ad-
ministration’s motivations.379 
The pervasive misunderstanding of Olney’s July memo is a legacy of the memo’s 
contemporaneous critics, the most prominent of whom was Britain’s Lord Salisbury.380 In 
November, Salisbury replied to the Cleveland administration by charging it with pretending, 
for domestic political purposes, that the Monroe Doctrine was a law that demanded obedi-
ence of other nations. In truth, he said, the dictum was irrelevant to the quarrel in British 
Guiana since the territorial contest preceded the famous 1823 doctrine and the establishment 
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of the Venezuelan state in 1845.381 Salisbury argued that, unlike the Monroe Doctrine, inter-
national law “is rounded on the general consent of nations,” and the United States has no 
authority to arrogate to itself the role of judge of a controversy unrelated to its sovereignty: 
“No statesman, however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert 
into the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized before and 
which has not since been accepted by the government of any other country.”382 Salisbury 
thus retreated to Britain’s long-standing position: the United States is free to offer friendly 
arbitration in a dispute that does not concern its national safety or sovereignty; but the 
United States has no basis to intervene coercively.  
Cleveland’s response to Salisbury came on December 17, 1895, by way of a special 
message to Congress.383 It repeated the arguments of Olney’s memo while clarifying the ad-
ministration’s view of its right of interference. Cleveland concedes that the Monroe Doctrine 
is a distinctly American doctrine for the peace and security of the nation and that no national 
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decree, due simply by its assertion, enjoys any claim over other states. The question, Cleve-
land argues, is not whether the Monroe Doctrine is a categorical part of international law, 
but whether any specific application of it is consistent with the rights of the United States 
under international law.384 The Monroe Doctrine is simply a particular, American version of 
the rights of every nation enjoys: namely, that no nation may extend its territory without 
right, and “that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced.” Like 
any claim of right, its application must be judged according to the merits of its appeal in a 
given circumstance or proceeding. The present appeal is merited, said Cleveland, because the 
dispute between Venezuela and Britain is over whether Britain is extending “her possessions 
on this continent without right,” and therefore imperiling American security as understood 
by the Monroe Doctrine.385  
Like Olney’s national-security rationale, Cleveland’s argument that potential territo-
rial acquisition in Venezuela presents a threat to American security relied on a nebulous con-
ception of deterrence. As critics would point out, he did not include an explanation for why, 
as a practical matter in this specific case, the security of the United States depends on an in-
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vestigation of British claims in Venezuela. Thus, Cleveland’s defense of the Monroe Doc-
trine raises the same question that bedeviled Olney’s memo. As the political scientist Brian 
Loveman asks: “if the Monroe Doctrine were merely the ‘right of self-defense,’ what did it 
have to do with a boundary dispute between Venezuela and England over a colony in north-
ern South America?”386  
However, like Olney’s memo, Cleveland’s message is not “merely” a dubious justifi-
cation of self-defense or simply “an emphatic definition of the Monroe Doctrine as a doc-
trine of self-interest,” as LaFeber describes it.387 In fact, in terms even more explicit than his 
top diplomat’s, Cleveland argues that the United States cannot countenance an ignoble 
peace based on the resulting dynamics of a raw power disparity. “Considering the disparity in 
strength of Great Britain and Venezuela the territorial dispute between them can be reasona-
bly settled only by friendly and impartial arbitration,” he says. As in the case of Hawaii, 
Cleveland argues that the small power (then Hawaii, now Venezuela) deserves to have its 
claims heard, and he expresses disappointment that the great power (then the United States, 
now England) has failed to publicly prove its commitment to the justice of an international 
tribunal: 
It is deeply disappointing that such an appeal, actuated by the most friendly feelings 
toward both nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice and to the 
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magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world, and touching its relations to 
one comparatively weak and small, should have produced no better results. 
As another great power, the United States is now presented with her own test of whether it 
will peacefully submit to England’s assertion and strength, or whether it will insist (by arbi-
tration or by force) on an investigation of the underlying facts. Cleveland stated his decision 
with no room for ambiguity: 
In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and 
keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. 
I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contem-
plate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than 
friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization and strenuous and worthy 
rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite 
which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the 
consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and 
defended a people’s safety and greatness.388 
Even if Cleveland’s ultimatum made his speech one his most “truculent” (as Alyn 
Brodsky describes it) or “among the most crudely assertive ever issued by responsible Ameri-
can statesmen” (as Nelson M. Blake puts it), it undoubtedly shared the weakness of Olney’s 
memo in failing to provide a prudential argument that American intervention was a matter 
of urgent necessity.389 That weakness, combined with his stunningly direct threat of war, 
provoked newfound leeriness among Cleveland’s foes and friends alike. “The message of the 
President was ill-advised,” said Republican Senator Edward O. Wolcott of Colorado, noting 
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that it “glowed with the possibilities of war.” The belligerency was no way to conduct diplo-
macy and only made the situation more untenable. “No dangers threatened us without. We 
are menaced by no foreign foe,” said Wolcott.390 While some historians would later describe 
Cleveland’s gamesmanship as a ridiculous bluff, James Ford Rhodes, a historian and early 
supporter of Cleveland, noted that few dismissed Cleveland’s strong words at the time. “That 
war was possible, even probable, as a result of the President’s ultimatum to England, was the 
belief of most thoughtful men.”391 
Writing to the postmaster general, John Bassett Moore, Cleveland’s otherwise loyal 
supporter and an intellectual authority on international law, said that Cleveland was justify-
ing an interventionist policy on the basis of a doctrine whose purpose was to prevent inter-
ventionism. As Moore explained, the Monroe Doctrine was an extension of Washington’s 
exhortation to remain neutral in external disputes as a means of safeguarding American lib-
erty and security.392 Cleveland, Moore argued, was twisting the principle into one that con-
ferred on the United States a legal right and even obligation to assume a role as an (ostensi-
bly) impartial judge because of a power disparity.393 Moore sympathized with Cleveland’s 
concern for justice. Still, he worried that the President’s announcement would set a prece-
dent for “our participation in numberless quarrels,” with outcomes that would launch the 
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country “on a career as mad and as fatal as that on which France was started by Louis 
XIV.”394 
Moore’s protests may not have reached the President directly, but Cleveland did not 
need to read them to recognize that many were questioning his judgment. Senators of both 
parties were expressing concern that “this country is embarking upon a new and different 
policy from the one laid down by our fathers.”395 The ordinarily imperialist and anti-British 
newspapers accused Cleveland of gratuitously inviting British enmity over a relatively minor 
matter.396 The psychologist William James wrote that the belligerent “moral ponderosity” of 
Cleveland’s address was “the biggest political crime I have ever seen.”397 Upon reading his 
address, even Cleveland’s own ambassador in London, Thomas Bayard, expressed confusion 
and bewilderment. Bayard had come to London with orders to press Britain on her behavior 
in Venezuela; he, like Cleveland, believed that the moment for such engagement was 
right.398 However, Bayard, a congenital Anglophile, did not share Cleveland’s willingness to 
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dare Britain to war—especially over a “mongrel state” (as he referred to Venezuela, in a sepa-
rate letter, to the banker William Putnam).399 He wrote to Cleveland: “I am not able to 
shake off a grave sense of apprehension in allowing the interests and welfare of our Country 
to be imperilled or complicated by such a government and people as those of Venezuela.”400  
At least for a moment, then, Cleveland’s application of the Monroe Doctrine—
which elevated American stakes far beyond what any well-defined concern for American se-
curity dictated—had led British officials, his domestic allies, the non-imperialist press, and 
his ambassador in London puzzled. Was Cleveland allowing a naïve sympathy with Vene-
zuela overwhelm his scruples? Was he ingratiating himself with jingo or business interests of 
the day for domestic purposes? Was he engaged in a design akin to what he warned against in 
the case of Hawaii—using a dubious pretext “mainly to establish its influence in the region,” 
as Zakaria put it?401  
Like Olney, Cleveland was sensitive to the confusion provoked by the policy and its 
justifications. Also like Olney, Cleveland did not hesitate to clarify his motives—to his min-
isters and the public, both during and after his presidency.  
Cleveland repeatedly denied that he was taking up the cause of Venezuela due to any 
altruistic motives. In his private response to Bayard (December 29, 1895), Cleveland wrote 
that his natural sympathy for a beleaguered state does not constitute a major motive for the 
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policy. He said he is fully aware that the Monroe Doctrine is not a charity house; the doc-
trine is to be maintained for its “value and importance to our government and welfare” (his 
emphasis).402 Similarly, in his post-presidency reflections, Cleveland insists that “securing to 
a weak sister republic peace and justice” was a consideration but not one that determined his 
diplomatic decisions. In fact, Cleveland never challenged Bayard’s point that the United 
States had little at stake in protecting Venezuela. Nor did Cleveland hold any illusions about 
Venezuela’s less-than-angelic dictatorial government.403 As in the case of Hawaii, Cleveland 
rejected the notion that the character of the regime’s institutions should guide decisions of 
intervention, whether for or against. He said plainly that the United States has no legitimate 
basis to make judgments in external disputes by its evaluation of the contesting regimes.404 
Cleveland said he believed his arbitration policy was helping both nations, and, in a sense, 
especially Britain. As he explained to Bayard, Britain was acting beneath her greatness, ques-
tioning American goodwill while demonstrating to the world “intensely disappointing” ob-
stinacy amid serious charges of wrongdoing.405 He said his policy was one consistent with his 
long-established friendship with Britain, and was now providing her with an opportunity to 
publicly reclaim her good name in an open court, on the basis of arguments whose existence 
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she had long-asserted but for which she had never brought evidence.406 Still, Cleveland in-
sisted that he harbors no prejudice regarding a final settlement and that his policy was not 
meant primarily to either help or harm either involved party. 
If altruism was not a primary motive, was it a matter of political self-interest? Cleve-
land, to be sure, was facing domestic challenges at the time. Following the 1893 economic 
depression, the Democrats endured heavy losses in the 1894 congressional elections. Out-
spoken Republicans such as Lodge and Roosevelt criticized the President for his timidity in 
foreign affairs.407 Many Republicans, and some Democrats, also harbored deep suspicions 
about British moves in Latin America.408 In other words, the President, constrained by a tide 
of jingoism in Congress and throughout the nation, had good political reasons to co-opt the 
foreign policy issue and turn it into a domestic victory.409 However, such an interpretation 
ignores the strong voices of anti-jingoism, including from the Republicans, and thus begs the 
question of why Cleveland did not co-opt them.410 In any case, for all of the supposed incen-
tives that to posture as jingo, there is little evidence that Cleveland recognized or hoped to 
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outmaneuver Congress for his political benefit.411 Cleveland had demonstrated his willing-
ness to oppose imperialists during the Hawaii controversy, and there is a mountain of evi-
dence that his Venezuela policy was predictably unpopular with many of his supporters and 
opponents.412 
That said, we cannot dismiss the importance of public pressure generated by the 
campaign of William Lindsay Scruggs, a former American diplomat hired by Venezuela to 
lobby on its behalf.413 According to Grenville and Young, Scruggs was the mastermind who 
“persuaded the President to adopt a more forceful attitude.”414 As the founder of what would 
later become the Atlanta Constitution newspaper and then a diplomat (from 1872 to 1892) 
with posts in Columbia, China, and Venezuela, Scruggs may have been the most vocal and 
knowledgeable voices in favor of U.S. intervention.415 According to historical depictions of 
his “immense propagandist venture,” copies of Scruggs’ pamphlet—British Aggressions in 
Venezuela, or the Monroe Doctrine on Trial (published October 1894)—were sent far and 
wide and had penetrated public discourse.416 It was, not coincidentally, Scruggs’ own home 
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congressman, Leonidas F. Livingston, who introduced the February 22, 1895 resolution 
(unanimously approved and then signed by Cleveland) that endorsed the arbitration pol-
icy.417 Scruggs was in periodic contact with both Cleveland and Olney for several months in 
late 1894 until May of 1895.418 
For all of Scruggs’ considerable influence, it would be inaccurate to portray him as 
the mastermind behind Cleveland’s policy, which began, and evolved, independently of 
Scruggs’ campaign. As newspapers accounts suggest, Bayard had been installed in London—
before Scruggs was a lobbyist, and before many Americans knew about the issue—with or-
ders to press London on the matter.419 Furthermore, although it is sometimes portrayed oth-
erwise, Scruggs’ pamphlet did not innovate the argument that the Monroe Doctrine de-
mands American intervention in the region. As Cleveland himself pointed out, that was how 
America’s interest in the border dispute was justified for decades, since at least President 
Grant.420 As a foremost expert on the border dispute who earnestly believed in the policy he 
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was advancing, Scruggs was undoubtedly a helpful resource to Cleveland and Olney, both of 
whom mined his arguments for their own purposes. Still, as even Grenville and Young con-
cede, the two statesmen were already predisposed to agree with him, and they filtered 
Scruggs’ case discerningly; there is much that Scruggs argued that is utterly absent in Cleve-
land and Olney’s case.421 Scruggs was one voice—perhaps the most important and well-in-
formed voice—in the public debate. However, there were others on the opposing side; John 
Bassett Moore, who was far closer to Cleveland and Olney, was one of them.422 Scruggs was 
someone of great persuasive ability, but his influence was endogenous to the broader debate 
over Venezuela. In sum, Scruggs was specialist-turned-activist advancing tendentious argu-
ments about a controversy in which the United States has expressed interest for decades and 
in which Cleveland had taken interest before Scruggs was hired by Venezuela. Like the Vene-
zuelan government, it seems that Cleveland and Olney found in him a useful resource, 
and—as it turns out, also like the Venezuelan government—they jettisoned the poor soul 
mercilessly as soon as their agendas diverged.423  
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Some historians point to the final settlement between Britain and Venezuela, widely 
regarded as unfavorable to the South American regime, as evidence that Cleveland was cyni-
cally exploiting the controversy to expand American power—precisely the kind of cynical 
calculation that he had inveighed against during the Hawaii controversy.424 What, then, of 
the claim that Cleveland had interposed his administration for the material, commercial, and 
strategic aggrandizement of American wealth and power? 
Cleveland loathed the insinuation that his policy was decided according to an eco-
nomic calculus. In Presidential Problems, he says his policy was agnostic to the worth of Brit-
ish Guiana, and levels the sharpest arraignment on critics who complained of financial losses 
due to his policy.425 The “conceited and doggedly mistaken critics” failed to see that “the 
value of the lands in dispute, was of the least consequences to us.”426 Indeed, Cleveland did 
not dispute the charge that his policy resulted in a negative economic balance.427 As with his 
criticism of Stevens in the Hawaiian issue, Cleveland expressed great disgust with a policy 
                                               
424 Although Cleveland and Olney regarded the settlement as “just and fair,” many historians today consider it 
to be an unmistakable victory for Britain. Grover Cleveland, “Fourth Annual Message (Second Term), Decem-
ber 7, 1896,” in Letters and Addresses of Grover Cleveland, ed. Albert Ellery Bergh Unit Book Publishing Com-
pany, 1909); James, Richard Olney and His Public Service, 134; LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of 
American Expansion, 1860–1898, 278; Harry Joseph Sievers, Benjamin Harrison: Hoosier Statesman (American 
Political Biography Press, 1996), 264–274. 
425 Cleveland, Presidential Problems, 278. 
426 Cleveland, 278. 
427 Business support for the Cleveland-Olney initiative was far from clear and unambiguous. Hamilton, Amer-
ica’s New Empire, 140–149; LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898, 
274. As The Commercial and Financial Chronicle put it in 1901, shortly before Cleveland’s message on his Ven-
ezuela policy, he had spoken of the grave issues regarding public finances, and “the collapse which ensued...in 
the general markets was the least surprising incident of the whole affair.” “President Cleveland on the Vene-
zuela Episode (July 27, 1901),” in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol 73 William B. Dana Company, 




based on personal or national acquisitiveness. He condemned the unpatriotic venality of 
those who viewed policy through their pocketbook. “The patriotism of such people traverses 
exclusively the pocket nerve. They are willing to tolerate the Monroe Doctrine, or any other 
patriotic principle, so long as it does not interfere with their plans, and are just as willing to 
cast it off when it becomes troublesome.”428  
Even if Cleveland’s policy was contrary to commercial and business interests, was it 
not a way to prevent Britain from strategic expansion and to recognize, as LaFeber says, a 
“claim of American dominance in the Western Hemisphere”?429 The tacit precognition im-
puted to Cleveland bears no resemblance to the President’s articulated concerns. He (and 
Olney) revealed no design by which compelling Britain to impartial arbitration over British 
Guiana would set the table for a new era of American hemispheric hegemony, global preemi-
nence, and commercial expansion.430 Cleveland and Olney’s argument that the maintenance 
of the Monroe Doctrine depended on the recognition that great powers cannot enlarge their 
claims unlawfully in the hemisphere was no great diplomatic innovation.431 Not unreasona-
bly, they pointed out that the purpose of the doctrine conceived of no practical distinctions 
between planting a new colony and advancing the frontier of an old colony.432 Not only did 
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Cleveland and Olney leave us no reason to believe that they defined this national interest in 
grand commercial and strategic terms, but, given that so much of the criticism leveled on 
them was that their application of the Monroe Doctrine was not a persuasive argument for a 
national interest in the border dispute, it is unclear why they would be coy about their strate-
gic cunning. 
Cleveland never hesitated to remind his audience that invoking the doctrine as a jus-
tification for American interest in the border dispute was an American diplomatic tradi-
tion.433 Privately, he suggested he did not share the diplomatic concern with the doctrine’s 
finer points.434 Insofar as champions of American supremacy (like Lodge and Roosevelt) 
sought to seize the controversy as a basis to expand the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine,435 
Cleveland expressed his anguished frustration.436 Cleveland and Olney had every oppor-
tunity to embrace the expansive interpretation of their policy. At one point, they joined some 
of their own policy’s Democratic detractors in opposing a Senate resolution, proposed by Re-
publican Cushman K. Davis of Minnesota, that would give the Monroe Doctrine congres-
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sional sanction and establish a United States protectorate over all of South America. Cleve-
land rejected it and called it an assault on the principle of arbitration that had guided his pol-
icy.437 “I regard the Davis resolution as mischievous, inopportune and unfortunate,” Cleve-
land said.438 Late in the controversy, his administration remained open to disengaging from 
the dispute and allowing bilateral negotiations between Britain and Venezuela to proceed. 
Those options were closed off only when it was determined that American arbitration was 
necessary to force Britain to agree on open negotiations with Venezuela.439 In sum, Cleve-
land has left us with little basis to conclude that he was using the Monroe Doctrine or his 
policy as a pretext to assert America’s hemispheric dominance. 
Cleveland and Olney did see American intervention as helping to establish preemi-
nence—but not, it seems, the narrowly-defined, strategic preeminence so often attributed to 
their policy. Both spoke of the policy as more a burden of responsibility than a prize of op-
portunity. For Olney, the United States could not simply limit itself to “self-preservation” or 
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the pursuit of “material interests.”440 “It is not enough for it to vaunt its greatness and superi-
ority and to call upon the rest of the world to admire and be duly impressed.” Olney said the 
isolationism of his day was irresponsible and dishonorable. “A shirking of the responsibilities 
of high place and great power is simply ignominious,” he said in 1898.441 Olney added that 
for the nation to live up to its power, “it behooves it to accept the commanding position be-
longing to it, with all its advantages on the one hand and all its burdens on the other.”442 By 
setting an admirable example of commitment to peaceful settlements, the United States is 
“sure to have the most important and beneficent influence upon the destinies of man-
kind.”443  
Similarly, in his final words in Presidential Problems, Cleveland proudly cites the 
Venezuelan controversy as bringing out the large mass of citizens’ “sublime patriotism and 
devotion to their nation’s honor.” In contrast to those who followed their selfish interests 
and departed from principle when the principle became troublesome, these honorable coun-
trymen demonstrated that “the integrity of their country” was a prize worthy of “the chances 
and suffering of conflict.” He concluded: 
I hope there are but few of our fellow-citizens who, in retrospect, do not now 
acknowledge the good that has come to our nation through this episode in our his-
tory. It has established the Monroe Doctrine on lasting foundations before the eyes 
of the world; it has given us a better place in the respect and consideration of the 
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people of all nations, and especially of Great Britain; it has again confirmed our con-
fidence in the overwhelming prevalence among our citizens of disinterested devotion 
to American honor; and last, but by no means least, it has taught us where to look in 
the ranks of our countrymen for the best patriotism.444  
Deterrence is a policy of national security and relative power. Yet Cleveland could say that 
his intervention in the dispute was “disinterested devotion to American honor.” As he and 
Olney had argued throughout the controversy, the national interest in this case was insepara-
ble from America’s willful preservation of the prohibition against aggression sanctioned by 
international law—a supreme protector of all just nations.  
 
We can summarize Cleveland’s policy toward the Anglo-Venezuelan border dispute by de-
scribing it as both a continuation and a departure from American policy. Following a tradi-
tion dating back to at least President Abraham Lincoln, Cleveland expressed a national inter-
est in offering Washington’s aid to settle the British Guiana dispute. Following a tradition 
dating back to at least President Grant, Cleveland had invoked the Monroe Doctrine as a rel-
evant pretext of America’s interest in seeing the dispute settled. Cleveland’s departure from 
tradition was in demonstrating unprecedented determination to refuse to permit England to 
strategically procrastinate, and in elevating the national stakes to a level that forced England 
to choose between arbitration and war. He and Olney described the situation in Venezuela as 
a challenge to America’s commitment to international law in the hemisphere. They articu-
lated a national interest in deterring international injustice—even when the injustice does 
                                               




not directly affect American security and fortunes—because the alternative would amount to 
“supine submission to wrong and injustice.” Should Venezuela’s claims of violated sovereign 
rights go unheard, then Britain would vindicate the pernicious principle that international 
law has no earthly power over nations, and that strong powers can simply assert their ad-
vantage.  
The Cleveland administration’s case for their interventionist policy was not flawless. 
It is fair to point out that Cleveland never explained precisely how this external dispute im-
periled American security. It is also fair to join their domestic critics who doubted their judg-
ment in introducing the nation to new risks disproportionate to the nation’s interest in the 
affair.445 Finally, it is fair to wonder whether Cleveland and Olney do not, to some extent, 
deserve their misunderstanding, for their position on the matter was a somewhat convoluted 
effort to situate an accepted national principle of strategic deterrence in what they viewed to 
be a kind of architectonic principle of moral deterrence. 
While such criticisms and doubts are fair, it is not fair to imply that the administra-
tion’s case for intervention was reducible to addressing a short-term security emergency or a 
long-term strategic calculus. The combination of British obstinacy and Venezuelan entreaties 
forced his government “to assert and vindicate a principle distinctively American” by posing 
a question about whether fresh colonization was undertaken by the brute force of Britain. As 
                                               
445 There is reason to believe that, had Britain refused arbitration, she would have forcibly extended her terri-
tory and forced the government’s hand to become allied with a government that did not enjoy Washington’s 




he explained, “we need proof of the limits of [Britain’s] rights in order to determine our duty 
in defense of our Monroe Doctrine; and we sought to obtain such proof, and to secure peace, 
through arbitration.”446 With immutable purpose, Cleveland argued for a policy based on 
protecting the United States from the ignominious fate of enabling, through inaction, an in-
corrigible international depravity. He regarded the controversy as a representation of a 
broader America’s right, interest, and duty to protect the legal authority sanctifying a just or-
der that serves to protect every sovereign state. 
 
THE CUBAN REBELLION (1895–1897) 
Scholars often describe the Spanish-American War as a tragic inevitability—an “un-
wanted war” that was driven less by the decisions of statesmen than by accumulating under-
lying dynamics. In 1823, John Quincy Adams said it was “Scarcely possible to resist the con-
viction that the annexation of Cuba…will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity 
of the union itself.”447 Decades later, an industrializing, post-Civil War economy and a 
growing federal government with a new, powerful navy put Adams’ prophecy within 
reach.448 Meanwhile, the growing influence of progressivism and Social Darwinism was in-
stilling new hopes of social engineering at home and abroad. With a shuffling of partisan 
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alignments and the emergence of populist figures like William Jennings Bryan, an especially 
turbulent political period brought new incentives for the new Republican majority to co-opt 
foreign policy from the Democrats.449 Given these strong compulsions, it is comprehensible 
that the United States would part ways from a tradition of neutrality, exploit the Cuban re-
bellion, and go to war with Spain on a novel and expanded understanding of America’s 
global responsibilities.  
It is also understandable why, in this context, Cleveland’s role during the Cuban 
problem is depicted as an insignificant prelude to the confrontation with Spain in April of 
1898, when McKinley and a supportive Congress began executing a far-reaching war ef-
fort.450 According to Zakaria, it was incidental and transient circumstances that made possi-
ble Cleveland’s necessarily temporary resistance to war: The country was distracted by a re-
cession at home, Spain’s intermittent concessions sustained hopes for a diplomatic resolu-
tion, the United States was taking a wait-and-see attitude toward other European powers.451 
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Given these factors, Cleveland’s resistance, based on a “quaint” vision of a “modest republic,” 
was feckless, and predictably so.452  
Lest we forget, between February 24, 1895 (when the rebellion in Cuba ignited), un-
til March 4, 1897 (when he transferred the reins to McKinley), Cleveland was the chief exec-
utive with all of the constitutionally-conferred discretions of the office. In those 739 days, 
Cleveland exercised these powers to oppose, with methodical purpose, the public and politi-
cal tide calling for intervention, even as his diplomatic efforts toward pacification met Span-
ish resistance. Throughout his retirement, Cleveland insisted that, were he in his successor’s 
position, he would not have gone to war with Spain.  
As far as we accept the deterministic accounts for the war of 1898 as comprehensive 
causal explanations, we risk underplaying Cleveland’s intentions as insignificant, overlooking 
his strident, reasoned, and well-articulated opposition to intervention. As I will argue, Cleve-
land’s steadfast commitment to neutrality was consistent with his notions of international 
justice and national duty that he had maintained in earlier controversies. He believed Amer-
ica’s highest interest in the dispute was pacification and that this interest must be pursued ac-
cording to America’s legal obligation to yield to Spain’s sovereign rights. 
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For Cubans, the rebellion that they started in 1895 was, in a sense, a continuation of 
a war of independence against Spain they had been waging in one form or another since 
1868, when the Ten Years War began. Spain’s goals throughout those years were to secure 
the most important remaining possession in the Western Hemisphere. When that war con-
cluded (260,000 lives later), Spain could claim victory only by promising that she would un-
dertake reforms of an island government that was run by wealthy officials’ ad hoc decrees. 
The promised political reforms proved insufficient or elusive. Troubles compounded once 
Congress’s 1894 tariff reform raised imported sugar prices to protect domestic growers and 
Cuba was no longer a sugar-exporting powerhouse. The resulting economic stagnation and 
widespread poverty revived new hopes for large-scale political change that would remove the 
yolk of a feckless and corrupt Spanish ruling elite.453 To that end, rebels took arms against 
Spanish colonial administration and virtually all economic infrastructure on the island, in-
cluding sugar plantations. General Maximo Gomez, a Cuban leader of the Ten Years War, 
decided that the lesson of the previous struggle was that an insurgency could only succeed if 
it defies the boundaries of conventional warfare and employs “a strategy of destroying the 
Cuban economy to persuade the Spanish to leave.”454  
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Spain feared that the rebellion would endanger its broader colonial authority and be-
came increasingly convinced that the only solution to its problem was to choke the rebellion 
in its crib. In 1896, the new Spanish governor of the island, General Valeriano Weyler, di-
rected a grisly reconcentration policy which effectively imprisoned the country’s peasants in 
urban centers, forcing about 400,000 Cubans to choose death by disease or the sword. In re-
sponse, the Cuban insurgents burned homes, destroyed plantations, and executed compatri-
ots unsympathetic to their cause.455  
Leery of American annexation yet nevertheless desperate for aid, the rebels appealed 
for American support that would help their footing against well-armed Spanish soldiers. The 
rebels calculated that the United States, due to moral and historical sympathy, economic in-
terest, and strategic opposition to the Spanish empire, would support their efforts.456 To that 
end, the Cubans set up an aggressive propaganda effort. According to the conventional his-
torical narrative, Americans were sympathetic to the freedom-fighting message of the Cubans 
and suspicious of Spanish intentions, especially after Spain courted the support of European 
powers. The Monroe Doctrine lent credence to the argument that a struggling European em-
pire should not force its dominion in the hemisphere.457 In the meantime, the newspaper in-
dustry acted as a conduit of propaganda, engaging in competitive sensationalist campaigns 
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about Spanish atrocities and Cuban heroism that avoided assiduously any standard of impar-
tiality. Politicians had self-serving reasons to join the chorus, and many Democrats joined 
with Republicans to call for American intervention by way of official recognition of the bel-
ligerents. At the outset of the rebellion, even Olney expressed sympathy for the Cuban 
cause.458  
Several months after an overwhelmingly Republican Congress was seated (in Decem-
ber 1895), members in both chambers resolved to reverse its previous policy of neutrality, 
calling on the President to grant the rebels official recognition—a gesture which would have 
enabled the United States to support them with materials without committing to direct mili-
tary confrontation. Cleveland was facing public hostility, especially from the South and 
West, and Olney warned Cleveland that American “politicians of all stripes, including Con-
gressmen,” were “setting their sails, or preparing to set them, so as to catch the popular 
breeze,” which of course blew toward support of the Cuban rebels.459 As Ambassador Bayard 
wryly noted, Congress seemed “strangely inclined to reverse the order of the Constitution, 
and . . . send messages and information to the Executive not to receive them from him.”460 
That message: Congress is running out of patience with Cleveland’s passivity. Senator John 
Sherman, Republican of Ohio, and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, gave a 
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rousing speech arguing that it is about time “to put an end to crimes…almost beyond de-
scription.”461 By February 1896, the Senate demanded that the President abandon neutrality 
and support the Cuban insurgents. In April, both chambers passed a concurrent resolution 
recognizing Cuban belligerency and calling on the President to find peace through Cuban 
independence.462 
As Cleveland prepared his first annual message since the start of the conflict, Daniel 
E. Sickles, a retired ambassador to Spain, offered the President free advice. “Our independ-
ence was founded on the right of insurrection,” he noted. Now that the Cuban cause “has 
already won the admiration and sympathy of our people,” it is the President’s turn to pass 
the test. “I hope...that the President, in his annual message, may recognize the claims of this 
struggle for freedom upon the attention of our government.”463 
 
Cleveland’s Case Against Intervention in Cuba 
Cleveland did not heed Sickles’ advice to take up the righteous cause. Even as he was 
pilloried by members of both parties, his administration’s private and public statements on 
the matter (including his final two annual messages, in December 1895 and December 
1896) conveyed his strong determination in favor of a policy of neutral non-interference. 
This was a policy grounded in Cleveland’s reasoned convictions rather than idle passivity or 
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strategic delay. Cleveland, as ever, believed that the United States was compelled to pursue 
its primary interests within the confines of international law, even—or especially—when 
such obedience is threatened by well-meaning, though ultimately misguided, temptations.  
Cleveland developed his policy while acknowledging the relevance of economic, stra-
tegic, and humanitarian considerations. He recognized that the conflict in Cuba was devas-
tating American property holders and foreshadowing a bleak future for American trade on 
the island.464 He also understood that sugar interests were unenthusiastic about the prospect 
of a Cuban republic regulating their entrenched investments on the island.465 The rebels had 
laid waste to plantations and reduced the sugar crop to a fraction of its previous size.466 
There was little reason to trust that a rebel victory would result in a civilian government that 
would reestablish the kind of commercial friendliness enjoyed under Spanish rule.467 
Cleveland also held suspicions about whether an insurgent victory would redound to 
the benefit of America’s interest in stability and prosperity.468 Unlike many proponents of 
American intervention, he and Olney did not ignore the gulf between insurgents’ noble goals 
and their maltreatment of an island they claimed to love. In destroying property and eco-
nomic infrastructure, the rebels were demonstrating their disregard for their compatriots’ 
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long-term well-being. Cleveland conveyed such apprehensions in a context of a broader pub-
lic debate with strong racial elements, with opponents of Cuban independence expressing 
skepticism that the Creole population and Catholic faith on the island was a good recipe for 
republicanism.469 
At the same time, Cleveland held no illusions about the pernicious incompetence 
and corruption of Spanish rule in Cuba. In his final years in office, the colonial administra-
tion had provided little reason to trust that its reestablished rule would resolve deep-seated 
problems on the island. Cleveland’s final congressional messages suggest that he sympathized 
with the Cuban rebellion insofar as it was animated by grievances against Spain’s long list of 
broken promises and recent military brutality. Nevertheless, he was circumspect about high-
lighting such facts. In the summer of 1896, he conceded the very real humanitarian outrages 
but expressed concern that emphasizing them would inflame an already volatile public at the 
cost of his policy objectives.470 
Cleveland stated these policy objectives forthrightly: The nation’s foremost interest 
was a conclusion of violent hostilities, so that “order and quiet restored to the distracted is-
land, bringing in their train the activity and thrift of peaceful pursuits.”471 Cleveland justified 
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his policy of neutrality as one that treats all ancillary concerns—humanitarian, commercial, 
and political—as subservient to the government’s honest fulfillment of “every international 
obligation”: 
Though neither the warmth of our people’s sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, 
nor our loss and material damage consequent upon the futile endeavors thus far 
made to restore peace and order, nor any shock our humane sensibilities may have 
received from the cruelties which appear to especially characterize this sanguinary and 
fiercely conducted war, have in the least shaken the determination of the Govern-
ment to honestly fulfill every international obligation, yet it is to be earnestly hoped 
on every ground that the devastation of armed conflict may speedily be stayed and 
order and quiet restored to the distracted island, bringing in their train the activity 
and thrift of peaceful pursuits.472 
In assessing his predicament, the most prominent of Cleveland’s many worries was 
that neither side was winning decisively. “If Spain has not yet reestablished her authority, 
neither have the insurgents yet made good their title to be regarded as an independent state,” 
he lamented in his December 1896 statement.473 America’s hardheaded interest in quiet and 
order meant that it must accept (if not welcome) even brutal Spanish asphyxiation of the Cu-
bans. In other words, Cleveland spoke negatively less of Spanish crimes than Spanish failure 
to successfully pacify the country. Olney, meanwhile, privately praised Spain for not repeat-
ing its slow-burn strategy of the Ten Years War and expressed regret of Spain’s tactics of 
overwhelming force—but only because it has proven unsuccessful in suppressing the chaos.474  
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The administration’s sober, if not outright chilly, attitude toward the Cuban cause 
has led many scholars to follow Cleveland’s critics and portray him as “siding” with Spain.475 
That was certainly not how Cleveland (or Madrid) understood things.476 It is more accurate 
to say that whereas American supporters of the rebels sought peace on terms consistent with 
(in their minds, at least) the promotion of American republicanism, Cleveland repeatedly 
said that the pursuit of peace was, and must always be, constrained by “the recognized obli-
gations of international relationship” with Spain, the only other sovereign power in the con-
troversy. Although they are often portrayed as such, Cleveland’s repeated invocations of 
America’s obligation to Spanish sovereignty were not priggish rationalizations or perfunctory 
asides decorating a pro-Spain or anti-Cuban American policy. Above all, they represented the 
central guiding premise of his argument: namely, that the conflict in Cuba was an internal 
family affair between Spain and her children—not an interstate conflict between sovereign 
powers.477  
Indeed, Cleveland’s understanding of America’s legal obligations to Spain emerged 
from the fact of Spain’s presumed sovereignty and the nonexistence of any independent Cu-
ban state. The rebels, he said, have no functional government. Their fly-by-night administra-
tion is a patchwork of paramilitary rule, where “the will of the military officer [is] in tempo-
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rary command of a particular district,” and a “putative Cuban government” that is so ineffec-
tual it must be considered “a government merely on paper.” Spain, in contrast, was still the 
only civil authority on the island, maintaining its functions “more or less imperfectly,” espe-
cially in the larger towns and suburbs. As “imperfect and restricted as the Spanish govern-
ment of the island may be, no other exists there,” he said.478 Thus, granting belligerent rights 
to the insurgents or formally acknowledging their cause of independence was a spurious legal 
gesture because it gave de jure legal status to an entity that had no de facto political existence. 
Christening Cuba with the respect of statehood was out of the question not merely because it 
was of dubious prudence but because the Cubans have no capacity to meet those obligations 
that “devolve upon every member of the family of nations.”479 For those who saw the success 
of the insurgent political movement to be America’s highest objective, the legal formalities 
were merely diplomatic levers; for Cleveland, these were principles that constituted America’s 
moral lodestar in all of its international affairs. 
Cleveland believed that, since Spain was the only sovereign ruler and internationally 
responsible party in the conflict, the only diplomatic route was to pursue peace through ap-
peal to Spain’s own interests and conscience.480 Cleveland made concerted efforts to encour-
age Spain to offer whatever concessions were consistent with her interests and dignity that 
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might conciliate the rebels.481 Spain consistently refused, making clear that its political con-
trol of Cuba was non-negotiable.482 Some historians therefore regard Cleveland’s Cuban pol-
icy as an abject failure—a naïve or unrealistic attempt to extract Spanish concessions that had 
no chance of coming, given the strength of Cuban nationalism.483  
Cleveland’s diplomacy, however flawed, was not a failure from his perspective. Given 
his commitment to the responsibilities to sovereign law, he had few available alternatives. His 
offer of friendly mediation was not a strategy designed in an abstract environment of cost-
conscious strategic players seeking a peaceful equilibrium. It was an effort guided by deliber-
ate, self-imposed moral constraints. In contrast to Venezuela, Cuba had no legal basis by 
which to sue Spain in an international tribunal. Revealingly, Cleveland reacted to Spanish 
obstinacy with disconsolation and disappointment rather than escalating gamesmanship or 
policy revisions. “I am thinking a great deal about Cuba,” he wrote to Olney on July 13, 
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1896. “But am so far as ever from seeing the place where we can get in.”484 As long as Spain 
was immovable, American diplomacy was legally constrained to friendly appeals and en-
treaties. Any other alternative would demand open contempt for legal obligations—conduct 
that Cleveland repeatedly said was out of the question. 
Cleveland believed that the only relevant and legitimate basis of coercive directives 
concerned Spain’s legal duties to the United States. Throughout the conflict, diplomacy with 
Spain was consumed by citizen-protection cases, such as those involving the expulsion of 
journalists and damage to American sugar planters who sued Spain for compensation.485 De-
spite ongoing controversies, Cleveland was compelled to say that Spain was fulfilling debt 
obligations to American citizens and engaging diplomatically over jailed Americans. In his 
annual message, he comes close to speaking on behalf of Spain, relaying Madrid’s “full ex-
pression of regret” regarding charged incidents of maritime inference.486 In short, Cleveland 
publicly acknowledged and believed (with reason) that Spain was behaving dutifully, some-
times admirably, as an international legal defendant toward the United States. 
Yet when it came to America’s duties to Spain, Cleveland conveyed consternation, 
bordering on shame and embarrassment. He repeatedly condemned American citizens and 
Cuban émigrés who departed American shores on volunteer, “filibustering” expeditions on 
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steamships and smaller crafts to arm the insurrectionists, thus compromising and contraven-
ing the federal policy of neutrality.487 Cleveland never denied that the American sympathiz-
ers of Cubans were acting out of considerations of republicanism and—especially following 
the onset of Spain’s brutal reconcentration policy—“considerations of philanthropy and hu-
manity.”488 But he believed that such considerations must remain subservient to America’s 
position as a legally conscientious member of the family of nations. In his July 1896 renewal 
of his neutrality proclamation, he admonished Americans “to abstain from taking part in 
such disturbances in contravention of the neutrality laws of the United States,” promising to 
vigorously prosecute violators.489 Cleveland’s sweeping policy against filibusterers included a 
new federal apparatus that would monitor, intercept, and prosecute Americans who violated 
national policy. He approved new bases along America’s southern coast to help the navy in-
tercept civilian vessels headed toward Cuba, an enforcement policy far more effective than 
even Spain’s patrol of Cuban harbors.490 In his third annual message to Congress, he prom-
ised that his administration would “enforce obedience to our neutrality laws” and “prevent 
the territory of the United States from being abused as a vantage ground from which to aid 
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those in arms against Spanish sovereignty.”491 We note the wording here; Cleveland’s anti-
filibustering policy was purposed to maintain national conduct that is consistent with due 
regard for “Spanish sovereignty”—not necessarily Spanish victory over the rebels or any 
Spanish-American alliance.  
There is no way to know if a more civil and politically promising insurgency, or a 
more powerful or pernicious colonial power than Spain, would have broken Cleveland’s 
principled stance regarding American obligations toward Spanish sovereignty. What is clear 
is that Cleveland could have, but chose not to, ground his policy on the dictates of prudence 
and the multitude of risks in an insurgent victory. Instead, his primary arguments in favor of 
neutrality and against intervention were consistent with his long-held view that foreign pol-
icy intervention could not be justly determined by evaluation of contesting principles or in-
stitutions represented by the foreign parties. As wary as Cleveland may have been of the Cu-
ban rebellion, and as tolerant as he may have been of Spanish power, Cleveland followed the 
same path he did in Hawaii and Venezuela, arguing that intervention can only be justified by 
the sovereign law of nations. The “plain duty” of the government, he said, is “to observe in 
good faith the recognized obligations of international relationship.”492 These duties included 
continuing to hold Spain accountable to its legal obligations and prosecuting Americans in-
volved in compromising international law. The United States was an onlooker on a terrible 
                                               
491 Cleveland, “Third Annual Message (Second Presidential Term), Washington, D. C., December 2, 1895,” 
374. 




conflict, but, absent a threat to its sovereignty, it had no right to break the law by way of ad-
vancing trans-legal republican or humanitarian objectives, however righteously pursued. 
Cleveland’s arguments against intervention from 1895 to 1897 present a challenge to 
the deterministic scholarly narrative of the Spanish-American War. That narrative presents 
McKinley’s decision in 1898 as the consummation of long-simmering dynamics—economic, 
cultural, political—preceding him, and which would have compelled Cleveland in a similar 
way, had the Democrat served a third term.493 Some scholars go so far as to argue that the 
Cleveland administration took steps toward war. According to LaFeber, Cleveland and 
Olney “contributed to the causes for war in 1898; they emphasized the involvement of 
American interests and provided a rationale for the right to use force, if necessary, to protect 
these interests.”494 According to Zakaria, “By December 1896, Cleveland had shifted Ameri-
can policy toward intervention, even as he denied doing so.”495 Robert Beisner says that 
“The Spanish-American War turned out to be McKinley’s War, not because Cleveland was 
an old-fashioned isolationist with a stiffer backbone than his successor, but because he left 
office just in time.”496 According to Margaret Leech, “Cleveland was convinced that war had 
become all but inevitable.”497 
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It is true that Cleveland, late in his second term, began to articulate greater frustra-
tion with the stalemate in Cuba and of Spain’s inability to contain the conflict. In his final 
annual statement to Congress, he made clear that peace is always conditional: “though the 
United States is not a nation to which peace is a necessity, it is in truth the most pacific of 
powers and desires nothing so much as to live in amity with all the world.”498 Then, in an 
oft-cited passage taken as evidence that he had expected a looming intervention, he adds:  
When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become 
manifest and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all pur-
poses of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has 
degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of hu-
man life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situa-
tion will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be su-
perseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and dis-
charge.499 
Referring to these words, Zakaria writes: “In his message to Congress, [Cleveland] declared 
that Spain had definitely lost control of the Cuban situation.”500 Similarly, Julius W. Pratt 
argues that Cleveland “intimated plainly that the United States could not see the struggle 
drag on indefinitely,” and had admitted that war may be the only solution to the Cuban 
question.501 Thus, we are led to believe that Cleveland, in late 1896, had lost faith in Spain’s 
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ability to control Cuba, had sent Madrid a final warning, and provided reassurance to Con-
gress that intervention was coming. According to this reading, Cleveland was about to reach 
the same conclusion that McKinley did 16 months later.  
Given that his address came amidst congressional attempts to recognize the belliger-
ents and isolate the executive, they appear as reassurances to Congress that his patience to-
ward Madrid is not unlimited.502 Insofar as he emphasizes the conditional nature of his anti-
intervention stance, these are foreboding words to Madrid. Some press reports at the time 
summarized Cleveland’s address as “intimat[ing] that the warfare may reach such a stage as 
to require action by this government.”503 
However, we have reason to doubt an interpretation suggesting that Cleveland ended 
his address in proto-McKinleyian terms or with resignation toward an inevitable war with 
Spain. In the first place, we must contend with the fact that neither Madrid nor Congress in-
terpreted Cleveland’s message the way that contemporary scholars with the benefit of hind-
sight have. In fact, the Sagasta government was encouraged that it could continue their pol-
icy of strategic procrastination that adeptly took advantage of Cleveland’s commitment to re-
specting Spain’s sovereign authority.504 Meanwhile, Congress perceived Cleveland’s address 
                                               
502 Grenville and Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873–1917, 197.  
503 “Message to Congress.” Washington Post, December 8, 1896. 




as a reaffirmation of his ongoing diplomatic efforts and refusal to pivot course and a signal 
that any war would be their exclusive responsibility.505  
To understand why Cleveland’s message left Madrid encouraged, and Congress de-
jected, it is necessary to return freshly to Cleveland’s precise wording. We note that, Cleve-
land did not say that Spain “has lost control of the Cuban situation”—only that it may, in 
the future, lose control. The President said that if Spain does lose control, intervention may 
be necessary—depending on the “precise conditions” and “contingencies” of the time. More-
over, following his “higher obligations” remark, Cleveland proceeded to explain what he 
means by “conditions” and “contingencies” that may warrant intervention, in a passage that 
is curiously left out of most scholarly accounts that allude to Cleveland’s terse warning: 
Deferring the choice of ways and methods until the time for action arrives, we should 
make them depend upon the precise conditions then existing; and they should not be 
determined upon without giving careful heed to every consideration involving our 
honor and interest or the international duty we owe to Spain. Until we face the con-
tingencies suggested or the situation is by other incidents imperatively changed we 
should continue in the line of conduct heretofore pursued, thus in all circumstances 
exhibiting our obedience to the requirements of public law and our regard for the 
duty enjoined upon us by the position we occupy in the family of nations. 
A contemplation of emergencies that may arise should plainly lead us to avoid their 
creation, either through a careless disregard of present duty or even an undue stimu-
lation and ill-timed expression of feeling. But I have deemed it not amiss to remind 
the Congress that a time may arrive when a correct policy and care for our interests, 
as well as a regard for the interests of other nations and their citizens, joined by con-
siderations of humanity and a desire to see a rich and fertile country intimately re-
lated to us saved from complete devastation, will constrain our Government to such 
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action as will subserve the interests thus involved and at the same time promise to 
Cuba and its inhabitants an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace.506 
Crucially, Cleveland did not say—indeed, he explicitly denied—that the mere presence of 
ongoing humanitarian violations would eventually force him to undertake action.507 In order 
for the United States to be permitted to act on behalf of humanitarian interests, Spain must 
first demonstrate not only that she has lost control of the island (which she had not), but also 
that she has no intention on regenerating her rule. Once such a scenario converges with com-
pelling national interests (including threats of interference “by any other power”), the United 
States may rightfully intervene. In other words, neither Madrid nor Congress interpreted 
Cleveland’s warning in the same way as contemporary scholars do because his warning was 
an explication of his long-standing, strikingly narrow conditions by which intervention in 
Cuba becomes legally legitimate and morally necessary. Short of meeting those conditions, 
Cleveland was promising a policy that remained “in the line of conduct heretofore pursued” 
and consistent with the “requirements of public law.” There was no mystery about what 
Cleveland meant by that—it had become his signature foreign-policy justification. 
Through his final days in office, Congress fought Cleveland’s restrictive policy, hop-
ing “that it might force the President’s hand,” as McElroy explains.508 Cleveland had never-
theless succeeded in consistently guarding his executive discretion on the matter. He and 
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Olney publicly promised that, were a resolution to pass that formally granted Cubans their 
independence, the executive branch would summarily disregard it.509 In that late period, in a 
private meeting with members of Congress, the President was told a lawmaker: “we have 
about decided to declare war against Spain over the Cuban questions. Conditions are intoler-
able.”510 To this, Cleveland is said to have responded: “There will be no war with Spain over 
Cuba while I am president.” After noting the costs of war and his (soon to be tarnished) 
hope to purchase the island, he added: “It would be an outrage to declare war.”511 Although 
this account may be apocryphal, it is consistent with Cleveland’s forceful neutralization of 
congressional efforts to force his hand. Cleveland did not want Congress to declare war, but 
he also recognized that Congress did not want to declare war, either—at least not on terms 
that precluded genuine executive support.512  
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Cleveland left the White House in 1897 with unflappable conviction that American 
intervention in Cuba remained illegal, conveying hopeful optimism that his Republican suc-
cessor has the good character to stay the course.513 Early in his retirement, he expressed con-
fidence that war would be averted through patience and diplomatic entreaties.514 When the 
Maine sank on February 15, 1898, and enthusiasm for war peaked, Cleveland lashed out at 
those who sought to use the tragedy as a pretext for American involvement.515  
Cleveland denied that McKinley was forced to war, whether by events or mounting 
public pressure. In his view, an honorable policy of friendly mediation was deliberately aban-
doned by the leadership succeeding him, and he said that history would judge that departure 
poorly.516 The ex-president believed that McKinley’s decision to go to war over Cuba re-
flected a deficiency in self-restraint among both the leaders and citizens. McKinley and his 
ilk had yielded to righteous, yet foolhardy and unprincipled, temptations to act on behalf of 
humanity.517 He believed that such intentions, however earnest, would be discredited, as we 
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“will find ourselves in alliance and co-operation with Cuban insurgents the most inhuman 
and barbarous cutthroats in the world. I suppose the outrages to which we shall then be 
privy, and the starvation and suffering abetted by our interference will be mildly called the 
‘incidents of the war.’”518 On June 21, 1898, a day before American troops landed in Cuba, 
the ex-president delivered a commencement address that said the war reflected a culture be-
sotted by the promise of glory and a hubristic notion of civilizing reform.519 There is no 
shortage of patriotic sentiments in the country and martial courage, he said. However, 
equally or more important to the “highest type of American citizenship” is “a constant steadi-
ness of sound American judgment and an uncompromising ability among our citizens to re-
sist temptation.”520 Privately, Cleveland divulged his bitter disappointment with America’s 
entry into war with Spain. “I cannot avoid a feeling of shame and humiliation,” he wrote to 
Olney.521 In September of 1898, a few weeks after hostilities with Spain ended, Cleveland 
told a friend that American objectives could have been secured eventually without a shot 
fired.522  
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Cleveland recognized that McKinley was under public pressure. However, as he re-
minded those who would listen, he was under tremendous pressure, as well.523 “I was time 
and again threatened by frenzied men and women with dire calamities to be visited upon 
myself and children because of what they saw fit to assert as my enmity to the Cuban 
cause.”524 Early in the conflict, Cleveland had witnessed the nation’s sentiments quickly shift 
in favor of the Cuban rebels, as Spain executed her notorious policy of extermination. He 
witnessed his diplomatic outreach fall to Spain’s deaf ears as conditions on the island wors-
ened. Meanwhile, Congress’s early and repeated demand for a more active policy from the 
administration met Cleveland’s unhesitant exercise of his constitutional powers and his pub-
lic resistance.  
As with his arguments relating to Hawaii and Venezuela, Cleveland had lived to wit-
ness his arguments about the Cuban crisis distorted. “My position was made known to Con-
gress in the various messages in which the subject was discussed,” the ex-president wrote to 
the Senate. He said that his views were “unmistakable,” and none other than what “was per-
fectly well known” by those who paid attention to “the official documents of the time.”525 
Cleveland did not see his stance as necessarily futile delay to—and certainly not preparation 
for—inevitable American intervention in Cuba. In his view, 1898 was not so different from 
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1896; Spain, throughout, was addressing America’s legal claims, and “there seemed to be re-
ally no justification for the attack upon Spain.”526 
                                               




Chapter 4: The Humanitarianism of William McKinley 
McKinley’s legacy in foreign policy is dominated by his decision, in late April of 
1898, to go to war with Spain over Cuba. That decision was the first international war with 
a European power since 1812, setting the stage for Hawaiian annexation and American con-
trol of Puerto Rico, Wake Islands, and Guam. It also led to his other famous decision, the 
annexation of the Philippines and the subsequent brutal counterinsurgency.527 For many 
scholars of the period, these decisions “established the United States as a dominant force for 
the twentieth century” and gave Americans a new “cosmic purpose.”528 
If McKinley was the father of America’s birth as a global power, he was an unlikely 
one. There is no evidence that McKinley came into office intending to wage war against 
Spain.529 McKinley was not particularly vocal about foreign policy during his campaigns and 
rarely made any mention of Cuba in his speeches leading up to his presidency. A pious and 
conservative Methodist, he had little in common with the colorful imperialists of the day, in-
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cluding Roosevelt, whom he regarded as intemperate, and whose influence in the administra-
tion (as Assistant Secretary of the Navy) wielded much less clout than is typically assumed.530 
There is no indication that McKinley was seized, intellectually or politically, by Mahan or 
the other apostles of imperialism of the day. As he once told Carl Schurz, he would brook no 
“jingo nonsense” in his administration.531 In his inaugural address, he mentioned foreign 
policy only briefly and mostly to make a point of which Cleveland must have approved: “We 
want no wars of conquest,” he said, adding: “we must avoid the temptation of territorial ag-
gression.” McKinley, writes Walter A. McDougall, “hated war and cherished the modest re-
public bequeathed by the Founders.”532 As Robert W. Merry puts it in his recent, sympa-
thetic biography: “[McKinley] never displayed the Roosevelt-Mahan-Lodge zeal in behalf of 
American sea power—and certainly never talked in their idiom of national grandeur. Never-
theless, when the war he sought to avoid became inevitable, he quickly employed that new 
navy to insert American power into faraway Asia and the nearby Caribbean in ways never be-
fore seen.”533 
This puzzle is all the more vexing given McKinley’s early reputation as a politician 
devoted to a fairly narrow set of economic and trade issues.534 As an Ohio congressman 
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(1877–1891) and then governor (1892–1896), he was his party’s outspoken champion of 
protectionism. His eponymous 1890 tariff act radically raised tariffs to protect American 
manufacturing and helped propel him to national recognition. After the 1893 economic col-
lapse turned much of the public against the Democratic Party, many looked to his promise 
to move trade and currency policy levers to stimulate industrial growth, drive down unem-
ployment, and address a federal budget deficit of $70 million.535 His successful 1896 presi-
dential campaign, which focused mostly on trade and currency issues, forged a new coalition 
that included Northeast businessmen (newly abandoned by the Democrats) and factory 
workers from the Upper Midwest. He beat his populist challenger, William Jennings Bryan, 
so dramatically that it triggered a sweeping party realignment, leading to 16-year Republican 
control of the White House and a lasting revision of the Democratic Party’s core domestic 
policy platform. 
During the twentieth-century interregnum, the mismatch between the effects of 
McKinley’s foreign policy and his reputation as a domestic policy president was reconciled 
by historians who adopted the argument of McKinley’s contemporaneous critics. McKinley, 
they said, was a supple figurehead, or a vessel through which the designs of more determined 
souls implemented their agendas. He was a weak and indecisive leader, a pliable stooge of 
others, and a vulgar groveler of popularity—a depiction consistent with Roosevelt’s famous 
derision of McKinley as having “no more backbone than a chocolate éclair.”536  
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Recent scholarship has pulverized the depiction of McKinley as the clay of conniving 
souls or as a rapacious seeker of public acclaim.537 The truth, according to these compelling 
revisionist works, is close to the opposite: McKinley was, in fact, a manipulator of manipula-
tors. The historian Henry Adams described McKinley as “a marvellous manager of men,” 
and, in handling matters of international relations, “adroit, courteous and far-sighted.”538 
Perhaps lacking in charisma, McKinley was nevertheless exceptionally astute in politically 
maneuvering his party and in commanding his carefully-selected cabinet. His amiability and 
stoic nature concealed a kind of ruthlessness and resolve that dismantled obstacles incremen-
tally, by exhausting friendly and unfriendly opposition.539 In service of his agenda, he cannily 
exaggerated the power of those around him and sometimes pretended he was merely follow-
ing rather than leading.540 “I have talked with him again and again before a Cabinet meeting 
and found that his ideas were fixed and his mind firmly made up,” reflected Elihu Root, who 
would serve as Secretary of War under McKinley and Roosevelt:  
He would then present the subject to the Cabinet in such a way as not to express his 
own decision, but yet bring about an agreement exactly along the lines of his own 
original ideas, while the members often thought the ideas were theirs. … He cared 
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nothing about the credit but McKinley always had his way. …He had vast influence 
with Congress. He led them by the power of affectionate esteem not by fear. He 
never bullied Congress.541  
McKinley was also an uncommonly sophisticated political tactician, modernizing the 
executive by establishing direct channels to public opinion, often through the press or 
through an unprecedented enthusiasm for public speaking.542 He was determined to com-
bine his constitutional powers with new methods to break post-Civil-War inertia of congres-
sional supremacy that hounded the presidency since Grant.543  
It is a curious feature of even sympathetic scholarship that McKinley’s foreign policy 
efforts are described in the passive voice—a hapless and somewhat pathetic act in a tragedy 
that played out independently of his will.544 A well-meaning, affable, and peace-loving vet-
eran from Ohio, McKinley is said to have been incapable of stopping an imperialist jugger-
naut driven by exogenous forces—cultural, political, economic, strategic—that, combined 
with proximate instigations to American sentiment, would have overwhelmed anyone else in 
his position. McKinley “led his country unwillingly toward a war that he did not want for a 
cause in which he did not believe,” says Ernest May. Caught between the public and his 
party, May concludes that McKinley “capitulated to the jingoes,” such as Roosevelt and 
Lodge.545 McKinley “stood against the current,” but was ultimately “swept forward with the 
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tide” of public opinion, notes his biographer, H. Wayne Morgan.546 Besides a war-hungry 
press, legislature, and public, McKinley is said to have faced great pressures to protect and 
expand the nation’s commercial reach. According to Zakaria, once the business sector shifted 
its views in favor of war, McKinley acquiesced. “The experience of William McKinley and 
the Spanish-American War is an excellent example of how structural pressures can over-
whelm an individual’s personal preference.”547  
As in the case of Cleveland, the grand narrative about the strategic shift during the 
Gilded Age tempts us to the conclusion that McKinley’s articulated justifications did not 
matter before taking them seriously, and before finding out whether they illuminate his in-
tentions.548  
Unlike Cleveland, McKinley left us no diary or autobiographical reflections of his 
presidency. However, in contrast to his reputation, he was deeply involved in diplomacy, 
war-preparation, and war conduct throughout his term.549 Moreover, although the man was 
opaque in private relations, he ultimately conducted his foreign policy in a strikingly trans-
parent way, directing his priorities through his ministers and periodically disclosing—
through Congress, the press, and public messages—his evolving efforts. Guiding his decision 
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to intervene in Cuba and to annex the Philippines was a considered belief that the United 
States has a right and obligation to monitor and forcefully sanction conduct within sovereign 
territories.  
 
THE CUBAN CRISIS (1897–1898) 
According to the “tragic” narrative, the mounting pressures that charioted the United 
States toward global expansion arrived during McKinley’s term due to its intersection with 
proximate catalysts over which McKinley had little control. In this account, McKinley en-
tered office in March of 1897 determined to follow Cleveland’s example in avoiding war 
while attempting to convince Madrid to appease the rebels insofar as was necessary to pacify 
the island. Although Spain’s new government made conciliatory gestures and inched closer 
to relinquishing its hold on Cuba, relations broke down when cataclysmic incidents in early 
1898 precipitated a new level of brinkmanship. That spring, as the pervasive public and po-
litical jingo spirit reached its peak, McKinley’s squeamish indecision yielded to the clamor, 
and he finally, reluctantly, agreed to authorize military action.550  
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The tragic, deterministic narrative is premised on the view that McKinley’s stance on 
the situation did not fundamentally differ from his predecessor’s. Indeed, McKinley himself 
sometimes portrayed his policy as essentially continuing Cleveland’s diplomatic efforts to 
bring peace to the island without taking sides. In his pre-inauguration dinner with Cleve-
land, McKinley said: “My President, if I can only go out of office, at the end of my term, 
with the knowledge that I have done what lay in my power to avert this terrible calamity, 
with the success that has crowned your patience and persistence, I shall be the happiest man 
on earth.”551 McKinley’s inaugural address (March 4, 1897), promised a continuation of 
George Washington’s policy of non-interference, free of foreign entanglements. “It will be 
our aim to pursue a firm and dignified foreign policy, which shall be just, impartial, ever 
watchful of our national honor, and always insisting upon the enforcement of the lawful 
rights of American citizens everywhere.”552 There is little reason to doubt that McKinley was 
speaking forthrightly when he said, in June of 1897, that he anticipates “no departure from 
the policy of my predecessor” vis-à-vis Cuba.553 Cleveland, as we’ve noted previously, seemed 
hopeful that McKinley would continue his policy of diplomatic patience. Given that McKin-
ley’s words and deeds pointed to a continuation of Cleveland’s policy, is it not unreasonable 
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to assume that, when he did decide to take military action in April 1898, he did so because 
exogenous circumstances compelled him? 
There is a good reason why Cleveland soon lost his hope in his successor. Not long 
after his inauguration, McKinley indicated his rejection of his predecessor’s insistence that 
American policy must abide by the sovereign rights of Spain. Whereas Cleveland believed 
that any consideration of intervention depended on Spain’s abdication of her sovereignty 
(whether through proven disregard for the island or direct threat to American security), 
McKinley believed that Spain must demonstrate a commitment to humanitarian conduct 
and outcomes. On April 11, 1898, when McKinley asked for congressional approval to inter-
vene in the conflict, his justifications were not a volte-face that represented his acquiescence 
to events beyond his control. If McKinley can be said to have acquiesced, it was an acquies-
cence to his own humanitarian policy that he had developed and articulated over the previ-
ous ten months. 
 
The Context 
Since McKinley said so little of the Cuban situation before his administration’s dip-
lomatic efforts with Spain, it is difficult to know the nature of his preconceived opinions.554 
But within a few weeks of his inauguration, American sympathizers of the Cuban cause had 
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reason to hope that McKinley would take more aggressive steps than had his predecessor. In 
May of 1897, he engaged a Senate debate by successfully attaining $50,000 for the relief of 
“American citizens in the island [who] are in a state of destitution, suffering for want of food 
and medicines.”555 Although the gesture invited little dispute, it struck observers as “an es-
sentially new departure in international affairs,” as one journal put it.556 “It is certainly very 
unusual, if not unprecedented, for the government to make a relief appropriation for its own 
people in some foreign land.” As the New York Tribune noted, “The policy of the Admin-
istration in reference to Cuba is not likely to be criticized, as was that of its predecessor, on 
the score of vacillation or indifference to the rights of American citizens.”557 Under Cleve-
land, Congress was acquainted with a president interposing his authority to counteract their 
anti-Spanish gestures. While McKinley would prove to be no less interested in defending the 
prerogatives of his office, by spring of 1897, he had at least signaled a willingness, if not an 
eagerness, to increase American engagement in Cuba.558 
It was not until late June that McKinley’s mostly symbolic gestures turned into pol-
icy, as his administration launched a shift in diplomacy that, over the course of the next eight 
months, culminated in a decision for military intervention. The course-change commenced 
                                               
555 William McKinley, “Message to Congress on the Condition of American Citizens in Cuba, May 17, 1897,” 
in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897,ed. James D. Richardson (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902). 
556 Quoted in White Trumbull, Our War With Spain for Cuba’s Freedom: A Thrilling Account of the Land and 
Naval Operations of American Soldiers and Sailors in Our War With Spain, and the Heroic Struggles of Cuban Pa-
triots Against Spanish Tyranny (Classic Reprint) (Forgotten Books, 2016). 
557 Quoted in Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley, 66. 
558 It also seems that McKinley was more personally perturbed by reports of inhumanity in Cuba. See Offner, 




shortly after McKinley dispatched William J. Calhoun to Cuba to provide an objective, first-
hand report. On June 22, McKinley’s longtime friend reported back his unsurprisingly bleak 
conclusions: The conflict was at a stalemate; the rebels would not accept any proposal that 
granted them autonomy short of complete independence; and yet, it was far from clear that 
the rebels were ready for self-rule. In other words, conditions were more-or-less as Cleveland 
had found them. The only difference was the passage of time and the unceasing deterioration 
of conditions.559  
 
McKinley’s Case for Intervention 
In June and July of 1897, McKinley’s first formal diplomatic statements notified 
Madrid that the United States has abandoned a “policy of mere inaction” and will now hold 
Spain responsible for her “manner of conducting operations” within her territorial do-
main.560 Spain must now pursue her interests in conformity with “every paramount senti-
ment of humanity”—that is, “in a manner responsive to the precepts of ordinary humanity 
and calculated to invite as well the expectant forbearance of this Government as the 
confidence of the Cuban people in the beneficence of Spanish control.”561 Writing on behalf 
of the President, Secretary of State John Sherman announced a new policy based on the right 
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to monitor and sanction a conflict that affects both “sentimental” and “direct” interests, in-
cluding domestic tranquility, commercial prosperity, and national safety: 
He [McKinley] is bound by the higher obligations of his representative office to pro-
test against the uncivilized and inhumane conduct of the campaign in the Island of 
Cuba. He conceives that he has a right to demand that a war, conducted almost 
within sight of our shores and grievously affecting American citizens and their inter-
ests throughout the length and breadth of the land, shall at least be conducted ac-
cording to the military codes of civilization.562  
In contrast to Cleveland’s policy of friendly, conscience-appealing mediation, McKinley’s di-
rectives deny Spain’s right to reestablish control over her colony by continuing her ongoing 
strategy of exhausting her enemy militarily.563 As long as Spain continued its “policy of dev-
astation and interference with the most elementary rights of human existence,” the United 
States had a right to interfere in Spain’s civil conflict by monitoring and sanctioning her be-
havior.564 Speaking “in the name of the American people and in the name of common hu-
manity,” the McKinley administration now promised it would hold Spain responsible for 
how it waged war.565 
The directives also unambiguously demoted the legal concerns so prominent in 
Cleveland’s policy. The summer memos are nearly silent about America’s legal obligations; 
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they speak of the laws of neutrality less as obligations than burdens that only serve an addi-
tional motivation for American engagement in the conflict.566 Spain, for its part, could no 
longer count on good relations with the United States so long as it fulfills its legal duties. Her 
legal territorial authority grants her only “reasonable time” to restore internal peace. Refer-
ring to Spain as a “titular authority,” the July memo avers that “reasonable time” has passed, 
and that the rules of “international comity” do not infinitely constrain the United States to 
“remain a passive spectator.”567 Insofar as the United States maintains a posture of neutral 
noninterference, it is now doing so out of discretion rather than any moral obligation. 
If John L. Offner is correct that McKinley had now placed an “impossible” burden 
on Spain and put the two powers on an inevitable “collision course,” then it was a course 
paved by McKinley’s newly assembled moral strictures.568 Within six months of his inaugu-
ration, McKinley had signaled to Madrid a departure from his predecessor’s policy, even 
while refraining from throwing his lot with the Cuban rebels.569 McKinley had told Spain 
that the United States no longer views itself as self-constrained by the principles of presumed 
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sovereignty. Not only did McKinley forbid Spain from ratcheting up its military conduct, 
but he had declared Spain’s ongoing efforts as beyond what is acceptable to the United 
States, and his right to intervene on behalf of “the inherent rights of civilized man.”570 The 
United States has the right and duty to evaluate (and sanction, if it determines it necessary) 
Spain’s conduct in war. In principle, at least, Spain remained free, in her difficult position, to 
discover a peaceful settlement, whether by concessions or abdication. Alternatively, McKin-
ley was free to retreat from his policy, attenuate his demands to match his predecessor’s, and 
limit the nation to its offer of voluntary mediation consistent with Spanish sovereignty. As it 
turns out, neither side was willing to retreat.  
Still, for a while, McKinley’s new demands seemed to come at an auspicious mo-
ment. Weeks after Madrid responded to McKinley by declaring the new policy a violation of 
Spain’s sovereign rights, Madrid’s Conservative party was supplanted by the Liberal party, 
which sought Cuban autonomy as part of a political settlement. A critic of General Weyler’s 
“excessive severity and repression” in a program that had done little toward pacification, 
Spain’s new prime minister, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, ordered the general to return home and 
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promised amnesty and release of Americans in Cuban jails. Most importantly, the new cabi-
net promised a negotiated autonomy program, consistent with Cuban interests and Spanish 
honor, that would go into effect at the beginning of 1898.571  
Madrid’s promising gestures toward reform were coupled with a reaffirmation that 
the Cuban matter is fundamentally an internal affair and that no other power has any just 
claim to forcibly interfere, even through forcible mediation.572 Madrid agreed to oversee an 
autonomy plan while insisting that the Spanish flag would always fly over their island, and 
that “the authority of the central power is in nowise diminished or abated.”573 It was made 
clear that any change in Spanish behavior would come from the mother country’s internal 
deliberation about the best means to secure her interests—not the asserted demands of any 
foreign government. In the meantime, Madrid was also facing a complicated reality in Cuba. 
As was apparent from the rebels’ loud demands and the abject failure of Spain’s significant 
military exertion in weakening a force a fifth of its size, Madrid’s promised autonomy plans 
fell short of rebels’ demand of complete independence.574  
Madrid’s ambiguous motions seemed to reflect a genuine effort by some of Spain’s 
ruling elite to reach a peaceful settlement while appeasing the strong nationalistic sentiments 
of the Spanish public. Since his arrival in Spain, U.S. minister in Madrid, General Stewart L. 
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Woodford, was told by the queen regent that she wants to avoid offense to popular feelings 
in her country, but that she shared McKinley’s urgency to see reforms.575 “I believe that she 
is sensible and is honestly trying to do the best she can under most difficult circumstances,” 
wrote Woodford.576 Meanwhile, Spanish conservatives were criticizing the governing liberals 
for going soft on Spanish interests, at one point even demanding Weyler’s reinstatement.577  
The McKinley administration held no illusion about these difficulties, reacting to 
Madrid’s efforts with cautious optimism. A persistent insurgency was successfully stalling a 
trained army five-times its size; clearly, the rebels would not voluntarily abandon their de-
mands for independence. However, precisely because there was little reason to hope that Cu-
ban insurgents would quiet their cries, there was a good reason to believe that Spain would 
soon discover her interests in hastening more generous concessions. McKinley hoped that 
Madrid’s political reforms would eventually pave the way toward a more realistic resolution 
in which Spain relinquished control of the island.578  
The Republican Party, officially more enthusiastic of the Cuban cause than McKin-
ley, remained patient with the President’s diplomacy. While House Democrats were playing 
the role of House Republicans during the Cleveland administration, assailing the President 
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of being overly deferential to Madrid, Republicans were now vigorously defending the Presi-
dent and urging members to give his outreach some time.579 By the end of the year, even 
Lodge sought to persuade his Senate colleagues to provide the President with more time.580  
In his first annual message to Congress (on December 6, 1897), McKinley publicly 
elucidated the new basis for his foreign policy even while denying it is anything but a logical 
continuation of his predecessor’s diplomacy that sought peace and order without taking sides 
or recognizing the insurgents. Forcible annexation is “by our code of morality…criminal ag-
gression.” Referring to American obligations in Cuba, McKinley said:  
Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace this Government has 
never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determi-
nation of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right and in conso-
nance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own people should the pro-
longation of the strife so demand.581  
Despite McKinley’s highly politic assertion that he was a faithful steward of his predecessor’s 
policy, his own “high sense of right”—his priorities, emphases, and moral justifications—
were fundamentally different from Cleveland’s. The most striking difference is McKinley’s 
unwillingness to countenance a peace based on Spain’s military victory and, relatedly, the in-
troduction of a humanitarian code (however ill-defined) that would be enforced by the 
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United States. While McKinley acknowledged that “the civilized code of war has been disre-
garded” by both sides of the conflict, he departs from his predecessor by saying that Spain’s 
“abuse of the rights of war” deserves America’s urgent protests. Accordingly, he reserved the 
harshest condemnation to Spain’s “cruel policy of concentration” that, he reminds his audi-
ence, began over a year before he took office. “It was not civilized warfare. It was extermina-
tion.”582 Moving forward, the United States would maintain a policy that takes an interest in 
the welfare of Cubans. “We have only the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and con-
tented, enjoying that measure of self control which is the inalienable right of man, protected 
in their right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country.”583  
McKinley also reveals he is much less inclined to forgive Spain for its abuses against 
American citizens. Cleveland had sought the release of American prisoners, but he went out 
of his way to justify Spanish indignation because naturalized Americans were undermining 
Spain’s sovereign authority, behaving as “Cubans at heart in all their feelings and inter-
ests.”584 McKinley, by contrast, did not equivocate, presenting these arrests as an example of 
Spanish abuse of war, and says it is his “first duty” to demand the instant release or speedy 
trial of all American citizens.585  
On the question of recognizing the belligerents, McKinley’s argument is superficially 
similar to his predecessor’s. Like Cleveland, and much to the disappointment of strident 
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champions of Cuban independence, McKinley privately and publicly regarded widespread 
sentiments in favor of official recognition of the Cuban rebels as an obstacle to diplomacy. 
Also like his predecessor, McKinley understood that recognition of Cuban belligerency was a 
scheme to force the executive to renounce Spanish sovereign supremacy in Cuba, halt ongo-
ing bilateral negotiations with Madrid, and elevate Cuban claim for independence before it 
demonstrates a capability for self-government.586  
Although both presidents agreed on the inexpediency and imprudence of a recogni-
tion policy, the two presidents articulated strikingly different moral justifications for how 
they arrived at their positions and how they understood America’s obligations. We recall that 
Cleveland’s opposition to recognition was based on a conviction that international law de-
manded a neutral presumption of Spain’s sovereign legitimacy in conducting her internal af-
fairs. In contrast, McKinley’s opposition to recognition followed his conviction that the 
United States has a right and duty to monitor, judge, and sanction any contestant departing 
from standards of right conduct. Thus, McKinley agreed with Cleveland that the Cuban in-
surrection was a legal non-entity. But he did not share Cleveland’s view that what follows 
from that fact is an abdication of America’s role as judge in the dispute.  
Instead, McKinley argued that recognizing the Cubans was misguided precisely be-
cause it would amount to a promise of American neutrality. Classifying the situation as an 
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interstate conflict would equalize the legal standing of the Cubans and the Spanish, give a 
practical advantage to the more powerful party, and hamper America’s role in the dispute.587 
As he put it, “In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belliger-
ency, unaccompanied by the assumption of international neutrality.” This “onerous code of 
neutrality,” he said, “could impart to the United States no jurisdiction between Spain and 
the insurgents. It would give the United States no right of intervention to enforce the con-
duct of the strife within the paramount authority of Spain according to the international 
code of war.”588 Unlike Cleveland, McKinley did not rule out recognizing the Cubans before 
the demonstrated evisceration of Spain’s rightful rule on the island, saying there could come 
a moment when recognizing Cubans would become a matter of America’s “right and 
duty.”589  
For McKinley, Spain’s official territorial and legal dominion could not purchase a 
guarantee of noninterference because such legal considerations were conditioned on the sov-
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ereign’s humanitarian conduct. The United States had the right to demand of Spain human-
itarian treatment toward its own citizens, and to enforce “the international code of war” 
when Spain miscarries humanitarian justice.590 
In December of 1896, McKinley believed that his country’s involvement in Spain 
was justified on humanitarian grounds. He nevertheless opposed military confrontation be-
cause he regarded it as a last resort, believing that a more patient method that exerted pres-
sure on Spain could achieve the same ends with less risk.591 Spain’s new government had 
pledged promising humanitarian reforms, including a reversal of “the policy of cruel rapine 
and extermination that so long shocked the universal sentiment of humanity.”592 However, 
McKinley regarded American patience to be a matter purely of national discretion rather 
than any obligation to international law or to Spanish sovereignty, acknowledging that “in-
tervention upon humanitarian grounds…has not failed to receive my most anxious and ear-
nest consideration”: 
Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright 
and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the Govern-
ment will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens 
and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which 
shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by 
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our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it 
shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will 
be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world.593 
McKinley never wavered from his view that the United States maintains a right to take ac-
tion once it determines it must do to secure an “honorable and enduring” peace, defined ac-
cording to the (ill-defined) humanitarian standards of his administration.  
Corresponding to McKinley’s emphasis on America’s humanitarian duties is his con-
certed effort to play down what his predecessor had regarded as America’s inescapable legal 
duties. McKinley acknowledged his continuation of Cleveland’s anti-filibustering policy and 
justified it as necessary to maintain a unified national policy, and one in “full duty according 
to the law of nations.” However, whereas Cleveland had saved the most loaded words to be-
rate American filibusterers, McKinley trains his fire at Spanish claims that his administration 
is failing to stymie the transnational offenses.594 McKinley, as he had in his private diplo-
matic directives, spoke of the anti-filibustering policy as an unfortunate one not because its 
need reflects poorly on Americans, but because it is a necessity that is subjecting the country 
to costly burdens.595 
Since McKinley came to office on a Republican platform that promised Cuban liber-
ation, his first annual statement to Congress can be viewed as the noble effort of an anti-war 
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president attempting to satiate domestic pressure for more aggressive action against Spain—a 
signal that his attempts to settle the conflict diplomatically does not detract from his hawk-
ishness.596 However much McKinley sought to “sell” his policy, he did so in a way entirely 
consistent with his private diplomatic efforts. In these efforts, the President said that he (like 
Cleveland) preferred a diplomatic peace consistent with Spain’s honor and interests, but (un-
like Cleveland) would not accept such a peace if sought by inhumane means.597 McKinley, 
unlike Cleveland, never circumscribed America’s right to interfere by the entitlements of 
Spain’s sovereign rights over its territory. Both privately and publicly, he had said he was un-
willing to accept a peace created by the Spanish Mauser. Instead, he articulated a duty to in-
dividual welfare that superseded concern for sovereignty. Insofar as McKinley was concerned 
with international law, he invoked its protection of individuals, not states.598 Cleveland 
viewed the conflict as Spain’s civil war (albeit one touching on American interests), and sug-
gested Spanish sovereignty, together with America’s position as a dutiful member of a family 
of nations, prohibits American intervention. McKinley, by contrast, viewed Cuba as a con-
test of political causes that the United States has every right to judge and sanction according 
to its estimation of proper codes of war. 
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McKinley’s elevation of humanitarian interests and demotion of concern for pre-
sumed Spanish sovereignty would prove to have a tangible effect on the conflict. It signaled a 
policy change to Madrid, which read McKinley’s congressional message “in a spirit of intense 
hostility by everyone except the Cabinet of Sagasta,” according to an army officer based in 
Madrid. “The unofficial expressions of some of its members are by no means friendly. They 
see it as a veiled threat of intervention unless war in Cuba stops.”599 Within days of McKin-
ley’s address, his administration directed a public campaign for charitable assistance to Cuba 
through the Red Cross and with coordination of American officials in Havana. (McKinley 
himself, historians later learned, contributed $5,000 to the national fund anonymously.)600 
For the first time, the United States would have an official hand in directing a national pol-
icy within Spanish territory, independent of Spanish oversight.  
McKinley’s concurrent secretive diplomacy suggests his policy shift was genuine and 
not merely a way to posture in front of a war-hungry domestic audience. Two weeks follow-
ing his message to Congress, Woodford confirmed to Madrid that the President believes he 
has the right and duty to monitor Spain’s promised political program, as well as its military 
conduct, within Spain’s own territorial domain.601 The American government would main-
tain an “attitude of benevolent expectancy” toward Madrid’s promised reforms, buoyed by 
encouraging signs that Spain’s “policy of devastation and extermination that so long shocked 
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the universal sentiment of humanity has already been signally reversed.”602 But Spain’s future 
actions will “be judged by their realization” of regenerating Cuba “upon the rock of equity 
and not upon the shifting sands of selfish interests.”603 Noting America’s security and com-
mercial interests in peace, the letter nevertheless emphasizes the “all-controlling sentiment of 
humanity” that guides American policy. Woodford warns that the “the history of civilized 
nations shows that such sentiments and such considerations have constrained the suffering 
on-lookers to mediation, and even intervention, when longer forbearance has ceased to be a 
virtue.” Woodford’s letter rebukes Spain’s demand for more diligent enforcement of neutral-
ity laws, arguing that the United States has gone above and beyond its duties. Whereas 
Cleveland had invoked Spain’s sovereignty and its legal protections as a constraint on Ameri-
can action, the McKinley administration had now flipped the logic on its head: Woodford 
said that Spain’s insistence that no state of war exists and that it is merely suppressing a do-
mestic insurrection means that the United States is not bound by some neutrality laws that 
only apply to interstate wars.604  
To review: Between June and December of 1897—before any of the cascading inci-
dents of early 1898 that are commonly portrayed as decisive catalysts in American entry into 
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war—McKinley had demonstrated, in both his diplomatic overtures and public announce-
ments, a departure from Cleveland’s overriding commitment to a policy consistent with due 
regard for Spanish sovereignty. McKinley and his ministers had not put down any specific 
terms for an eventual peace settlement. They also refrained from expressing any support for 
the moral cause of Cuban independence (in fact, they pointed out the practical problems of 
doing so). Nevertheless, departing from his predecessor, McKinley’s private and public mes-
sages had effectively ruled out a Spanish military victory; he conveyed to both Spain and the 
American public that any path to peace could not be implemented by Spain’s “sheer force of 
arms.”605 While abandoning his predecessor’s view that American policy was constrained by 
the fact that this was Spain’s domestic quarrel, McKinley announced a new “righteous peace” 
involving America’s monitoring and sanctioning of Spanish military conduct and (no less 
vaguely) whether the outcomes of Madrid’s reform plan prove equitable. 
 
If Spain had hoped its autonomy plan would quell American demands and buy more time to 
exhaust its insubordinate colonial children, it took only days into the new year to receive its 
rude awakening. In January, pro-Spanish riots broke out in Havana protesting the autonomy 
program. The outbreaks were dispiriting to McKinley and his assistant secretary of state, 
William R. Day, who was in charge of the administration’s Cuban policy. If Spanish officers 
could not accept menial steps toward autonomy, how could they accept their ultimate fate of 
                                               




appeasing an irrepressible insurgency?606 Spain’s ambassador in Washington reported to his 
colleagues that war was now a real possibility since the American government “have lost all 
faith in Spain’s success.”607  
The January riots not only demonstrated that Spanish intransigence on Cuba was 
categorically toxic, but that it endangered Americans who were within the blast radius of the 
strife. The riots expedited McKinley’s budding efforts to prepare for the possibility of war 
with Spain. McKinley had already instructed the Navy to plan for contingencies around the 
island and to strategize reconnaissance missions in Cuban harbors. Commodore George 
Dewey, the commander of the Navy’s Asiatic fleet, was stationed in Hong Kong, awaiting 
further orders. McKinley had also instructed the military to refuse enlistment termination.608 
On January 25, adding to these efforts, McKinley decided to send a second-class battleship, 
the USS Maine, to Havana to prevent future disorders and protect American interests on the 
islands.609 McKinley understood, and previously vocalized, the risks of moving American as-
sets into a hot zone. Still, he believed that it was important for the United States to demon-
strate its commitment to peace missions to keep pressure on Spain’s Liberal government and 
its promised reforms.610  
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Madrid reacted to Washington’s ominous military maneuvering and diplomatic di-
rectives with stiff defiance. On January 20, Spain’s minister to Washington, Enrique Dupuy 
de Lôme, told Day that the United States is indirectly responsible for the conflict since the 
insurrection was kept alive by America’s tacit moral support for the rebels and the govern-
ment’s tepid response to Cuban advocacy within its borders. Then, on February 8, replying 
to Woodford’s letter of December 20 and the subsequent navy maneuvers, the Spanish gov-
ernment berated Washington for departing from its high tradition of neutrality and interfer-
ing with Spain’s internal problems.611 The letter said that the United States was assuming the 
role of judge and attempting to determine, without authority, “whether indispensable condi-
tions of peace have been realized” by Spain.612 Madrid acknowledged that the new admin-
istration has continued with its anti-filibustering duties but (somewhat ironically) demanded 
that Washington take more aggressive steps to shut down pro-Cuban propaganda within 
America’s sovereign borders.613 Madrid, meanwhile, owes the United States nothing regard-
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ing Cuba: The “Spanish people and Spanish Government will resolutely maintain their legit-
imate and traditional sovereignty in Cuba.” The letter then promises that Spain would do 
whatever is necessary to maintain its rule of Cuba:  
Cuba has its life and future united to Spain, and to conspire against their perpetual 
union reveals designs of destruction and involves inadmissible pretension. Peace nec-
essary for Cuba and advantageous the United States can be found only in the for-
mula of colonial self-government and Spanish sovereignty.614 
Following Madrid’s truculent reply to Washington, two events within a week of each 
other quickly escalated the situation. On February 9, a private letter by Dupuy de Lôme to a 
friend was leaked and published in the New York Journal. It described McKinley as a “weak 
and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd besides being a would-be politician (politicastro) 
who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoes 
of his party.”615 Despite a prompt apology from Madrid, the letter was sensationalized by the 
yellow press as an audacious taunt of American mettle. The controversy led Congress to ask 
McKinley to release to it the diplomatic correspondence to Madrid. One week later (Febru-
ary 16), the Maine exploded near the Havana harbor, killing 266 marines. The reaction by 
both the press and Congress was now predictably (and perhaps understandably) frenzied.616 
The Dupuy de Lôme letter and Maine incidents meant that McKinley had to pro-
ceed diplomatic engagement with greater public scrutiny and pressure. Even as he sought to 
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tame congressional anxiety and anger, some politicians came to believe that continued diplo-
macy in the face of Spanish crimes was deeply shameful. The uproar would peak around 
mid-March, when, upon a return from a self-funded visit to Cuba, Republican Senator Red-
field Proctor, a Vermont conservative with a reputation for sobriety and isolationism, con-
verted into an interventionist. The Senator held no illusions about the dangers of Cuban in-
dependence but nevertheless said American inaction in the face of the horrors he had wit-
nessed was no longer justifiable. The Senator said the strongest argument for American inter-
vention was not the barbarity of Weyler or the loss of Maine but the plain fact that no rea-
sonable person could expect a Cuban majority to cease “struggling for freedom and deliver-
ance from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge.”617 Proctor’s Wyoming 
colleague observed that the speech produced “a raising of the blood and temper as well as of 
shame that we, a civilized people, an enlightened nation, a great republic, born in a revolt 
against tyranny, should permit such a state of things within less than a hundred miles of our 
shore as that which exists in Cuba.”618  
Proctor’s speech dovetailed with, and perhaps encouraged, a shift in business atti-
tudes. For years, while the public became increasingly hostile to Spanish conduct in Cuba, 
those with fears of domestic economic disruptions opposed American intervention, while 
prominent business leaders—including John D. Rockefeller and J.P. Morgan—expressed 
                                               
617 Quoted in Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895–
1898, 134. 




deep skepticism over potential American intervention.619 Following the events of early 1898, 
some prominent business leaders were now following the mood of the moment, joining 
other erstwhile reluctant souls like Elihu Root, and vocally supporting Cuban liberation.620 
According to the tragic narrative of the war, the public pressure created by these incidents 
meant that averting war was now inconceivable.621  
However, McKinley’s words and actions during the spring of 1898 suggest a conti-
nuity in his objectives and his declining optimism in achieving them—less because of “pres-
sures” than because of Spanish intransigence amid continually deteriorating conditions in 
Cuba.  
Throughout February and March, McKinley continued to pursue two tracks—pre-
paring for the contingency of war while attempting to persuade Madrid to renounce its 
claims to the island. Early in March, he successfully sought $50 million from Congress for 
national defense spending, including a preemptive purchase of Brazilian ships that the Span-
ish were about to purchase.622 The moves stunned Spain for its brazenness while reassuring 
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Congress that the President was not limiting his efforts to interminable diplomacy.623 Mean-
while, McKinley sought to use the domestic clamor in service of his diplomacy, that is, to 
move Spain toward proposals that would pave toward a dignified withdrawal from Cuba.624 
McKinley was able to pursue these tracks only by resisting, for weeks, the supposedly 
overwhelming frenzy for war. For all of the uproar created by the press (and underscored by 
scholars), there is no indication that McKinley took personally any of Dupuy de Lôme’s er-
rant insults.625 More important to him was what the letter conveyed about Spain’s goodwill, 
or lack thereof. Besides insulting the President, the letter revealed that Spain’s autonomy 
program in Cuba is “a waste of time and progress,” and that Madrid believes that the Cuba 
situation will ultimately resolve militarily. Madrid was using negotiations with Washington 
as a stalling mechanism while it waged a counter-propaganda campaign to influence Ameri-
can opinion in its favor. In other words, the letter was unwelcome news for those, like 
McKinley, who had hoped Spain could be persuaded to restore peace in Cuba through grad-
ual political reforms. Dupuy de Lôme was saying that his government was playing along, but 
only as far as was necessary to buy time to exhaust the insurgency by military means.626  
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McKinley’s reactions to the Maine incident was similarly sober and thoughtful, de-
spite the worsening state of relations with Madrid and the vituperative, anti-Spanish assess-
ments in the press.627 The Maine incident may have confirmed McKinley’s long-standing 
worry that the very existence of a nearby conflict exposed the United States to collateral dan-
gers. Still, the official announcement was that the administration is withholding judgment 
until a complete expert investigation concluded. Diplomacy with Madrid continued; in cor-
respondence and meetings, the incident was often unmentioned.628 In a speech to the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania on the occasion of George Washington’s birthday, McKinley alluded 
to the Maine incident only by way exhorting his audience to emulate the first president’s ex-
ample in demonstrating equipoise amid tumult: “He has emphasized the necessity at all 
times for the exercise of a sober and dispassionate public judgment. Such judgment, my fel-
low-citizens, is the best safeguard in the calm of tranquil events, and rises superior and trium-
phant above the storms of woe and peril.”629 In his December 1898 annual address, follow-
ing the conclusion of hostilities with Spain, McKinley would reflect on the Maine reaction as 
a moment when the United States had every reason to move instantly but chose to wait and 
                                               
627 As Offner explains: “Had there been no emotionalism over the Maine, would McKinley’s diplomacy have 
fared any better? Probably not. The differences over Cuba were as large as ever. Time had run out, and neither 
Washington nor Madrid had any new proposals to offer.” Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the 
United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895–1898, 158. 
628 After meeting with his Spanish counterparts on February 25, Woodford wrote to McKinley and made no 
mention of the incident. Mr. Woodford to the President, February 26, 1898. 
629 William McKinley, “Address to the Officers and Students of the University of Pennsylvania, Academy of 
Music, Philadelphia, February 22nd, 1898”,” in Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley: From His Election 




take action only on its own terms—“striking evidence of the poise and sturdy good sense dis-
tinguishing our national character.”630 
At the time, however, it was not the nation that insisted on poise and patience; it was 
McKinley. The President continued to press for calm even after six weeks after the explosion 
when the investigatory committee would publish a verdict that would blame the Maine ex-
plosion on foul-play (effectively pointing to Spain).631 Senators in the Foreign Relations 
Committee were nearly unanimous in favoring Cuban independence, and dozens of House 
Republicans threatened to join the Democrats in forcing a vote on the matter. McKinley 
convinced Congress to delay further action that might hurt the outstanding proposals to the 
Sagasta government, agreeing to release the diplomatic correspondence of his administration, 
and assuring that he would compel Spain to pay reparations.632 McKinley’s commitment to 
exhausting the path of peaceful diplomacy did not waiver, even as his assessment of Spain’s 
intentions became bleaker. He was, as Roosevelt said at the time, “bent on peace.”633 
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Private diplomatic correspondence suggests that, in the spring of 1898, the most 
pressing matters for McKinley were not consumed by the controversies of the moment. 
These controversies only heightened his sense of urgency regarding the continued deteriora-
tion of the situation on the island and his grave concerns with Spain’s increasingly transpar-
ent refusal to adapt her objectives to McKinley’s terms for a peaceful settlement. In a tele-
gram to Woodford on the Maine situation, Day said that the President believes that what is 
most important is the  
general conditions in Cuba which can not be longer endured, and which will de-
mand action on our part, unless Spain restores honorable peace which will stop star-
vation of people and give them opportunity to take care of themselves, and restore 
commerce now wholly lost… . Relations will be much influenced by attitude of 
Spanish Government in Maine matter, but general conditions must not be lost sight 
of.634  
The President’s fears were heightened by the sense of certainty that time was allied with mis-
ery. For weeks, Woodford expressed the administration’s worry that, once the rainy season 
begins in mid-April, famine and epidemics would deteriorate already bleak conditions on the 
ground and heighten dangers to the American homeland.635 These concerns, expressed in 
private, had nothing to do with the supposed posturing of jingoes who sought to “sell” a stra-
tegic war on humanitarian pretenses.636  
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While McKinley’s continued hope for Spain to commit to a program that culmi-
nated in a relinquishment of the island seems naïve in hindsight, the public pressure at the 
time may have made it more likely. In Madrid, the outcry over the sunk battleship provoked 
renewed urgency to avoid war with the United States. Following the incident, the Sagasta 
government toned down its belligerent brinkmanship and considered seriously selling the is-
land (an alternative that had been periodically entertained by the administrations of Polk, 
Pierce, Grant, and Cleveland), or reaching an agreement through direct peace talks with the 
rebels.637  
Any sincere hope by members of the Sagasta cabinet and the queen regent to proceed 
down such paths were dashed by deep fears that relinquishment would spell the end of the 
dynasty. The Spanish had lost a vast empire in the nineteenth century; of its remaining colo-
nies—Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and few small islands in Asia—Cuba was the crown 
jewel.638 Thus, despite a massive debt burden, Spain rejected a March 1 offer by insurgents 
to buy independence for $200 million. As to a negotiated settlement with the insurgents, 
Spanish officers in Cuba indicated that they were ready to disobey any peace settlement by 
their civilian superiors that did not begin with the absolute surrender of the Cuban rebels. 
                                               
637 Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley, 78–85. 
638 The Nation, published by anti-war Irish-born journalist Edwin Lawrence Godkin, aptly summarized Spain’s 
predicament: “The Spanish people are as patriotic a race as ever lived. The impulse of a splendid past is still 
upon them. Traditions of national valor, dating from a time when their infantry swept Europe and their natives 
drove the dreaded Turk from the Mediterranean are a part of their life-blood. Threatened bankruptcy, certain 
defeat in the long run, will not for a moment deter that proud nation from fighting for its honor…. We must 
not deceive ourselves at this point. Spain is no doubt anxious for peace. She will no doubt make every conces-
sion to us or to the Cubans compatible with her dignity and honor as a nation. But if driven into a corner she 




Noting Madrid’s situation, Woodford wrote to McKinley ten days after the explosion of 
Maine: “They want peace if they can keep peace and save the dynasty. They prefer the 
chances of war, with the certain loss of Cuba, to the overthrow of the dynasty.”639 For 
Spain’s leaders, the voluntary relinquishment of Cuba posed a greater risk to the queen’s 
dynasty than the risks of war with the United States. Madrid was now asking for a pause un-
til their parliament reconvenes in May—a transparent scheme to leverage the upcoming 
rainy season to gain a battlefield edge over the insurgents.640  
In late March and early April, McKinley’s last efforts at diplomacy continued despite 
his clear-eyed recognition of Madrid’s domestic constraints and strategic procrastination.641 
As before, the priorities he articulated—both to his ministers and to Madrid—emphasized 
the humanitarian conditions in Cuba. On March 25, Day noted that the President “cannot 
look upon the starvation in Cuba save with horror. The concentration of men, women and 
children in fortified towns and permitting them to starve is intolerable to a Christian nation 
geographically so close as ours to Cuba. All this has shocked and inflamed the American 
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mind, as it has the civilized world.”642 Meanwhile, Woodford conveyed the President’s prior-
ities to his counterparts in Madrid, saying that “The United States has not varied its attitude 
since I came to Spain last September,” and has been disappointed with the lack of pro-
gress.643 The “time has come when the United States must, in the interest of humanity and 
because of the great pressing commercial, financial, and sanitary needs of our country, as that 
some satisfactory agreement be reached within a very few days which will assure immediate 
and honorable peace in Cuba.” Woodford explained than an honorable peace was incon-
sistent with American inaction while Madrid continued to attempt to repress the insurgency. 
As Americans have gradually come to experience the famine and destitution of Cuba, 
humanity and civilization required that peace must be secured and firmly established 
at once; and that neither the present judgment of the civilized world nor the final 
judgment of history would excuse the United States in longer permitting the present 
condition of affairs in an island lying within 100 miles of our coast.644  
McKinley’s terms for a humanitarian peace were now more specific than before. He 
sought from Madrid an immediate armistice with Cubans, a revocation of the reconcentra-
tion policy that remained in operation despite Weyler’s official recall, and (“if possible”) an 
agreement that would empower the President to manage arbitration proceedings that would 
determine the terms by which Spain relinquishes its hold of Cuba. In the meantime, McKin-
ley successfully prevented Congress from moving forward on resolutions demanding Spanish 
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relinquishment of Cuba. At this point, McKinley conveyed little hope in a Spanish about-
face, but he continued to regard a diplomatic breakthrough to be preferable to war.645 
Over the course of McKinley’s final diplomatic efforts in late March and early April, 
it had become clear to him that Spain had no intention of yielding to his demands. On April 
1, the New York Tribune reported that McKinley’s “closest friends” believe that the President 
“has less confidence in a peaceable outcome.”646 Still, McKinley could have averted war by 
renegotiating America’s position, permitting Spain to see through its rainy-season strategy 
and fight the rebels to exhaustion. In rejecting the final proposals reaching him, he had indi-
cated his dissatisfaction with that scenario. Those proposals, he knew, were attempts to pla-
cate Washington through promises while defeating the insurgents by a war of attrition.647 If 
we are to take seriously McKinley’s articulated priorities throughout the conflict, he rejected 
Spain’s final overtures because they sought to devastate the insurgents—a strategy that, even 
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if successful, he consistently said he would not countenance due to its humanitarian implica-
tions.  
On April 11, 1898, McKinley asked Congress for authority to intervene as a neutral 
in Cuba to establish peace.648 On April 19, Congress agreed, empowering the President to 
enforce a policy of Spanish relinquishment of Cuba.649 The next day, the two nations broke 
diplomatic relations and the American consuls were notified to leave Spain at their discre-
tion.650 On April 21, McKinley ordered a Cuban blockade. On April 25, Spain declared war 
on the United States and Congress formally reciprocated. 
McKinley’s so-called “war message” on April 11 is no stemwinder—it contains no 
patriotic bluster, spirited denunciation of Spain, or any sense of imperial adventurism.651 Its 
tone is consistent with interpretations that see it as a strained attempt of a weak-willed presi-
dent attempting to justify a war in which he does not believe. As was his custom, McKinley 
portrays his actions as a natural and unfortunate evolution of American diplomacy that be-
gan before his presidency. He explicitly invokes Cleveland’s warning to Spain about his 
country’s “higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.”652 
Like Cleveland, he says that what is of utmost importance in considering intervention is 
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America’s national interest in peace to secure domestic liberty and prosperity.653 McKinley’s 
address was a self-effacing, factual survey of his diplomacy that invites the interpretation that 
he was forced into war.654 
Even so, no less than his December congressional message, McKinley’s war message 
underplays his agency, conservatively places his policy in the context of the evolution of 
American foreign-policy tradition, and underscores the constraints of circumstances—yet do-
ing all that while articulating plainly conditions of acceptable peace that were different from 
his predecessor’s. McKinley’s arguments in the war message were entirely consistent with his 
administration’s private and public statements on the matter over the previous ten months. 
The guiding principle of the President’s Cuba policy, from June 1897 to April of 1898, was 
that the United States had an interest and duty to prevent a peace born of military devasta-
tion.655 
Whereas Cleveland grounded America’s “higher obligations” on a highly confined 
scenario whereby Spain announces in words or deeds its abdication of sovereignty over the 
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island, McKinley suggested that Spain’s successful establishment or reestablishment of sover-
eignty would only heighten America’s obligations to intervene—not because the United 
States is against Spanish victory, per se, but because in practice it would mean a devastating 
conflict a la the Ten Years War. “The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the 
present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilized 
world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are, deeply and inti-
mately, by its very existence.”656 McKinley lists four “grounds for…intervention.” Three are 
about protecting American security and commerce, but he lists the humanitarian reason first: 
First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, star-
vation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict 
are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in 
another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. 
It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.657 
As was by then characteristic, McKinley would assert the paramount importance of Ameri-
can interests in security and commerce while underscoring the deplorable conduct of war-
fare, noting that “the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare, 
shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.” Once again, 
he reminded his audience that, by the time he came into office, “the policy of devastation 
and concentration” had already been made effective over multiple months and over a large 
portion of the island.658 He explicitly reiterated his prior standard of peace and his long-
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standing unwillingness to watch Spain subdue the island violently. McKinley recounted that 
he insisted on an “an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of the island” 
through an autonomy plan and the simultaneous enforcement of “more humane methods” 
during the conduct of hostilities.659 Despite promising gestures by Madrid, McKinley said he 
remained deeply concerned with the humanitarian situation, which he said provoked him in 
December to campaign for a civilian effort to relieve suffering on the island. McKinley does 
not say, but he does come close to saying, that humanitarian reasons alone justify interven-
tion:  
The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war, according 
to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents where 
neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by interne-
cine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds.660 
McKinley’s message was a rejection of Cleveland’s insistence that American foreign 
policy must pursue interest in accord the nation’s sovereign legal duties to Spain. Short of a 
deliberate and irreversible destruction of Cuba, Cleveland had regarded humanitarian con-
siderations as subservient to American obligations to the sovereign law of nations. He had ar-
gued that American fulfillment of its duties to Spanish sovereignty presented an opportunity 
for the nation to show its integrity and fidelity to the law of nations. He regarded American 
filibusterers as well-meaning traitors whose only virtue was in providing the United States 
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with an opportunity, through their prosecution, to prove a national commitment to neutral-
ity. In contrast, McKinley, goes out of his way to speak of the “burdensome and costly na-
ture of such obligations” represented by the enforcement policy, and as provoking “irritating 
questions and entanglements” that the United States is eager to escape.661 In other words, 
McKinley accepted the propriety of Cleveland’s anti-filibustering policy, but, unlike his pre-
decessor, showed little pride in it, and little shame in those whom it targeted; indeed, 
McKinley viewed the liberation from the burdens of legal compliance as a significant bonus 
to intervention in Cuba. 
In recounting the failure of Cleveland’s 1896 attempt to mediate peace, McKinley 
suggests that the culprit was the prioritization of Spanish sovereignty. Cleveland had sought 
an honorable settlement “on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba 
under the flag and sovereignty of Spain.”662 This course was doomed, says McKinley, be-
cause it ruled out “any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of 
the insurgents to the mother country.”663 
McKinley does not say that he believes Cubans deserve recognition or independence 
as a matter of right or expediency. On the contrary, he repeats his opposition to recognizing 
the rebels (or an independent Cuban republic) because it is a back-door attempt to create an 
alliance with the Cuban cause while forcing the United States to a position of neutrality that 
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would only hurt the Cubans. Unlike Cleveland, who saw Cuban recognition as a brazenly 
illegal pretense, McKinley’s argument against recognition and independence was largely 
based on the practical consideration that it would unduly harm Cubans and constrain Amer-
ican action. McKinley now added that recognition would constrain America’s conduct dur-
ing its interference by endowing premature authority to an undetermined Cuban govern-
ment.664 On the eve of war, the question of Cuban recognition or independence must yield 
to America’s primary objective of “the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the 
misery that afflicts the island.”665 
The supposedly overwhelming public demand for war and the outrage over the 
Maine explosion—those pressures so often presented by scholars as the spark that lit the 
flames of war—are unmentioned until the end of McKinley’s message, and seem to be 
wholly subservient to his overriding purpose to achieving a humanitarian peace. Rather than 
directly blaming Spain for the “inexpressible horror” of the Maine explosion, McKinley pre-
sents it as “a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable” and 
the inability of Spain to assure the safety of its harbors during peacekeeping missions.666  
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It would be an exaggeration to say that McKinley’s war message rationalized inter-
vention on purely humanitarian grounds. In appropriating American resources and risking 
American lives, he justified his action on the primacy of American security and prosperity. 
However, it would also be an exaggeration to say that this was an address that uses humani-
tarian concerns as ancillary, rhetorical window-dressing. At the end of his message, McKinley 
encapsulates the mixture of his motives that is prompting intervention: “The only hope of 
relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacifica-
tion of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered 
American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba 
must stop.”667 McKinley’s articulated mixture of motives is unambiguously consistent with 
his initial insistence on not just peace and order but peace and order consistent with humani-
tarian standards. These were standards absent in his predecessor’s diplomacy, which was 
scrupulously guided by America’s obligation to international law and that law’s protection of 
Spanish sovereignty. McKinley’s initial stance on the situation implied an outright rejection 
of Cleveland’s policy of noninterference based on American duty to Spanish sovereignty. 
This stance coincided with an affirmative policy of interference—first diplomatically and 
now militarily—based on an American duty to humanity. 
Once war commenced, McKinley toured the country and delivered multiple speeches 
that effectively removed the finer points of his intentions and established America’s cause as a 
                                               




noble, God-ordained enterprise primarily on behalf of humanity. On October 11, 1898, 
speaking to a crowd in Cedar Rapids, McKinley said the war and its settlement would bring 
burdens, but the “American people never shirk a responsibility and never unload a burden 
that carries forward civilization. We accepted war for humanity. We can accept no terms of 
peace which shall not be in the interest of humanity.”668 McKinley added that the “real 
honor” in America’s conduct exceeds military valor—it comes with “the substantial gain to 
humanity.”669 Speaking in Belle Plaine later that day, McKinley said: “This war has taught us 
a great many lessons, and one of the most priceless connected with the conflict has been the 
triumph of our humanity. …What we want, my fellow-citizens, is that the conclusion of this 
war, as written in public treaty, shall be a triumph for humanity.”670 In his December 1898 
annual address, while reflecting on his decision to go to war, he acknowledged the nation’s 
interest in stability in Cuba. However, he once again emphasized the war’s cause as a nation’s 
“earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indef-
inite prolongation of which had become insufferable.” The decision emerged after he had es-
tablished Spain was not a serious partner in pacifying Cuba humanely, relying instead on the 
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“most objectionable and offensive policies.” American initiative was necessary to end condi-
tions “repugnant to the universal sentiment of humanity,” he said.671  
There is no doubt that, before the war and especially after the Maine incident, 
McKinley was facing intense pressure from a large part of the public, Congress, and the press 
to take more aggressive action against Spain. There is also no doubt that, in the speeches fol-
lowing the onset of war, McKinley spoke much more forcefully of a humanitarian impera-
tive. However, as we have learned, McKinley’s standards of a just peace were first articulated 
in the summer of 1897, guided his subsequent diplomacy, and became the basis by which he 
determined that his standards for peace were unreachable. By April, McKinley seemed to 
doubt the possibility of any breakthrough as Spain had revealed her unwillingness to yield to 
Cuban demands and her determination to pacify the island militarily. As his ministers sug-
gested, the President feared that further engagement with an obstinate Spanish government 
would come at the cost of near-certain deterioration of conditions in Cuba. Throughout this 
ten-month period, McKinley indicated that he sought a peace that was inconsistent with 
Spain’s objectives of pacifying the island militarily and that he would end diplomacy once 
“longer forbearance has ceased to be a virtue.” 
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THE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES (1898–1900) 
In January of 1899, Senator George F. Hoar, a Republican and supporter of McKin-
ley’s Cuba intervention, represented the voice of a growing and estimable minority of dis-
senters when he rose to speak to his Senate colleagues. Hoar excoriated the President for 
launching the nation on an unconstitutional policy that imposes on a foreign people an 
American government they had violently rejected. “You have no right at the cannon’s mouth 
to impose on an unwilling people your Declaration of Independence and your Constitution 
and your notions of freedom and notions of what is good,” Hoar cried.672  
McKinley had kept his promise to free Cuba and avoid any attempt to annex the is-
land. During the war, strategic considerations had convinced him to take Puerto Rico and 
other Spanish territories. The acquisition of the Philippines, however, was far more contro-
versial, turning many of McKinley’s erstwhile allies against his administration. 
What led McKinley to take over an archipelago six thousand miles away from the 
U.S. homeland that was protected by a Spanish naval squadron that posed little direct threat 
to American security? More puzzlingly, what led him to establish total military control after 
reaching an armistice with Spain and assume for the United States the responsibility for the 
entire archipelago?  
                                               
672 United States Congress, “Acquisition of Territory,” 55th Congress, 3rd Session, January 9, 1899,” in Con-






For many scholars, McKinley’s policy of total acquisition of a Pacific archipelago be-
tray the ugly roots of the Spanish-American War. According to these studies, the Philippines 
acquisition is the best proof that McKinley’s philanthropic mission was a veil covering irre-
pressible strategic and commercial needs.673 According to one line of arguments, the acquisi-
tion was the logical outcome of growing concern over the future of American commerce in 
the Far East, and a fulfillment of a need for a gateway to the Chinese market.674 The combi-
nation of a highly productive economy and the insatiable need for raw materials and invest-
ment opportunities compelled U.S. policy to turn to Asia.675 Overlapping with this theory is 
one that argues that McKinley was fulfilling the great dreams of the overeager imperialists, 
such as Roosevelt and Lodge.676 Historian Gerald Linderman describes this attitude: “The 
War of 1898 was not an accident.…Americans, and no one else, must be masters of the 
cross-roads of the Pacific.”677 According to Schoonover, “The acquisition of the Philippines 
                                               
673 The exception to this tendency can be found in the decade after his assassination, while his legacy still en-
joyed a honeymoon. At that point, historians acknowledged McKinley’s humanitarian impulses, such as claim-
ing that he was “the first of our Presidents to respond to the call of a broad philanthropy towards other less for-
tunate people.” Quoted in Ephraim K. Smith, “William McKinley’s Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical 
Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands,” Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War & Its After-
math (1993), 211. 
674 LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898, 362; Pratt, Expansionists of 
1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish Islands, 228. 
675 Schoonover, Uncle Sam’s War of 1898 and the Origins of Globalization, chapter 6. 
676 Paolo Enrico Coletta, “The Peace Negotiations and the Treaty of Paris,” in Threshold to American interna-
tionalism; essays on the foreign policies of William McKinley (New York: Exposition Press, 1970). 
677 F. Linderman Gerald, The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American War (University of 




was related to one hundred years of U.S. activity in the Pacific and four centuries of quest by 
North Atlantic maritime powers for Asian trade.”678 Some scholars argue that McKinley was 
pursuing these objectives deliberately because he shared the concerns and dreams of imperial-
ists; others argue McKinley was driven to do so, either by the pressures of business interests 
or by an imperialist zeitgeist, and a crusading, highly racial progressivism.679 Michael H. 
Hunt, for example, suggests that McKinley acquired the Philippines for the same reason that 
Roosevelt and Lodge approved of it and that he shared Beveridge’s belief in redeeming the 
Filipinos from barbarity through missionary Anglo-Saxon uplift.680  
In assessing the merits of these theories, we must begin by acknowledging the relative 
dearth of data regarding McKinley’s decisions during the war. Before the war’s onset, 
McKinley’s intentions are revealed in his extended and detailed public messages and private 
diplomatic efforts (sometimes through his ministers speaking on his behalf). For obvious rea-
sons, war evokes the secretive privileges of the executive office; many decisions emerge from 
deliberations that are limited to tight circles of commanders and ministers. At that point, di-
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plomacy is terse, words are guarded, and the success of war efforts take precedence over ex-
tended public deliberation. Thus, McKinley’s intentions in the summer of 1898 were far 
more opaque than they are in the preceding months before the war. Many observers have 
therefore sought (not unreasonably) to infer McKinley’s intentions by assessing the relevant 
pressures and interests of the time, or by evaluating second-hand accounts.681 In truth, we 
know remarkably little about what McKinley thought about the extent to which the acquisi-
tion of the Philippines fit into any plans for America’s global role. Insofar as McKinley was 
silent, it is a silence that must inspire inferential humility rather than creativity.  
That said, beginning especially with the August 1898 armistice with Spain and the 
September peace commission’s convention, McKinley had become much more vocal about 
his intentions, especially as he toured the Midwest and South, and explained what considera-
tions led to his decision to take control of the distant archipelago. McKinley’s explanations 
deserve attention, not least because, in contrast to what many of his critics believed, he was 
deeply engaged and involved with every major decision during the war. McKinley would rely 
on his advisers and military commanders to manage the conflict’s minutiae, and he (like 
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most at the time) had little knowledge of the situation in the Far East prior to the war. How-
ever, he quickly became a dedicated student of the situation there, and his judgments about 
American interests and duties became the primary direction of the policy, penetrating a sea 
of countervailing voices.682 Many of his recent biographers have remarked on the admirable 
way in which he supervised operations closely, facilitated deliberation in a way that would 
compel his advisers to find problems with their own ideas, and moved quickly to replace sub-
ordinates when they lost his trust.683 As he was prone to do, McKinley would command 
strongly while underplaying his agency, eventually saying that “events had governed him” in 
the Philippines.684 In fact, McKinley very much governed events. As Paolo E. Coletta puts it: 
“In directing both the Spanish war and the peace negotiations…he was the opposite of the 
milksop: no one was more responsible than he for the character of the peace treaty and the 
acquisition of the Philippines.”685  
Although McKinley assumed his wartime constitutional powers and duties with au-
thority, he was not implementing the grand strategic plan imputed to his actions in hind-
sight. In the first place, the extent to which McKinley sympathized with the Roosevelts 
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Lodges of his party is far from clear.686 There are some (though somewhat incidental) indica-
tions that he shared their worldview, at least in outline.687 Following the onset of war and 
through the following year, McKinley spoke more grandly about America’s global destiny 
than he had previously. Lodge and Roosevelt, it must be said, emerged mostly satisfied with 
McKinley’s decisions regarding the Philippines.688 On the whole, however, the actual acqui-
sition of the Philippines had almost nothing to do with the sort of visions attributed to Roo-
sevelt or Lodge or any of the other late nineteenth- to early-twentieth-century voices who 
most loudly championed American expansionism.689  
In truth, neither McKinley nor anyone else in May of 1898 knew that the United 
States would emerge victorious over Spain in just 113 days, let alone acquire distant depend-
encies. Nor was there any tradition (as there was, say, in Hawaii) of interest by American 
missionaries and merchants in greater American involvement in the archipelago.690 There is 
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no evidence that, before the spring of 1898, anyone inside or outside the administration 
looked upon the Philippines as a stepping-stone to the Chinese market.691 Neither Congress 
nor the American public foresaw that a war with Spain would transform America’s commer-
cial activity in the Far East, which at the time comprised approximately two percent of 
America’s total trade.692 There is little evidence that potential for trading opportunities fac-
tored in any significant ways into McKinley’s decisions before or even during the war.693 The 
United States had no office of colonial affairs and no colonial administrators standing by to 
assume post in the Far East.694 As Grenville and Young conclude, McKinley “left no evi-
dence” that he considered taking the Philippines prior to the war with Spain.695 If McKinley 
had connived to acquire the Philippines before the war, it must be regarded as the best-kept 
conspiracy in American history.  
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The acquisition of the Philippines did not emerge from any Mahan-led seminar in 
grand strategy. On the other hand, nor was it an impulsive move made in “a fit of absent-
mindedness,” as Robert Osgood once said.696 Rather, it was the culmination of iterative steps 
taken in the winding roads of war—an attempt to emerge victorious against Spain on the 
most favorable terms, and yet in a way consistent with the war’s initial, humanitarian aims. 
The initial push of the locomotive was Commodore Dewey’s masterful May 1 attack 
on the Spanish Pacific Squadron in Manila Bay—an operation that would become a byword 
for American expansion in the Pacific. As Grenville and Young explain, “Dewey’s victory 
proved to be worth more than all Mahan’s books put together.”697 That breathtaking defeat 
of the Spanish navy initiated a series of events that would expand American commitments in 
the Far East. However, these were implications, not the methodical implementation of any 
imperialist strategy. Merry explains that the naval victory “brought forth a kind of serendipi-
tous imperialism—the acquisition almost by accident of strategic territory in far-flung re-
gions of the world, the result of actions by people who had other ends in mind and who 
hadn’t contemplated what they would do with such rewards of victory.”698  
The earliest military plan for sailing to Manila was devised in 1896 by the Naval War 
College. An obscure naval intelligence officer, William W. Kimball, figured that destroying 
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Spain’s weak pacific squadron would secure the American west coast while hemorrhaging 
Spain’s revenue sources on the islands.699 In other words, it was a plan that had everything to 
do with expediting victory over Spain, should war break out; it did not involve Roosevelt or 
Lodge and had nothing to do with the imperialism of the era’s ambitious strategists.700 Inso-
far as control of the Philippines was viewed in a longer, strategic timeline of America’s naval 
outreach, it arose from concerns of naval officers of possible imminent and strategic dangers 
from Japan, not opportunities in China or any abstract sense of counter-balancing influence 
in Asia.701 These officers, tasked with planning American victory over Spain, “never dreamed 
that the American Army would be sent to capture and hold the principal islands.”702 In sum, 
Commodore Dewey was sent to his station in Hong Kong in December of 1897 as part of 
the Navy’s plan to defeat Spain in a war, should McKinley’s diplomacy fail to secure to 
peace. When the United States Navy sailed to Manila, it was under a narrowly tailored oper-
ation to help defeat Spain in a war; there was no plan to annex or to place the archipelago 
under American control.703  
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Once Dewey’s deed was done, McKinley was, quite simply, unsure about the next 
steps. The President, like most in Washington at the time, never seriously considered Amer-
ica’s role in the Philippines’ until after Dewey’s victory.704 As Merry explains, “McKinley 
didn’t know what he wanted there. More important, he didn’t know enough about the is-
lands to know what he should want.”705 On May 19, McKinley ordered the U.S. army to oc-
cupy the Philippines “for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish 
power in that quarter and of giving to the islands order and security while in the possession 
of the United States.”706 In the meantime, McKinley’s self-awareness of his ignorance com-
pelled him to undertake a deep study of the region, and grapple with the complicated ques-
tions of occupation and political settlement that apparently he had never given serious 
thought. On August 4, the French ambassador Jules-Martin Cambon, who was serving as an 
intermediary between Spain and the United States, met with the President. He reported: 
“[T]he question of the Philippines was the only one which was not definitely resolved in his 
mind.”707 Assessing the available evidence, Merry draws a judicious conclusion about the 
President’s cautious incrementalism regarding the question of American acquisition of the 
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islands: “McKinley was genuinely conflicted on the question. He wanted more time to pon-
der it, more information to bolster his thinking, and full flexibility of decision making. His 
approach gave him all three.”708 
McKinley’s deliberation over the vexatious situation consistently defaulted to erring 
on the side of American control and deferment of final determinations to a post-war diplo-
matic settlement between Spain and the United States. In July, McKinley ordered “the occu-
pation by the United States of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of 
a treaty of peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the 
Philippines.”709 As Spain was losing its hold on its island and a simmering insurgency grew 
in force, he professed to favor “the general principle of holding on to what we get.”710 His 
August peace terms determined to keep American troops in place pending a final agreement 
over the government of the Philippines.711 Recognizing the plethora of difficulties of any 
joint-occupation shared with the insurgency, McKinley instructed the military to unilaterally 
preserve peace and stability, even if it means suppressing the insurgency. The commanders in 
the Philippines were ordered to “use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this 
end.”712 A few weeks later, McKinley told the peace commission: “While we are conducting 
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war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep 
what we want.”713 On October 26, five weeks after the insurgency formed its constitutional 
assembly and drafted an interim constitution, McKinley called his administration to execute 
a policy of total acquisition. His reasoning: pending a final peace treaty between the United 
States and Spain, only the United States can establish order.  
 
McKinley’s Case for Annexation of the Philippines 
Several months prior to his assassination in September of 1901, McKinley would de-
scribe his decision regarding the Philippines in terms similar to future historians—as inaugu-
rating a new era of American power, leaving behind “a spirit of isolation” that dominated 
since at least the Mexican War. McKinley called it “one of the best things we ever did” be-
cause merely capturing “a coaling-station or an island” would have made the United States 
“the laughing-stock of the world.” He boasted that his decision had made his nation a “world 
power; and I know, sitting here in this chair, with what added respect the nations of the 
world now deal with the United States, and it is vastly different from the conditions I found 
when I was inaugurated.”714  
Such far-reaching purposes were not so evident in 1898 when McKinley took steps 
to put the archipelago under American control. Why? To a cynical eye, McKinley’s decision 
to order U.S. control of the islands, even while conceding Spain’s de jure sovereignty until a 
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treaty is signed, appears as a duplicitous pursuit of the commercial spoils of war. Evidence 
that McKinley followed a profit motive in the Pacific is suggested in his then-secret instruc-
tions to the peace commission in September of 1898: 
Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which 
American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means 
for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient 
which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready 
to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally 
and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial pos-
session than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privi-
leges.715 
McKinley’s recognition of the commercial opportunity in the Philippines no doubt was 
shaped in part by the tutoring of General Francis V. Greene, whose army service was fol-
lowed by a successful business career in New York. Greene had studied the Philippines ex-
haustively and, in September, issued a report to McKinley that presented the Philippines as 
ripe for American annexation. Greene wrote that the rich mineral resources on the islands are 
“very valuable,” with cigars nearly as good as the best in Cuba and a coffee industry that can 
be easily revived. “With these islands in our possession and the construction of railroads in 
the interior of Luzon, it is probable that an enormous extension could be given this com-
merce, nearly all of which would come to the United States,” wrote Greene.716 However, 
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there was one catch: these considerable economic opportunities depended on a central gov-
ernment capable of maintaining the cohesion of a “one and inseparable” archipelago that 
would otherwise be disintegrated by the deeply-rooted ethnic and political divisions. 
Was McKinley’s policy of acquisition guided by Greene’s optimistic analysis? It is 
possible. However, McKinley never articulated the extent to which the “enlargement” of 
American trade conformed to the expansive vision of Greene, or whether it was closer to a 
much more limited plan, such as a small commercial depot or a naval station envisioned by 
the Naval War Board with whom he had been deliberating.717 What is clear, however, is that 
McKinley did not emphasize these commercial considerations, nor did he equate American 
predominance with the commercial benefits of annexation. In fact, as we shall see, he repeat-
edly treated the situation as an obligation rather than an opportunity, insisting that he 
“didn’t want the Philippine Island,” and that he had acquired them due to the absence of al-
ternatives.718 In other words, he not only said explicitly that commercial considerations were 
“incidental” but, in his private and public justifications, also treated them as such by saying 
little of them. 
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Beyond concluding the war with a victory over Spain, McKinley’s primary concern 
vis-à-vis the Pacific was that the archipelago was fragile and susceptible to devastating disinte-
gration from within or exploitative conquest from without.719 Greene had cautioned: “If the 
United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensure and lead 
to foreign intervention.”720 As the insurgency gained in strength, the Spanish government 
conceded it could no longer guarantee the protection of life and property to the Spanish sub-
jects in the Philippines.721 To protect the natives, Spain cynically offered to reestablish heavy 
troop presence.722 The insurgency, which never accepted an alliance with the United States, 
was incapable of holding the islands together. Establishing an independent, functional re-
public was even further out of reach.723 Even the insurgency’s leader would later say that 
McKinley was wise to insist on total control, for partial annexation could have irreversibly 
dismembered the archipelago and left it incapable of deterring opportunistic conquest by Eu-
ropean powers.724 McKinley knew, not least from his study of Greene’s report, that an ab-
sence of a centralized administration with the capability of law enforcement threatened the 
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archipelago’s stability and prosperity.725 As Louis J. Halle put it: “For Dewey to have just 
sailed away, leaving possible chaos and bloodshed in his wake, would have represented an ab-
dication of humane responsibility…. Any administration that had ordered his [Dewey’s] im-
mediate return would have committed itself to political disaster and would be remembered 
in infamy to this day.”726  
McKinley argued that abandoning the archipelago would compromise the initial, hu-
manitarian casus belli. Even in his aforementioned, secret instructions to the peace commis-
sion mentioning the “incidental” commercial opportunity on the islands, McKinley stressed 
that the United States foremost duty is to conduct and conclude the war in the same spirit 
that had initiated it.  
It is my wish that throughout the negotiations entrusted to the Commission the pur-
pose and spirit with which the United States accepted the unwelcome necessity of 
war should be kept constantly in view. We took up arms only in obedience to the 
dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations. We 
had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest.727 
The United States, he said later, “was impelled solely by the purpose of relieving grievous 
wrongs and removing long-existing conditions which disturbed its tranquillity, which 
shocked the moral sense of mankind, and which could no longer be endured.” McKinley 
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then exhorted the commissioners to avoid relinquishing the high moral position of the 
United States: 
It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same 
high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and 
magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original 
action. The luster and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confi-
dently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any illu-
sion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive 
demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths. It is believed that the 
true glory and the enduring interests of the country will most surely be served if an 
unselfish duty conscientiously accepted and a signal triumph honorably achieved 
shall be crowned by such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory 
as best comports with the traditions and character of our enlightened republic.  
 
Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to lasting results and to the 
achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization, rather than to 
ambitious designs….728 
Defining honorable triumph as one consistent with the “just and humane” casus belli rather 
than “ulterior designs,” McKinley’s high-minded rhetoric reflected an awkward recognition 
that the United States would stand to benefit from wielding indefinite influence over the is-
lands. As he acknowledged, “the Philippines stand upon a different basis” than that of Cuba, 
and thus American action there demands an independent justification. Ultimately, McKinley 
would reconcile the motives by convincing others, and perhaps also himself, that acquisition 
was in the best interest of the native inhabitants, even if they did not yet know it, and even if 
acquisition presents new costs and challenges to the United States. Nonetheless, even before 
the Tagalog insurgents took up arms against American troops, McKinley regarded American 
                                               




policy toward the Philippines as a contingency of war that introduced new, moral duties. As 
he explained at the end of his memo to the commissioners: 
[W]ithout any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence 
and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot dis-
regard. The march of events rules and overrules human action. Avowing unreservedly 
the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we 
cannot be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has 
brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as be-
comes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the ruler of na-
tions has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.729 
McKinley’s self-underplay and his transference of responsibility to a disembodied 
“march of events” would become a prominent theme in his public and private exasperations. 
According to one report, McKinley at one point expressed frustration that “If old Dewey had 
just sailed away when he smashed that Spanish fleet, what a lot of trouble he would have 
saved us.”730 He consistently described his (and his nation’s) situation as a moral, even spir-
itual, test, rather than any kind of calculated opportunity. An observant Methodist (“one of 
America’s most intensely religious presidents,” says one historian),731 McKinley is reported to 
have said that the agonizing indecision regarding the Philippines ended after prayer and di-
vine counsel.732 Although that anecdote might be apocryphal, it is consistent with his in-
creasingly religious rhetoric in public. In an October 1899 address, he said the American flag 
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is on the islands because, “in the providence of God, who moves mysteriously, the great ar-
chipelago has been placed in the hands of the American people.”733 This, he averred, is a sit-
uation for which the United States had not planned nor desired. “It was no responsibility we 
sought, but it was a responsibility put upon us.”734  
It is tempting to balk at McKinley’s moralistic self-pity and projected jeremiads. 
McKinley could have declared a navy battle won, left Manila City alone, and recalled 
Dewey. That was a distinct option at the time, and many (including Cleveland) said they 
wished McKinley would have done just that.735 Alternatively, he could have sieged Manila 
temporarily and then, on August 12, when Spain signed a peace protocol and ceasefire, with-
drawn American troops and left the problem to the Spanish and the Filipinos.  
Rather than disengaging after an initial mistake, McKinley incrementally committed 
to the protection of the Philippine inhabitants. A preliminary, May 4 dispatch of a force of 
12,000 men to hold Manila evolved into offensive operations to rout Spanish forces and con-
tain an insurgency. Practically, this meant the United States would exert unilateral military 
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control of the Philippines, restraining any insurgent hostilities, deterring foreign powers (in-
cluding Spain), and protecting inhabitants pending the hostilities between the United States 
and Spain.736 In the view of opponents of America’s intervention in Cuba, McKinley was 
like a physician who committed an initial blunder and sought to escape his conscience by 
poisoning his patient to death.  
McKinley saw it differently. As he would explain in December of 1898, “It was fit-
ting that whatever was to be done in the way of decisive operations in that quarter should be 
accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone,” since the United States had the 
obligation to achieve as speedy a peace as possible to prevent needless loss of life.737 Thus, 
although he spoke of American control of the islands as something beyond his control, it was 
the result of his evolving and deeply considered judgment of the alternatives—alternatives 
that he concluded were inconsistent with “the same high rule of conduct which guided it in 
facing war.”  
In the President’s public addresses beginning in early fall of 1898, McKinley empha-
sized the overriding importance of avoiding a hit-and-run war policy by which the United 
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States dismantles the islands’ Spanish defense only to watch them devolve to “chaos and an-
archy, after we have destroyed the only government they had.”738 Speaking to a Georgia au-
dience, McKinley explained that once Dewey’s deed was done, and the government in Ma-
nila was destroyed, it became “the duty of the American people to provide for them a better 
one.” The United States did not hope for such a scenario, but what was convenient for the 
United States was no longer relevant. For “who will shrink from the responsibility, grave 
though it may be,” to offer guidance and protection to a helpless people?739 “Are we to sit 
down in our isolation and recognize no obligation to a struggling people whose present con-
ditions we have contributed to make?” The United States could not abandon its responsibil-
ity to “give to the inhabitants protection and also our guidance to a better government, 
which will secure to them peace and order and security in their life and property and in the 
pursuit of happiness.” McKinley rejected outright any course that would leave the islands in 
chaos, any alternative that would turn them into the feed of rapacious European powers, 
such as Germany, Japan, or, indeed, Spain.740 Speaking to a Boston audience on February 
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16, 1899, McKinley said that returning Spain her Pacific possessions would have meant toss-
ing the islands “into the arena of the strife of nations.” It would be a shameful and selfish dis-
regard. “No true American consents to that….[I]t would have been a weak evasion of 
duty.”741 The presence of the United States in the Far East was an outcome of wartime ne-
cessity that cannot be undone. “It is not a question of keeping the islands of the East, but of 
leaving them,” he said.742 The only remaining questions concerned a triumph worth of 
America’s high moral position in going to war in the first place. “[W]hatever covenants duty 
has made for us in the year 1898 we must keep.”743 McKinley stressed that remaining faith-
ful to the war’s original, humanitarian aims, meant securing the Philippines, even at great 
cost. 
McKinley spoke of the Philippines as a moral responsibility of war rather than a 
commercial and strategic boon; his arguments were more subdued and less millenarian than 
those clerics of the Protestant-Progressive civil religion. The clearest difference between him 
and the Josiah Strongs and Alfred Beveridges of the day were that, even while he expressed 
self-assuredness about the justice of his policies, he did not pretend that his decisions were 
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other than the best among a mass of flawed options.744 As he told a Boston audience in Feb-
ruary of 1899, his decisions were approximations of judgments guided by “an honest effort” 
consistent with “conscience, justice, and honor.”745 When he spoke of providence, he did so 
in the context of fulfilling obligations to humanity amidst the unanticipated, evolving conse-
quences of war, and less as affirmative projects of global renewal. Providence, and war, had 
thrust on the United States a responsibility from which the United States could not shrink 
without undoing the moral luster of the war’s initial basis. “Have the American people ever 
been known to run away from a high moral duty?”746 Privately, McKinley intimated the 
same concerns, saying that that the “well-considered opinion of the majority” would agree 
with him that “duty requires we should take the archipelago.”747 In an October speech in 
Chicago, he said: “We cannot escape the obligations of victory…We are bound in conscience 
to keep and perform the covenants which the war has sacredly sealed with mankind. Accept-
ing war for humanity’s sake, we must accept all obligations which the war in duty and honor 
imposed upon us.”748 McKinley believed that relinquishing the Philippines was impossible 
“for the very reasons which justified the war.” It “would be to escape responsibility for our 
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own acts and that we could not do; our duty and destiny demanded that we undertake our 
own responsibilities.”749 Even after extending sovereignty over the whole archipelago and 
fighting an insurgency, McKinley would deliver speeches describing his policy as a necessary 
sacrifice to emancipate foreigners.750  
On September 19, several days after McKinley sent his instructions to the peace 
commissioner, Senator Beveridge spoke to a Republican crowd in Indiana, encapsulating 
McKinley’s concerns with a rhetorical question: “Would not the people of the Philippines 
prefer the just, human, civilizing government of this Republic to the savage, bloody rule of 
pillage and extortion from which we have rescued them?”751 Unlike commercial and geo-
strategic considerations, McKinley never regarded the question posed by Beveridge as “inci-
dental” to the nation’s duties in directing a peace consistent with its interests.  
Soon, McKinley’s intentions to maintain a Philippines policy consistent with the hu-
manitarian motives of war clashed with another moral principle he promised to uphold in 
Cuba: namely, his avowal to refrain from undemocratic annexation. Like Beveridge, he was 
led to the conclusion that the rule of liberty “applies only to those who are capable of self-
government,” and that the highly fractured and turbulent political culture in the archipelago 
did not fit that category.752 In February of 1899, McKinley asked a Boston audience: 
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Could we, after freeing the Filipinos from the domination of Spain, have left them 
without government and without power to protect life or property or to perform the 
international obligations essential to an independent state? Could we have left them 
in a state of anarchy and justified ourselves in our own consciences and before the tri-
bunal of mankind? Could we have done that in the sight of God or man? . . . We 
were obeying a higher moral obligation, which rested on us and did not require any-
one’s consent. [Great applause and cheering] We were doing our duty by them, as 
God gave us the light to see our duty.753 
McKinley was well-aware that military annexation did not comport easily with a common-
sense view of democratic imperatives. In his mind, the alternative was between an American-
made non-democratic order or a weak and hastily formed Filipino congress that would com-
promise the archipelago’s political integrity.  
While the incapacity of self-government in Philippines in 1898 had led him and his 
military commanders to recommend annexation, it had led others, including his secretary of 
state, William Day, to the conclusion that the United States must avoid committing its re-
sources there. Shortly before McKinley declared total acquisition American policy, Day 
wrote to the President: “[A]s I have always said to you, the acquisition of the great archipel-
ago with eight or nine millions of absolutely ignorant and many degraded people, with the 
capacity for supporting a population of fifty millions, seems like a very great undertaking for 
a country whose pride it is to rest its Government on the consent of the governed.”754 
McKinley himself had long cautioned against forgetting democratic procedures “in the race 
for wealth and commercial supremacy.” As McKinley said in a Philadelphia address eight 
years earlier, no gain is worth the price of a constitutional soul. “Duty must be master and 
                                               
753 McKinley, “Speech at Dinner of the Home Market Club, Boston, February 16, 1899,” 189. 




right supreme. The government of the people must be by the people, and not by a few of the 
people; it must rest upon the free consent of the governed and all of the governed.”755  
It is likely that McKinley, like most Washington officials, had overestimated the Ta-
galog gratefulness of American military presence.756 However, he did little to pretend that 
the Filipinos had welcomed American military control with open arms. Instead, he under-
scored a responsibility to the welfare of inhabitants as more important than democratic pro-
cedures or any political outcomes on the horizon.757 On December 21, he announced his 
“benevolent assimilation” policy. McKinley instructed U.S troops to win the affection of in-
habitants by assuring them, as far as possible, the full measure of individual rights of liberal 
regimes.758  
That legally dubious proclamation—which supplanted budding efforts of Filipino 
self-rule with U.S. sovereign imposition—triggered armed conflict between American and 
Filipino rebels. Throughout 1899, McKinley argued that the American military is preserving 
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the most fundamental security of the Filipinos, who would, in time, “bless the American Re-
public because it emancipated and redeemed their fatherland and set them in the pathway of 
the world’s civilization.”759 He argued that acting in Filipino interests sometimes meant 
denying them the formalities of democratic consent; democracy is rule by the opinion of the 
many and that opinion is distorted outside of the context of peace and order. Thus, anarchy 
is no time to “submit important questioning concerning liberty and government to the liber-
ated while they are engaged in shooting down their rescuers.”760 He mocked any suggestion 
that the United States needed consent to protect the “the welfare and happiness and the 
rights of the inhabitants” in the Philippines. “Did we need their consent to perform a great 
act for humanity?” This was a fulfillment of an unchosen, God-ordained duty undertaken 
“with the consent of our own consciences and with the approval of civilizations,” McKinley 
said to applause.761 The United States is acting morally as long as it keeps the interests of the 
inhabitants in focus. The inhabitants may question the United States now, but in truth, he 
said, “their good is our aim” and “their welfare is our welfare.”762 McKinley asked: “If we can 
benefit these remote peoples, who will object?”763 
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Of course, it would be the Filipinos themselves who would object—and object vio-
lently. Shortly after Spain signed over its sovereign claims over the Philippines to the United 
States, the rebels became determined to rout the United States as they had sought to rout 
Spain. By the middle of 1900, most of the U.S. Army was fighting a war in the Philippines, 
ultimately costing over 4,200 lives and $600 million, killing more Filipinos in three years 
than the Spanish government had in three and a half centuries.764 Not unreasonably, such 
outcomes have led observers to conclude that, McKinley’s words and intentions aside, “the 
Filipinos were not interested in his conception of duty, humanity, civilization. They were in-
terested in the independence of their country”—and McKinley was unwilling to give it to 
them.765  
The American counterinsurgency against Filipino freedom-fighters casts a shadow 
over McKinley’s motives. In 1890, Congressman McKinley said that “Commercial interests 
and material progress should have our constant concern and our close consideration, but hu-
man rights and constitutional privileges must not be forgotten in the race for wealth and 
commercial supremacy.”766 In 1897, President McKinley repeatedly warned against “forcible 
annexation” and “wars of conquest,” calling them a crime against justice and a betrayal of 
American democratic principles. But then, in 1898 and 1899, the President was intent on 
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waging a war of territorial control and acquisition, and to do so even in the face of stiff na-
tive resistance, and even at the cost of great blood and treasure. 
In going to war over Cuba, McKinley had listed various and wide-ranging reasons. 
As the Philippines presented new difficulties, his justifications had become increasingly mor-
alistic—even as his actions cast new doubts on America’s high purpose. Observing the disso-
nance between McKinley’s words and actions, many scholars have concluded that McKinley 
either sought to exploit the war for America’s riches, or, less harshly, that he was giving in to 
overwhelming enthusiasm of holding on to the unexpected gains of war.767 The leader of the 
Filipino insurgency said McKinley’s annexation policy was an imperialist program in hu-
manitarian décor.768 In 1911, Admiral French Ensor Chadwick summarized McKinley’s 
troubling decision to take control of the Philippines in this way: “To demand the Philippines 
was undoubtedly to alter the moral position of the United States and change its attitude 
from one of altruism to one of self-interest.”769 Schoonover puts it more forthrightly: “U.S. 
conduct in the Philippines was contrary to the rhetoric justifying it.”770  
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In a sense, there is nothing unusual about McKinley’s increasingly expansionist pol-
icy amid narrowing justifications. As historian H.W. Brands observes, “Conflation of causes 
is a chronic hazard of American (and probably democratic) war-making; in lining up support 
for belligerence, the bellicose cast their net as widely as feasible, hoping to catch anyone with 
half a mind for war.”771 But to what extent does the war against Filipinos suggest that 
McKinley’s intentions were driven by a Janus-faced policy of conquest merely sold on hu-
manitarian grounds? 
McKinley may have developed a taste for empire after the war with Spain com-
menced and perhaps especially after it concluded. He may also have shared the military’s 
concern over Japan’s rise and the commercial promise of a Pacific foothold. (Of course, if 
McKinley lived to see that the Philippines would become an unprofitable liability that only 
threatened American security, perhaps he would have acted differently.) However, as we have 
seen, while McKinley acknowledged potential benefits in Eastern acquisition, he refrained 
from elaborating on them or even mentioning them. Instead, and in contrast to the imperial-
ists of the day, he repeatedly said that the whole matter was an unfortunate obligation thrust 
on the nation from its decision to wage war with Spain. When he acknowledged the material 
benefits, he said they were “incidental” to peace terms; when he fought the war, he treated 
them as incidental (largely by being silent about them) when explaining and defending his 
policy. Indeed, his language emphasized the sacrifice entailed in the obligation of the policy. 
                                               




Meanwhile, he advocated, both privately and publicly, for a military policy that was con-
sistent with the original humanitarian objectives.772 He never departed from his justification 
of his decision to retain Spain’s former colonial possessions as a means to a decisive victory 
consistent with the war’s initial humanitarian impulse.773 Despite a vocal, important, and siz-
able minority of politicians intellectuals who had turned against McKinley due to his annexa-
tion policy, most Americans, it seems, accepted the sincerity of his reasons.774  
Further, we have little reason to think that McKinley was “pressured” into a military 
program due to overwhelming political and economic strains. In late 1898, McKinley was a 
popular president of a nation that just emerged victorious in a war.775 He could have used his 
position and his constitutional powers to conduct a foreign policy consistent with the rejec-
tion of territorial aims. He could have co-opted the vocal minority that had supported his 
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decision to go to war but became hostile to his plans for annexation. His peace commission-
ers and the American people “would no doubt have acquiesced in his decision to pull out of 
the Philippines,” says Coletta. “But he consciously chose to demand their cession.”776  
McKinley described his decisions as the consequences of great pressures—these came 
not from the public, the business community, or the imperialist wing of his party, but from 
the consciences of his self, his country, and the “tribunal of mankind.” Unwilling to, “in the 
sight of God or man,” abandon the duty he had attached to the nation in launching the war 
of 1898, he concluded that the United States must protect and rehabilitate a now-defenseless 
archipelago. Doing so, he said, was the only way for the nation to avoid contradicting “the 
same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war.”777  
Eight years after the decision to annex the Philippines, McKinley’s bitter, anti-expan-
sion enemy, Senator Hoar, reflected once again on McKinley’s conduct regarding Cuba and 
the Philippines. Despite his strong disagreement with the President at the time, Hoar said 
that McKinley had committed to a standard of righteous international conduct, and was ma-
nipulated only insofar as an individual could be manipulated by his own moral commit-
ments. “I dare say that he was influenced as any other man who was not more than human 
would have been influenced,” wrote Hoar. According to the Massachusetts Senator, McKin-
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ley was earnest both in his avowal against “forcible annexation” before the war and his justifi-
cations for it after the war. “I have no doubt whatever that in the attitude that he took later 
he was actuated by a serious and lofty purpose to do right. I think he was led from one step 
to another by what he deemed the necessity of the present occasion.”778 
                                               





Since its founding by early realists, modern IR theory has sought to supplant the 
study of subjective, moral opinions with the science of objective, amoral facts. Early realists 
exposed “the real basis of the professedly abstract principles commonly invoked in interna-
tional politics” as the relentless pursuit of fixed interests.779 Their deterministic scientific 
method was a deliberate counter-education, an assault on moral “voluntarism,” or of evalua-
tion of the “moral qualities of motives.”780 Great destruction is threatened by the belief that 
human beings can use their wisdom to reform consciousness and apply theoretical truths for 
the purpose of peace. The realist project was directed at achieving certain political, Western 
objectives by means of a scientifically sterile pretense. Its primary goal was to educate the stu-
dent of international politics that “there is little room for meaningful choice on the part of 
state decisions makers, and even less room for the choice of moral values that conflict with 
the national interest.”781  
Today, few IR theorists concede the moral purpose of their work, and fewer still 
question the political purpose of their methods. In the name of rigorous social scientific in-
quiry and conformity with systematizing methods, analysis of moral purpose in foreign pol-
icy is jettisoned prior to the start of inquiry, and the actual content of moral imperatives in 
foreign policy is left to the silo of a “normative” school concerned with “philosophical values 
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and metaphorical abstractions,” with concerns of “ought” distinguished by their irrelevance 
to what “is.”782 Insofar as morality is not ignored, IR theorists investigate questions relating 
to “how and to what degree” moral justifications conform to social and biological needs, or to 
what extent they are words “utilized as instruments of meaning-making to ‘sell’ the decision 
to go to war to the domestic audience.”783 However much it falls short of its objectives, to-
day’s IR theory nevertheless aspires to its original, idealized image: what Carr called the 
method by which morality in international politics is exposed “a succession of phenomena 
governed by mechanical laws of causation.”784 
IR theory has demonstrated the advantages and the disadvantage of its pursuit of 
causal regularities. Using his methods, the positivist theorist can stipulate non-contingent re-
lationships, unify phenomena across time and space, generate plausible causal explanations 
for broad patterns, develop connections between variables, and predict outcomes based on 
entire classes of conditions.785 However, the pursuit of generic causal inference depends on 
simplification, which means standing at a remove from the speakers under study and black-
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boxing their intentions. “Simplifications lay bare the essential elements in play and indicate 
the necessary relations of cause and interdependency,” says Waltz.786 Indeed, Waltz’s neore-
alism explicitly rejects the accuracy of its own assumptions about human nature, claiming 
that assumptions are analytical heuristics used to generate testable predictions. The system’s 
structure explains outcomes, and these outcomes “cannot be inferred from intentions and be-
haviors.”787 To focus on the aims, policies, or actions of states is to “describe” events, but 
“from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can logically be drawn.”788  
The positivist pursuit of valid generalizations and panoptic causal explanations is 
strikingly evident in explanatory accounts of the late-nineteenth century strategic shift in 
American foreign policy. Decisions and opinions during this period are treated as outcomes 
or manifestations following from, as if by syllogistic necessity, antecedent factors—whether 
economic, strategic, or cultural—that acted upon the era’s feeble political participants. Ac-
cording to these explanations, America’s expansionist shift was the realization of overwhelm-
ing domestic and international pressures relating to the increase of state capabilities, the rela-
tive expansion of executive power, the economic needs of domestic interests, or a cultural 
zeitgeist that seized the minds of the public and the elite. Accordingly, these same factors are 
used to explain that the period immediately preceding American expansion was futile and 
temporary delay of, if not preparation for, American expansion.  
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These explanations of America’s strategic shift, like IR theory more generally, pur-
port to explain by predicting outcomes according to hypothesized structural determinants. 
Yet even accepting Waltz’s distinctions about what counts as a theory with “explanatory 
power,” we are free to ask: what relevance is a causal explanation that “abstract from reality,” 
eschews investigation of intentions in favor of predicting “outcomes,” and reduces human 
conduct to “the essential elements” defined by, and is apparent to, only the trained ob-
server?789  
We need not answer this question ourselves, for the answer is implied in the very the-
ories that seek these causal explanations. After all, most of these accounts do not entirely ster-
ilize their inquiry by refraining from proper names and abstracting from the specific inten-
tions of the actors under study. In other words, even IR theories that greatly simplify and 
“depart from reality” of human motives in order to pursue abstract causal patterns cannot 
help but demonstrate that the inescapable determinants of action, such as the pursuit of “rel-
ative power” or the powerful needs of “economic interests,” had particular effects on—or 
were particular manifestations of—particular, important people on the scene. The point here 
is not that these IR theories contradict themselves when they speak of intentions or purposes; 
they do not. Rather, the point is that these theories implicitly concede the limited relevance 
of any causal theory that does not also say something—however cursorily or inadequately—
about who the actors were, what they believed, and what they intended to achieve with their 
                                               




foreign policies. They are theories that seek to explain the causes of outcomes while conced-
ing in their practice the limited relevance of explaining reality as what Carr called “a succes-
sion of phenomena governed by mechanical laws of causation.”790  
However incidental, the tendency to explain foreign policy not merely as outcome but 
also as purposeful action that no social scientist who is committed to causal inquiry that ab-
stracts from human intentions and human freedom truly accepts the relevance of his theory. 
However wedded to his model, the social scientist is ultimately dealing with behavior and 
speech that is meaningful and purposeful, reflecting the specific priorities and intentions of 
an expressive agent.791 Indeed, the scientist cannot explain his own purpose of inquiry as an 
effect of a mechanical process. As Carr himself observed, generic causal theorization is, on its 
own, irrelevant, and the IR theorist pursuing an “underlying reality” of mechanistic causa-
tion “is ultimately compelled to believe not only that there is something which man ought to 
think and do, but that there is something which he can think and do, and that his thought 
and action are neither mechanical nor meaningless.”792 
Carr’s insight points to the inherent limits of the nomological characteristic of IR 
scholarship, and specifically the limits of theorization of foreign policy that treats a “cause” as 
merely “an effect, result, or consequence.” What is lost in such inquiry is the other dictionary 
definition of “cause”: “a basis for an action or response; a reason”—or “a goal or principle 
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served with dedication and zeal.”793 Due in part to its commitment to generic explanations 
as defined by its pursuit of “cause” in the first sense, modern IR theory has proven ill-
equipped to understanding it in the latter sense. Insofar as apodeictic “microfoundations” 
make possible pursuit of causal patterns through scientific detachment from their subjects’ 
speech, they also limit sympathetic inquiry into that speech’s moral content, or as an elucida-
tion of purpose. Such content deserves careful analysis in its own terms by stepping into the 
world of the statesman and seeing the situation from his perspective. For if this content is 
not a wholly deceptive instrument of fixed ends or a false construct of context, it may include 
a moral principle to which the statesman is dedicated, and the “basis for an action” toward 
that goal or principle. The reason and purpose may then be the, or a, cause of action. In that 
case, assuming that this moral content is deceptive or false is to distort the subject matter, or 
to “sacrifice political relevance on the altar of methodology.”794 
Understanding foreign policy from a perspective of intentions reveals that it is not 
necessary, and perhaps not usually possible, to distinguish between a rhetoric of persuasion 
and a rhetoric of explanation.795 The president may indeed have a need or incentive to “sell” 
his policy in order to advance his agenda. He may also be persuading himself by “framing” 
his actions in a way consistent with his specific cultural zeitgeist or historical milieu. How-
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ever, if the president himself does not present his moral arguments as merely a form of ma-
nipulation or a historically conditioned flash in the pan, then it is necessary to at least enter-
tain the possibility that the president may be offering a genuine reason for his action. To “re-
think the thoughts” of the president entails, at least at the outset, to accept that his rationali-
zation is what he presents it as—that is, as the impetus for his action.796  
The relevance of cause understood as reason and purpose in American foreign policy 
becomes fully evident only by interrogating charitably the specific moral arguments that are 
attached their decisions. This approach assumes that presidents have a capacity to articulate 
political and moral responsibilities in foreign affairs. But it does not mean that it necessary to 
treat statesmen as scholars of international theory. Neither Cleveland nor McKinley spent his 
evenings studying Vattel or holding seminars on Grotius. In his private correspondence and 
public messages about foreign policy, neither president appealed to Wolff or Pufendorf. That 
was perfectly ordinary. No less ordinary, however, was their thoughtful moral discernment in 
formulating foreign policy in ways that do not conform to narrow conceptions of the na-
tional interests. Few statesmen moonlight as moral theorists. But however removed from aca-
demic debates, no statesman understands his job as that of a switchman chained to a railroad 
track on which the trains of interests are running.797 As Michael Walzer explains, “We don’t 
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have to translate moral talk into interest talk in order to understand it; morality refers in its 
own way to the real world.”798  
Reviewing our cases, we have no reason to believe that Cleveland or McKinley would 
agree with the IR scholar who asserts that “interests have chronological precedence over 
norms in the shaping of national behavior.”799  
In fact, Cleveland explicitly and repeatedly distinguished between slavish submission 
to “material interests” and honorable conduct according to the nation’s “higher obligations” 
to itself and the world.800 Such was the case in Hawaii, where the United States had acted ac-
cording to the “the odious doctrine” that the strong nation may take advantage of the weaker 
nation simply by material desire and disapprobation of another sovereign’s institutions. 
Cleveland attempted to reverse the damage, insofar as was possible, by throwing light on the 
sin and exhorting the nation to live up to its fair name. He argued that a national pursuit of 
profit and power incommensurate with “international morality” was a degradation of the na-
tion—“not merely…a wrong but…a disgrace”—because it represented conduct beneath the 
good character of the nation.801 He conceded that even agreed-upon international rules that 
serve the interests of all nations are flouted due to myopic opportunism. Yet he denied that 
this fact liberated America’s obligation to them. On the contrary, he said that it is precisely 
because international rules leave obedience up to the conscience of nations that they present 
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an opportunity to a great power to demonstrate its exceptional self-possession, fair dealings, 
and commitment “to do justice in all things without regard to the strength or weakness of 
those with whom it deals.”802 
In Venezuela, Cleveland saw the same principle of international morality threat-
ened—this time, by Great Britain’s unwillingness to address a weak defendant’s incriminat-
ing charge of wrongdoing. He and Olney argued that only the United States enjoyed the ca-
pability to confront the prospect of incorrigible depravity in the hemisphere and avert a set-
tlement based on the raw dynamics of power. Inaction would have amounted to an irrespon-
sible discrediting of America’s public commitment to its security. More importantly, inac-
tion to a public scandal by the only hemispheric power capable of taking action would have 
amounted to “supine submission to wrong and injustice” because it would have discredited 
the very international legal order that grounded every nation’s sovereign rights.803 Both dur-
ing and after the controversy, Cleveland’s policy was attacked for introducing unnecessary 
risks and costs to domestic profit and national security; others, meanwhile sought to justify it 
as a symbolic form of hemispheric superiority. Cleveland did not dispute the risks and costs 
of his policy—in fact, he rebuked those who complained in those terms—and he fought ef-
forts that sought to exploit his arbitration policy as a declamation of the nation’s authority 
over the hemisphere.  
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In the case of Cuba, a commitment to an international legal order meant that the 
United States must pursue its peace-seeking objectives by giving “careful heed to every con-
sideration involving our honor and interest or the international duty we owe to Spain.”804 In 
contrast to his policies towards Venezuela and Hawaii, Cleveland’s Cuba policy did not ap-
pear to take up the cause of the small power or hold the larger power to account because, as 
he explained, this was an international quarrel, not a dispute between international parties. 
The Cubans were not a small power or any power—they were, rather, an administrative 
patchwork without the means of accepting the burdens and rights of sovereign rule. Short of 
Spain’s direct threat to the American homeland, her abdication of legal responsibilities to 
America’s legal suits and grievances, or her willful and permanent abandonment of her Cu-
ban territory, her presumed legitimacy prohibits any American interference with what he 
viewed as a legally internal quarrel. In late 1895, Theodore Roosevelt was speaking for many 
of Cleveland’s critics when he told Olney he wished the administration “would take the same 
line as regards Cuba” as it had with Venezuela.805 Of course, from Cleveland’s perspective, 
he was taking the same line with Cuba. As ever, his foreign policy was a public demonstra-
tion of the nation’s commitment to a legal order of sovereign nations. In contrast to the Ven-
ezuela controversy, the threat to this order came not from Great Britain but from powerful, 
well-meaning yet ultimately criminal temptations within his own country. Accordingly, he 
left office proud of his legacy of refusing to yield to humanitarian impulses and his success in 
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containing them, in large part through his administration’s highly effective federal apparatus 
designed to enforce his government’s policy of neutrality.  
Cleveland justified his decisions regarding Hawaii, Venezuela, and Cuba in terms 
consistent with the communitarian understanding of international justice. Informing his ar-
guments was the idea that nations are equally bound to a uniform law of nations, just as in-
dividuals in a domestic society are bound to a uniform rule of law. As he said in 1902, “I 
don’t believe that nations, any more than individuals, can safely violate the rules of honesty 
and fair dealing.”806 Cleveland regarded “international morality” as the highest authority of a 
nation’s conscience and the ultimate source of proscriptions against self-serving conquest and 
the unscrupulous pursuit of interest.807 It is a fact of nature that “a strong power may with 
impunity despoil a weak one of its territory.”808 Yet that fact only adds gravity to the im-
portance of demonstrating moral continence when ill-begotten temptations test self-posses-
sion, and the dutiful behavior according to “a high standard of honor and morality.”809 
Like his predecessor, McKinley explicitly distinguished between an unadulterated 
pursuit of national power or profit and the pursuit of national objectives on terms delimited 
by the obligations of international justice. However, McKinley did not share Cleveland’s un-
derstanding of international justice. In his early diplomacy with Madrid, he stressed a far 
more limited conception of sovereign rights. McKinley, like Cleveland, did not want war but 
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pronounced his country’s right to take action at the moment when its security is threatened. 
Unlike Cleveland, he did not view Spain’s fulfillment of her legal obligations as justification 
for what he derided as “a policy of mere inaction.”810 Whereas Cleveland expressed a willing-
ness (if not an eagerness) for Spain to extinguish its internal problems brutally, McKinley an-
nounced his unwillingness to countenance Spain’s unlimited military policy, even if it prom-
ised pacification. He averred that Spain’s war was now to be “conducted according to the 
military codes of civilization.”811 In effect, McKinley reversed Cleveland’s declaration that 
humanitarian duties are circumscribed by the “international duty we owe to Spain.” Having 
connected the nation’s self-respect with the basic welfare of Cubans, he effectively abrogated 
Spain’s sovereign jurisdiction, measuring the success of his diplomacy according to the im-
provement of local conditions. In words not lost on Madrid, he conveyed that failure to im-
prove conditions on the island would trigger “a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, 
to civilization and humanity to intervene with force.”812 Significantly, McKinley articulated 
his duty to prevent what he viewed as a contemptible peace before, during, and after, the cat-
aclysmic episodes of 1898 that are thought to have, directly or indirectly, “forced” him into 
war.813 Indeed, McKinley doggedly pursued his humanitarian objectives diplomatically amid 
the public clamor, and would later boast that the United States never lost command of its 
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scruples, taking action against Spain on its own terms—that is, on his administration’s well-
considered, noble objectives to finally address “the piteous appeals of the starving and op-
pressed inhabitants of Cuba.”814  
McKinley could not say quite the same regarding the Philippines, for his annexation 
policy was only considered until after the war started. Following the onset of hostilities, 
McKinley found himself constrained by the military’s war strategy—a strategy he had dele-
gated but whose details and implications he had failed to devote his responsible attention. 
However, the annexation of the Philippines was never a fait accompli. Following the Navy’s 
defeat of Manila’s Spanish squadron, McKinley studied, but ultimately rejected, alternatives 
to annexation. If we listen to McKinley, we learn that his intentions do not comport with ac-
counts that portray his decision as a manifestation of the nation’s incorrigible pursuit of 
power and profit. In fact, McKinley never regarded the strategic and economic advantages of 
military occupation as anything but “incidental” to the supreme “moral duty” of protecting 
“the welfare and happiness and the rights of the inhabitants” in the Philippines.815 After 
committing to war with Spain, he said he became determined to proceed in the only way 
that corresponds to the war’s raison d’être. However noble the war’s initial aims, it had bro-
ken the only defenses of a brittle archipelago. To relinquish the Philippines to chaos or leave 
them in “the arena of the strife of nations” would have discredited the nation’s initial aims 
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and constituted “a weak evasion of duty.”816 McKinley’s obstinacy in the face of dissent no 
less well-reasoned may have been foolish. But his obstinacy was also high-minded; he viewed 
his determination to proceed according to “the same high rule of conduct which guided [the 
United States] in facing war” as an obligation whose increasingly apparent costs only added 
to its nobility.817 “Accepting war for humanity’s sake, we must accept all obligations which 
the war in duty and honor imposed upon us,” he said.818 As he explained, “The peace we 
have won is not a selfish truce of arms, but one whose conditions presage good to human-
ity.”819 At the same time, McKinley presented the nation’s significant contributions to hu-
manity as redounding to the benefit of the United States in attaining the “most wholesome 
respect and admiration for this country.” The war, he believed, “had placed the United 
States in a new light.”820 As he put it in a characteristic speech, “Forever in the right, follow-
ing the best impulses and clinging to high purposes, using properly and within right limits 
our power and opportunities, honorable reward must inevitably follow.” This “honorable re-
ward,” made possible by the nation’s “high purpose and unselfish sacrifices for struggling 
peoples” would establish the United States as a “world power” worthy of her position—“a 
symbol,” now on two hemispheres, “of liberty and law, of peace and progress.”821 
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